Taiwan’s Lai Risks DPP Factional Infighting in Bid for Control

Executive Summary:

• Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te has jettisoned a Tsai Ing-wen era formula designed to keep peace between factions within the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and has actively advanced his own New Tide faction.
• Lai’s more control-oriented approach has given the president increased leverage over the executive branch, the party’s minority legislative caucus, and the DPP.
• Pushback from factions has already occurred and will likely increase as by-elections and primaries for next year’s local elections start to take place through the rest of the year, while simultaneously providing opposition parties with ammunition to campaign on.
• It is too soon to determine if Lai’s strategy of consolidating and streamlining of control and decision making will increase successful outcomes, or if he has sown the seeds of intensifying internal party division.

The inauguration on May 20, 2024 of President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) has heralded a return of public factional infighting within Taiwan’s Democratic People’s Party (DPP). Lai, who leads the New Tide faction (新潮流系統, usually abbreviated to 新系), has sought to overtly control internal factional politics. Upon election, he staffed the Executive Yuan with New Tide members and other allies, upsetting the careful balance that his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) had maintained. This contributed to a groundswell of dissatisfaction among various internal party groups that played out in the weeks surrounding the party’s National Congress in July last year.

Factional politics have remained central to political developments in 2025. In ongoing recall campaigns against district legislators from the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)—a strategic move on a scale unprecedented in any democratic state—the process of nominating by-election candidates will involve fierce competition between rival factions. [1] Competition is also already underway ahead of the 2026 local elections, primaries for which could take place as early as this fall. A committee that includes key figures from various factions is currently determining the rules for selecting candidates (RW News, May 26). [2]

Discussion of DPP factions has been largely absent from English-language reporting for more than a decade. As these latest developments show, however, factional dynamics are crucial to understanding Taiwan’s politics today.

A Short History of DPP Factions: A Formal Ban Before Balance Under Tsai

In 1986, a group of pro-democracy and anti-martial law activists gathered in Taipei and declared the founding of the DPP. Martial law was still in force and new political parties were banned. To the surprise of many, then-President Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) did not crack down. The following year, he lifted martial law on Taiwan proper, though authoritarian repression continued into the early 1990s.

The founders of the DPP were united in their opposition to the KMT’s one-party state, but beyond that binding glue they were a disparate group with a range of ideological viewpoints and ambitions. Factions formed to maximize interest groups’ impact on the party’s agenda. Their fortunes varied: some ceased to exist, some were absorbed into other factions, and some reformed under new names. The sole exception was New Tide, the only original faction that remains intact today.

Throughout the 1990s, the factions increasingly focused their energies on promoting their influence and interests and building patronage within the party. This escalated following the democratic election of the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) to the presidency as factions jostled for power within his administration. Intense factional infighting became the norm and soap opera–style intrigue at the top of government frequently played out in the press. This embarrassed the DPP and provided ammunition for opposition parties to portray them in a negative, chaotic light.

The DPP formally banned factions in 2006, but they did not disappear. Instead, they simply became more opaque. New Tide, the biggest and most organized of the factions, could no longer operate a headquarters openly and stopped issuing membership cards. Meetings began to be held more secretively, such that members in one area might not be aware of those in other areas who were also members. The ban had no effect on limiting the factions’ influence on politics, however. New Tide continued to expand, and was the most proactive in recruiting beyond political circles, actively moving into business and academia.

Following a landslide electoral defeat in 2008, the DPP was in disarray. The relatively unknown technocrat Tsai Ing-wen ran for party chair and won—the first for a woman in the DPP. She had no factional affiliations and had only officially been a party member for four years. A former academic, Tsai was tapped to serve as a trade negotiator for the KMT administration of Lee Tung-hui (李登輝) before serving in the Chen administration as head of the Mainland Affairs Council, where she oversaw relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

As party chair and especially as president, Tsai implemented a formula for appointing key party and government positions that reflected factional interests. Members of New Tide—the largest and most powerful faction—were appointed to 30–40 percent of positions. (Their business connections also assured them high representation in running SOEs.) The Taiwan Normal Country Promotion Association (TNCPA; 正常國家促進會, usually abbreviated to 正國會), another powerful faction, received 20 percent of positions, and other factions were apportioned roughly 10 percent each (China Brief, March 3, 2023). This reduced incentives for factions to engage in public conflict, as drawing press attention would harm their position in negotiations with Tsai. While factional infighting did continue at the local level, it did little harm to the image of the party nationally. Tsai’s formula allowed the DPP to present itself as more united and disciplined. The local Chinese-language press continued to write about factions, but the lack of high drama meant fewer big headlines. In English-language news coverage, factions all but disappeared.

