Sanctions Deepen Kremlin Influence in Belarus and Strengthen Lukashenka Regime

Executive Summary:

• Western punitive sanctions against Belarus since 2020 may have done more to strengthen authoritarianism in Belarus and reinforce the country’s economic, political, informational, and military cooperation with Russia.
• Sanctions have negatively impacted the lives of ordinary citizens, making it harder to obtain visas, cross borders, and use banking services. All this has contributed to a rise in pro-Russian sentiments among the population.
• An alternative to the sanctions policy could be the concept of offering a deal to achieve specific goals and initiating criminal cases against representatives of the Lukashenka regime.

On August 5, the European Union imposed restrictive measures on an additional 28 individuals for their “role in the ongoing internal repression and human rights violations in Belarus.” These individuals include various members of Belarus’s judiciary who have issued “politically motivated sentences … against citizens who protested the fraudulent presidential elections of 2020, or who simply voiced their opinions against the [Alyaksandr] Lukashenka regime” (Council of the European Union, August 5). Since 2020, the United States, the European Union, and a number of countries have imposed multiple sanctions packages against Belarus in response to the actions of the Lukashenka regime, such as its cooperation with Russia during its war of aggression against Ukraine (see EDM, August 9, 2023). Many of these sanctions aim to end mass repressions, limit Belarus’s participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine, and create internal pressure to change Minsk’s political course. Western sanctions, however, have not achieved their intended goals and have led to deeper economic, political, military, and informational cooperation between Belarus and Russia. These sanctions seemingly affected the Belarusian people much more than official Minsk, potentially alienating the population from the West. The punitive effects of the sanctions have driven Belarus closer toward Russia. If the West hopes to pull Belarus closer and away from Russia, alternative methods may need to be considered.

Personal sanctions against high-ranking officials and businessmen have consolidated the Belarusian political elite around the ruling group, benefiting the West by limiting officials’ ability to travel abroad. The Kremlin, not interested in the independence of Minsk’s foreign policy, compensates for Belarus’s sanctions losses by providing loans and placing orders with Belarusian enterprises. In 2023, Belarus’s total export of goods exceeded $40 billion, with about 62.5 percent going to Russia, a record (Belstat, accessed August 7). A supply channel of sanctioned goods to the Russian market has been established through Belarus, where goods can officially be passed on to third-party countries. Blocking access to Western technologies has led Belarusian enterprises to switch to Russian software (TASS, July 12). Sanctions on flights through Belarusian territory and the closure of airspace by neighboring countries have seriously undermined the stability of the national airline Belavia, further increasing dependence on Russia (Vedomosti, December 3, 2021).

The Western sanctions have affected citizens’ interests, causing problems with obtaining visas, crossing borders, and using banking services. This has contributed to the growth of pro-Russian sentiments among the population, as some see Moscow as a more reliable ally than the West (DW, June 30, 2023). The latest EU sanctions package in June was particularly painful for the population in limiting trade and transit between EU and Belarusian territory. The aim of this package is to provide “an effective strategy in combating circumvention [of sanctions] while ensuring that the measures are proportionate to the level of Belarus’s involvement in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine” (Council of the EU, June 29). The new restrictions include a ban on exporting more than 400 categories of goods from the European Union and the entry of vehicles with Belarusian registration, further disrupting the lives of regular Belarusian citizens (Zerkalo, July 10).

Since February 2022, state propaganda in Russia and Belarus has intensified, portraying the West as a hostile force and justifying the war against Ukraine. Unlike Russian state channels, Belarusian state television channels have not been blocked on YouTube, leading to a sharp increase in their viewership due to massive advertising and an influx of Russian viewers (Social Blade, accessed August 7). YouTube’s advertising restrictions in Belarus and Russia hit state-supported bloggers hard, drastically reducing their income. Meanwhile, official state media strengthened propaganda narratives and took a dominant position in Belarus’s media market, including narratives about Western sanctions (Euractiv, March 2, 2022; EU Neighbors East, August 18, 2023; The Moscow Times, August 1; Realnoe Vremya, August 5).

Western powers have yet to initiate criminal cases against Lukashenka and his entourage within the European Union and the International Criminal Court, though such an approach could produce results. Continuing the current sanctions policy will strengthen the Kremlin’s influence in Belarus and have destructive consequences for Belarusian statehood. This approach may lead to a new “Iron Curtain” in Europe and further alienate the Belarusian people from the West, whom they will blame for their problems.

An alternative to the sanctions policy could be the temporary complete blockade of transit to Europe through Belarus. This measure would not be permanent but could prove to be extremely difficult for the Lukashenka regime and achieve quick results, as Belarus acts as a major route between Europe and the East. An effective example has been Polish actions, such as the blockade of major transit routes, that have reduced migration attacks on the border and initiated the release of political prisoners in Belarus (RMF24, July 8). History shows that the release of political prisoners in Belarus over the past 20 years has largely come from international pressure that improves Belarusian officials’ image as benevolent and eases Western pressure, such as the release of numerous Belarusian political prisoners this past July (see EDM,  June 4, July 11; European Union External Action, July 4).

Often, those responsible for imposing sanctions on Belarus often lack sufficient understanding of the realities on the ground, leading to ineffective measures that have yet to achieve the goals of the West’s sanctions policy. Rather, the current sanctions policy has been counterproductive and requires a reassessment of approaches to avoid harming ordinary citizens in Belarus. This could include simplifying visa policies for Belarusian citizens and lifting restrictions based on nationality. Another priority could be supporting media and bloggers who play a crucial role in informing the population. This would help balance the state media’s propaganda narratives and provide citizens with alternative information sources.

Developing more purposeful actions toward Lukashenka’s Belarus requires an understanding of its internal and external realities. Currently, many of the Western sanctions against Belarus seem to have hurt the general population more than the targeted political elite, reinforcing a distrust of the West. Such sanctions may be more effective if they were targeted specifically toward the regime rather than the Belarusian people. More effective actions might call for a trade of something valuable to the regime, such as more political prisoners or refusal to cooperate with the Kremlin, that would affect Belarusian elites. This approach would likely be more effective in cleaving Belarus from Russia, separating the Belarusian people from the Lukashenka regime, and preventing further alienation of the Belarusian people from the West.