The PLAN’s Tasman Sea Drill: A Military Response to AUKUS

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PLAN 055 Type Missile Destroyers Nanchang and Anshan in a drill. (Source: iFeng)

Executive Summary:

  • The People’s Liberation Army Navy conducted two live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea in February without providing customary notification to Australia or New Zealand and causing at least 49 civilian aircraft to divert course.
  • The Tasman Sea drill was designed to demonstrate the PLA’s long-range power projection capability and to prove that the People’s Republic of China can break through the second island chain.
  • The Tasman Sea drill also was timed to coincide with several high-level diplomatic meetings and likely was designed to deter the trilateral security partnership AUKUS from deeper alignment.

On February 21–22, 2025, a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) task force conducted a live-fire drill in the Tasman Sea, South Pacific Ocean, catching both Australia and New Zealand off guard (The Sydney Morning Herald, February 21). The drills complied with international law, but they further strained relations with Australia and New Zealand, both of whom are cooperating closely with the United States in the Pacific. They also fueled anxieties over the intentions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), indcating the need for a careful assessment of Beijing’s intentions to avoid miscalculations in regional security policy.

PLAN Declines Customary Notification for Drills

Australia’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) first confirmed the presence of a PLAN task group in the South Pacific on February 13, consisting of the Hengyang frigate (衡阳号导弹护卫舰), Zunyi destroyer (遵义号驱逐舰), and Weishanhu replenishment vessel (微山湖号综合补给舰), which had entered the region from Southeast Asian waters (MOD, February 13). Six days later, the task group was operating 150 nautical miles east of Sydney (Financial Times, February 19). On February 21, the situation escalated when the PLAN conducted a live-fire exercise in the Tasman Sea without providing the customary 12–24-hour advance notice to regional governments. Instead, civilian aircraft overflying the area were instructed to vacate the airspace (ABC News, February 21; The Guardian, February 26). Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong said she would raise concerns at the G20 meeting, though PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) merely urged Australia to “manage differences properly” (妥善处理差异分歧) (MFA, February 22).

New Zealand detected a second live-fire drill on February 22, which the PLAN communicated via radio, while Australia received no prior notification (ABC News, February 23). The Australian government accused Beijing of deliberately withholding information, while the PRC’s defense ministry dismissed the concerns as political hype, asserting the drills were legal under international law (Xinhua, February 23). The two exercises forced at least 49 civilian aircraft to reroute (ABC News, February 25).

PLAN Projects Power, Gathers Intelligence, Seeks Influence

The most direct message of the drills is the demonstration of the PLA’s long-range power projection capability. In recent years, PRC maritime operations have focused on the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea, using military drills and gray-zone operations to assert sovereignty over these regions. By deploying warships in South Pacific, Beijing is demonstrating its ability to breach the second island chain and conduct military operations in the Pacific. The drills also serve as a warning, not only to Australia and New Zealand but also to South Pacific island nations that the United States is no longer the region’s only security player (Jamestown, June 7, 2024, March 3).

The drills also served to assess Australia and New Zealand’s reaction time during military operations. In the first live-fire drill, the PLAN task force only notified the civilian aircrafts in the Tasman Sea airspace, while in the second, it informed New Zealand via radio. By deliberately bypassing international norms that require prior notification, the PRC aims to observe response times for adversaries’ military cooperation functions. This intelligence gathering serves as a basis for adjusting the future military exercises and refining operational strategies in the region (China Brief, March 25, 2022).

The drills also had a political component. PRC choose to launch a live-fire drills during ongoing diplomatic talks with Australia and New Zealand, and ahead of Australian parliamentary elections scheduled for May. The PRC has a history of combining political activities with military operations to reinforce its demand through both diplomatic engagement and military pressure. For instance, in its dealings with the Philippines, the diplomatic agenda conducted through the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism occurs in parallel with continued China Coast Guard patrols around South China Sea islands claimed by the Philippines (PRC MFA, July 2, 2024; USNI News, July 2, 2024; Reuters, July 6, 2024). The Tasman Sea drill coincided with diplomatic events, including the Australia-PRC defense strategic dialogue in Beijing, the G20 foreign ministers meeting in South Africa, and visits by senior officials from the Cook Islands and New Zealand to the PRC (MND, February 17; G20, February 21; China Brief, March 3).

The Tasman Sea drills can also be interpreted as a warning to the AUKUS alliance. Since AUKUS was established, Beijing has repeatedly criticized the partnership for undermining regional peace. It also has strongly opposed its expansion. In December 2023, New Zealand’s Prime Minister Christopher Luxon expressed his interest in joining AUKUS second pillar; and in February 2024, AUKUS was discussed at consultations with Australia (Reuters, December 20, 2023; MOD, February 1, 2024). The Tasman Sea drill serves as a forceful response from the PRC to AUKUS and a deterrent to countries considering deeper alignment with the alliance.

Conclusion

The PRC’s demonstration of long-range power projection in the Tasman Sea drill signaled its regional ambitions. It constituted a practical display of its ability to break through the second island chain and deter Pacific nations. At the same time, it also served as a gray-zone operation directed toward Australia and New Zealand, as well as an intelligence gathering opportunity.

The February drills mark the first direct PRC military action near Australia and New Zealand’s respective homelands, but it is unlikely to be the last. With the apparent success of this exercise, the PLA likely will feel emboldened to conduct more drills in future to reinforce its warnings and strategic intentions, particularly as the PRC presence in the South Pacific continues to expand.