Factional Infighting Returns Under Lai

President Lai prefers to be overtly in control of factional politics. This distinguishes him from Tsai, who positioned herself as the essential node in a more consensus-driven model of internal governance. In January 2023, Lai ran unopposed to become DPP party chair. The following April, the party nominated him as its presidential candidate. His ascendance broke old alliances; and factions split into two camps, a “trust in Lai” (信賴) coalition, comprising New Tide, TNCPA, and “Vital Spring of Democracy” in one camp, and another comprising everyone else. (For more on these and other factions, see below.) Upon his inauguration in February 2024, Lai had the executive branch firmly under control and a strong hold over the DPP’s (minority) legislative caucus.

Lai’s Executive Yuan cabinet and other top officials in the Office of the President are weighted heavily toward figures from his own New Tide faction and other close allies. The latter group consists of people he worked well with during his years as Tainan mayor and as head of the cabinet, and could be referred to as Lai’s clique (China Brief, March 3, 2023). Political opponents refer to them instead as Lai’s “Tainan gang” (台南幫).

At the time of Lai’s election, analysis by this author found that of 42 key positions, 11 were widely recognized publicly as New Tide figures, while a further 11 were of Lai’s clique and may or may not be formal members of New Tide (Taipei Times, June 22, 2024). Of the remaining 20, half were non-factional technocrats, and half affiliated with other DPP factions. New Tide figures also featured prominently on the list of leaders running state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is not unusual for incoming leaders to appoint people they know they can work with or those from their wing of the party, but the makeup of Lai’s incoming administration provoked alarm both within the DPP and among the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).

Within weeks, and in the run-up to the party’s National Congress, DPP factional infighting on a scale not seen in well over a decade broke out. Lai’s New Tide and allied factions were at loggerheads with non-allied factions and breakaway rebels. The opposition parties have long held strong suspicions about the power and influence of DPP factions, especially New Tide. President Lai’s open promotion of New Tide members provided opportunities for these opponents to raise these concerns anew to their respective core support bases.

The next battle, which took place in July 2024 at the party’s National Congress, was over control of the DPP’s powerful 10-member Central Standing Committee (CSC), the 30-member Central Executive Committee (CEC), and the 11-member Central Supervision Committee. As part of the “trust in Lai” coalition, the TNCPA agreed to only run two candidates for the CSC, down from the three they held previously. They opted to pick their north and central Taiwan leaders to run, cutting out Tainan lawmaker Fifi Chen (陳亭妃), the top leader in the south. Chen had grievances against Lai from his time as Tainan mayor. (Lai allegedly had backed Huang Wei-che over her in the DPP primary for the 2018 mayoral race.) Overriding the factional agreement, Chen declared she would run for a CSC seat to ensure that the next Tainan mayoral primary would be fair. She was expelled from the TNCPA, along with some of her supporters, but went on to win the CSC seat with the highest vote count of any candidate. Although the “trust in Lai” coalition won six of the ten CSC seats, her election helped deny New Tide a majority. TNCPA now only have one CSC seat, and are only a mid-range faction among party representatives. Following the congress, Lai has instituted regular “lunchbox” (便當會) meetings with top factional leaders. These likely ensure Lai hears the concerns of various factions, which might help inform overall party strategy

Factions and Figures Today: Seven Groups and their Key Members

Today, many individuals are known to be members of a particular faction (sometimes this is publicly acknowledged, especially for the top leadership). Many others are widely assumed to be members of—or seen as “friendly” to—a specific faction. Others still have no known factional affiliations. Some publicly tout their lack of factional affiliations as a badge of neutrality. Assumptions about an individual’s alignment are usually fairly accurate; however, this is not always the case. For example, Lai’s successor as Tainan mayor, Huang Wei-che (黃偉哲), was publicly close to Lai and New Tide figures. To his frustration, he was regularly labelled as New Tide as a result. He eventually held a press conference to deny any factional membership.

