Russia’s Space Industry Struggles to Compete With US Commercial Space Strategy

Executive Summary:

• Moscow now likely considers US commercial space assets as part of Washington’s military infrastructure following the Department of Defense’s issuance of the 2024 Commercial Space Integration Strategy.
• Russia’s military capabilities in space are highly asymmetric compared to US methods, and the Russian military is unlikely to achieve significant advantages in space surveillance.
• The Kremlin, despite sanctions, will continue to try to access the commercial space services provided by the United States, Europe, and China using third-party entities in other countries.

On April 11, Russia conducted the fourth test launch of its new heavy-class Angara-A5 expendable launch vehicle. The new system has been in development for almost 30 years and aims to replace the Soviet-era Proton rockets. Simultaneously, the new Resurs-P No. 4 optical imaging satellite delivered its first photos of Dallas, Texas. This satellite, however, is set aside for civilian purposes, officially focused on economic and ecological matters and operated by Roscosmos, not the Russian military (Ixbt.com, April 5; Interfax, April 11). By contrast, the US Department of Defense (DoD) captured Moscow’s attention by issuing the 2024 Commercial Space Integration Strategy on April 2. The Russian media and expert community are focused on the following points of the strategy: the DoD wants to rely on technological innovations developed by the private sector and aims to gain permanent access to well-developed commercial space solutions/services before and during any conflict. Russia’s decision to employ asymmetric measures to counter US superiority in outer space is inevitable largely due to the DoD’s recent actions and the Russian economy flailing under sanctions (Defense.gov; TASS, April 2; Dfnc.ru, April 3).

Russia will likely consider US commercial space assets as part of Washington’s military infrastructure. This view slightly differs from Moscow’s recent approach, in which private US satellite constellations only become potential targets when they provide communication and optical observation services for the Ukrainian military and are suspected as possible cover for US military activity in orbit. Consequently, US commercial satellites are transforming from potential targets to a real threat to the Russian military leadership (RIA Novosti, February 16, 2023; Voennaya Mysl’, July 2023; RIA Novosti, October 16, 2023).

Moscow now faces the issue that its military capabilities in space are highly asymmetric compared to Washington’s and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) methods. For example, the planned production rate of Angara-A5s is up to eight rockets a year, and the Russian Ministry of Defense plans to be their primary customer. Considering that the capacity of Angara-A5 is comparable to the capacity of SpaceX’s Falcon-9 launch vehicle but costs at least 1.5 times more, the new Russian rocket hardly has sustainable commercial prospects in the global market. This will inevitably make the Angara-A5 an even more costly launch vehicle for Russia. As a result, the Russian military in space will rely on the limited amount of increasingly more expensive heavy-launch vehicles, several light-class Angara-1.2 launch vehicles a year, and old-fashioned, Soviet-era medium-class Soyuz rockets. This is far from the tens of US heavy rockets made by SpaceX and the United Launch Alliance, not to mention dozens of other types of launch vehicles that are or will be available in the coming years (RIA Novosti, December 24, 2020; Kommersant; Interfax, April 9).

Paltry production is another example demonstrating how Russian space strategy lags behind the United States. On average, Russia produces just 15 satellites annually. This number hypothetically may increase to 40 satellites a year. However, to fill the gap in space capabilities, both military and civilian, Russia officially needs 250 satellites a year (RIA Novosti, February 10). Even the current development of the Resurs-P satellite means that Russia is still trying to restore its optical-imaging capabilities to that of the previous decade when three Resurs-P satellites worked in orbit simultaneously. These three satellites, however, have been out of operation for years. Suppose Russia can deploy another Resurs-P satellite in orbit later this year and develop a new Resurs-PM satellite in 2025–26. In that case, civilian and military customers could share the restored optical-imaging capabilities. Still, they will never give the Russian military a significant advantage in space surveillance, and the asymmetry with Western capabilities will remain.

Russia has inevitably chosen an asymmetric approach to countering US space capabilities. Moscow, at times, has focused on developing a potential space-based, nuclear-powered electronic warfare system, which would be rather sophisticated, and threatened the use nuclear weapons in orbit. The Kremlin, however, has other possible options in countering US supremacy in space. For instance, Russia may try to blind US commercial optical-imaging satellites from ground-based space observation stations. Additionally, Moscow may conduct attacks or cyberattacks against the ground-based space infrastructure of commercial space companies and their manufacturing facilities. The Kremling will likely continue to try to access the commercial space services provided by the United States, Europe, and China companies using third-party entities in other countries to circumvent sanctions.