The BLA Becomes South Asia’s Most Effective Insurgent Group

• The BLA has become South Asia’s most capable active insurgent group, with growing manpower, sophisticated attacks, and strong social legitimacy among alienated Baloch youth.
• Pakistan’s security-first approach and new counterterrorism laws are fueling—not containing—the insurgency, pushing more Baloch toward militancy and entrenching anti-state resentment.
• The BLA’s attacks on Chinese projects under the CPEC have turned the Baloch insurgency into a geopolitical flashpoint, directly affecting U.S.–Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation and the PRC’s regional ambitions.

On August 11, the U.S. Department of State officially placed the Baloch Liberation Army (Balochi: بلۏچستان آجوییء لشکر, BLA) and its suicide unit, the Majeed Brigade, on its Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list (Dawn, August 11). The designation came against the backdrop of the Jaffar Express train hijacking in March 2025, which made the BLA the second insurgent group in South Asia’s history, after Indian Maoists in 2009, to have hijacked a train (Express Tribune, March 12).

The FTO raises attention to the BLA receiving attention for its increasing influence in the region it operates. BLA has been on the U.S. list of Specially Designated Terrorists since 2019. While the FTO designation of the BLA signifies potential growth for U.S.–Pakistan cooperation in counterterrorism, it also brings into focus to the BLA’s rise as one of South Asia’s most formidable insurgent groups (The Diplomat, April 17; Express Tribune, August 13). In recent years, the BLA has carried out several high-profile attacks—even briefly occupying remote towns in Balochistan to challenge the state’s control in the province (Terrorism Monitor, July 30). The FTO ban will create legal and financial challenges for the BLA, but will likely do little to impede the group’s momentum. On the contrary, such a move may even add to its legitimacy within its core constituency.

The BLA’s Regional Perspective

The BLA’s growing organizational strength and the pacification or defeat of other insurgencies in South Asia makes it one of the region’s most potent insurgent groups. In the 1990s, the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, better known as the Tamil Tigers) was considered South Asia’s most powerful insurgency (Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, December 27, 2021). However, the organization was officially defeated by the Sri Lankan government in May 2009. Likewise, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal was pacified through an elaborate negotiation process culminating in a formal peace agreement in 2006 (Hindustan Times, November 16, 2006). And while the Taliban captured the seat of the Afghan government following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the organization, now recognized by much of the international community as the de facto government of the country, is now seeking to engage with the international community as it pursues its own counterterrorism strategies against groups like Islamic State–Khorasan Province (Dawn, August 29, 2021). Other insurgent movements in India’s northeast are suffering from an ageing leadership crisis, financial challenges, and internal disputes due to declining public support (The Observer Research Foundation, September 12, 2019).

Unlike the above movements, the BLA maintains a resilient social support base. Its backbone is made of alienated Baloch youth, and the group articulates a narrative based on grievances that resonate with larger segments of Baloch society, notwithstanding disagreement over the group’s violent methods. Moreover, the BLA has evolved its operational tactics from traditional hit-and-run guerilla operations targeting power pylons, gas pipelines, and railways tracks to deadly and audacious assaults on military camps, convoys, and security checkpoints. Balochistan’s rugged and sparsely populated terrain, dotted with mountains and deserts, acts to the BLA’s favor, making counterterrorism operations difficult for the Pakistani government, as the BLA has used its superior knowledge of the terrain to compensate for the power asymmetry vis-à-vis the conventionally superior Pakistani military.

Factors Contributing to BLA’s Rise

The following four factors have continued to contribute to the BLA’s operational and organizational strength.

Populist Approach to Baloch Separatism

The BLA has made significant inroads among the middle class public in recent years. Since parting ways with its mother group BLA–Azad, led by Hyrbyair Marri (Balochi: حیربیار مری), in 2018, the leadership of the BLA moved to middle-class leaders like the late Ustad Aslam Baloch and Bashir Zeb (names in Balochi: اسلم بلوچ؛ بشیر زیب) (Militant Leadership Monitor, October 5, 2022). These two leaders rose through the ranks of Baloch Student Organization-Azad (Balochi: بلۏچی نۏدربرانء اورگان, BSO–A) instead of Baloch tribal structures. Their ascent to leadership positions democratized the Baloch separatist movement, significantly widening the scope of people who could join in and participate in the Baloch independence movement, and positioning the BLA as its spearhead (Terrorism Monitor, May 6, 2024).

The BLA’s decision making process has become somewhat populist and even pseudo-democratic, leading those from the educated middle-class to join the BLA in larger numbers (Dawn, August 29, 2024). Instead of superimposing their decisions in a tribal fashion, the new insurgent leadership took decisions through consensus, earning them widespread public support, especially from the Makran (Urdu: مکران) coastal belt (Express Tribune, June 23, 2022). They also opened the movement to female participation: not just as caregivers, recruiters, fund collectors, propagandists and nurturers of future generations, but in primary roles like militants (The Friday Times, October 30, 2024; Terrorism Monitor, May 20, 2022; Militant Leadership Monitor, October 9).

Likewise, social media also played a significant role. The medium, once it made inroads into rural Balochistan, allowed BLA sympathizers to amplify their grievances, demands and goals (Global Network on Extremism and Technology, November 8, 2024). Social media eroded the monopoly of the Pakistani state on the flow of information, leading the BLA to dominate the battle of narratives among Pakistani Baloch youth.