New Tide remains the biggest, most powerful faction. Three main subfactions have formed around key figures. Lai’s subfaction is currently dominant. Another has formed around former Kaohsiung mayor and current Control Yuan President Chen Chu (陳菊), though in her role at the Control Yuan she has formally stepped back from internal DPP politics. A third, smaller subfaction has formed around former Taoyuan Mayor Cheng Wen-tsan (鄭文燦), but his current incarceration on alleged corruption charges has thrown its future into question. Other key figures in New Tide include Secretary-General to the President Pan Meng-an (潘孟安) and former DPP legislative deputy speaker Tsai Chi-chang (蔡其昌).

The leader and top figure in the TNCPA is Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍). DPP Secretary-General Lin Yu-chang (林右昌) is also a key player.

The Taiwan Forward faction (湧言會) is widely known as the “Ocean Faction” (海派). [3] Some members are frequently cited in international press. These include, on defense and regional security issues, Lawmaker Alex Wang Ting-yu (王定宇), who has contributed to this publication (China Brief, February 16, 2024). Another is Lawmaker Huang Jie (黃捷), who was selected for the TIME100 Next 2024 List due to her status as the youngest Taiwanese legislator and her advocacy for underrepresented groups and human rights (Time Magazine, October 2, 2024).

The Su Faction (蘇系) is named for Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌), a former premier in both the Chen and Tsai administrations. Former foreign minister and current Secretary-General of the National Security Council Jaushieh Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) is a prominent member. He is well-known internationally and is another former contributor to this publication (China Brief, November 24, 2008). Domestically, Su’s daughter and current lawmaker Su Chiao-hui (蘇巧慧) is considered a possible DPP candidate for mayor of Taiwan’s largest city, New Taipei.

The Ing Faction (英系) is named after Tsai Ing-wen, though she has publicly distanced herself from it. Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴), Minister of the Ocean Affairs Council Kuan Bi-ling (管碧玲), and Minister of Health and Welfare Chiu Tai-yuan (邱泰源) are widely associated with this Faction, while former premier and Vice President Chen Chien-jen (陳建仁) is widely speculated to be in or close to the faction.

The Green Fellowship Association (綠色友誼連線, sometimes written as 綠色友誼系統) is often referred to as the Sunny Bank Gang (陽信幫). It is one of the older factions in the party and is increasingly active at the local level.

The newest faction lacks an official English name, but may be rendered as “Vital Spring of Democracy” (民主活水連線). This group is pro-Lai but is significantly less established than New Tide. Its top figure is Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰), the current premier.

Conclusion

President Lai has actively advanced people in his powerful New Tide faction within the DPP and people associated with him. This follows roughly 15 years of relative factional peace under a balanced power-sharing formula introduced by former party chair and president Tsai Ing-wen. Factional infighting made a significant impact on the DPP’s internal party congress in July 2024. If current recall campaigns against legislators prove successful, it likely will feature in the selection of by-election candidates too. Factions are already in fierce competition in some areas of Taiwan ahead of next year’s local elections, notably in the cities of Tainan, New Taipei, and Kaohsiung. These rivalries will likely intensify ahead of party primaries, which may be held this fall.

Notes

[1] Civil society groups launched recall campaigns against KMT district legislators starting in February. The deadlines for second-stage recall voter signups for the anti-KMT groups are currently coming due. Roughly 30 will proceed to the third stage, which is the public recall vote. The KMT and their supporters have responded by launching their own recalls against DPP lawmakers, though only 15 of their campaigns reached the second stage. Having started later, the results for the anti-DPP campaigns will not become clear until around mid-June. Currently, the DPP is united behind the recall efforts.

[2] Under the Republic of China (ROC) constitution, Taiwan is designated as a province. This elevates the 22 local heads of county and special municipality governments to a political role similar in stature to state or provincial governors in other countries. National-level factions have local chapters with their own histories, cultures, and makeup. These two levels converge in the selection of these local government heads, and local leaders often move on to national positions in the cabinet or the presidency.

[3] The “Ocean Faction” moniker comes from the third character in the name of Lin Kun-hai (林崑海). A former chair of pan-green news outlet SET TV, Lin more or less reconvened the former Frank Hsieh faction after the latter left the political scene. Lin has since passed away.