Surge in Recruitment

The surge in the BLA’s recruitment has been equally significant in bringing the BLA to prominence. The new leadership has made recruitment gender-inclusive, paving the way for women to join the insurgency in significant numbers (New Lines Magazine, December 14, 2023). Meanwhile, the BLA’s background in the BSO–A student organization has increased recruitment from the educated middle-class (Gandhara, May 14, 2020).

The BLA has demonstrated growing boldness and efficacy since its 2024 Operation Herof (Balochi: آپریشن ہیروف). The BLA’s complex and coordinated attacks, including a series of suicide attacks to avenge the killing of Baloch politician and elder Nawab Akbar Bugti (Balochi: نواب اکبر بگٹی), as well as the 2025 hijacking of the Jaffar Express train, taking dozens hostage. BLA insurgents numbering in the hundreds have even begun occupying remote towns, and blocked Balochistan’s main highways after dusk in some places (Dawn, March 5). BLA claims around 5,000 to 6,000 fighters in its ranks, with the number growing constantly due to resentment toward the Pakistani state (NDTV, March 12).

State Policy

The Pakistani military establishment’s harsh counterterrorism measures have flamed resentment and contributed to the BLA’s success in recruitment. Islamabad tends to view Balochistan’s conflict through a narrow security lens, avoiding any attempts at a political settlement (Dawn, March 23). The imposition of a hand-picked provincial government through rigged elections, the censorship of peaceful protests highlighting the issue of arbitrary detainment by Pakistani security forces, and characterizing Baloch social movements, such as the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (Balochi: بلوچ یکجھتی کمیٹی, BYC), as foreign sponsored entities have also pushed people into BLA’s fold (Dawn, October 12, 2024; Dawn, February 14).

In June, the Balochistan Provincial Assembly (the provincial government) passed the Anti-Terrorism Act (Balochistan Amendment), 2025 (Urdu: انسداد دہشتگردی ایکٹ) (Balochistan Provincial Assembly Secretariat, June 5). This legislation provided law enforcement agencies with powers to detain anyone without a charge-sheet and present them before a court of law. It will remain in effect for the next six years and could be extended for another two years (Express Tribune, August 31, 2025). The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2025 will likely empower security agencies to suppress political dissent, provide legal cover for arbitrary detention (often referred to as “disappearances”), and deflect criticism of heavy-handed counterterrorism tactics. [1]

The over-militarization of an already draconian counterinsurgency framework will further alienate the Baloch people. In light of the new legislation, security agencies will likely abuse new laws to suppress social movements like the BYC of Dr. Mahrang Baloch (Balochi: مہرنگ بلوچ), who was nominated for the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize, and depict the BYC as the BLA’s political front (Arab News, March 7). In return, the growing resentment among the Baloch people will intensify recruitment toward the BLA and other separatist groups, sustaining a vicious cycle of violence and in the restive province.

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (Urdu: چین پاکستان اقتصادی راہداری, CPEC), a major Chinese development initiative comprising infrastructure, energy, and communication projects, has also strengthened the BLA’s separatist narrative. The BLA and its sympathizers see the PRC as a neo-colonial power usurping Balochistan’s resources in collusion with the Pakistani state while neglecting the rights of local Baloch (Durand Dispatch, July 15). The BLA’s targeting of Chinese nationals working on CPEC projects in Balochistan, including the Jaffar Express and Confucius Institute attacks, has been pivotal in catapulting the group to prominence.  For the BLA, attacking the CPEC has become a vehicle to internationalize the Baloch conflict and draw attention to the group’s demands and grievances (Terrorism Monitor, July 30).

The BLA have used attacks against the CPEC to transform a local separatist conflict into an unsung geopolitical flashpoint, where the militant group poses a major sticking point for the PRC’s expansion into South Asia. The CPEC is especially important as a means for Chinese access to Indian Ocean trade routes, allowing the PRC to bypass international scrutiny of its behavior in the South China Sea (see China Brief, June 21, 2024).

The BLA portrays the CPEC as a threat to Baloch identity and uses it as a justification to target Chinese workers (Terrorism Monitor, January 21, 2024). The U.S. decision to place the BLA on the FTO list has added to the group’s notoriety, and within its core constituency it is being viewed as a source of legitimacy, encouraging more attacks rather than deterring them.

Conclusion

The BLA’s phenomenal rise as the Baloch insurgency’s spearhead is grounded in some real grievances which help the group ground its message and help make the organization resilient and adaptive. By popularizing its insurgent message and opening the BLA up to broader Baloch society, strategically using social media platforms to highlight its narrative, feeding off resentment toward Pakistani government repression, and positioning itself as a stumbling block for Pakistan’s geopolitical ambitions, the BLA has strengthened the Baloch insurgency—making it South Asia’s most active and effective insurgent group. Although the BLA’s FTO listing marks a diplomatic win for the Pakistani state narrative, and will strengthen US-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation, the U.S. designation will likely not have a decisive impact on combatting the BLA’s insurgency.

Notes:

[1] After the three months, the detainees must be brought before a court and informed of the charges against them.