The US-Ukraine Security Agreement: Wartime and Postwar

Executive Summary:

• The US-Ukraine security agreement anticipates crisis responses in the event of another Russian aggression, building the “Ukrainian future force” during the war and after, as well as future security requirements in the Black Sea.
• US-Ukraine joint crisis response would cover both a repeat Russian aggression and the threat of another one. This could trigger a surge of deliveries of war matériel to Ukraine from the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, albeit outside the alliance’s framework.
• Ukraine’s Future Force program envisages supporting a wide range of capability goals for the armed forces. Some of these goals, however, seem to be stretched out for lengthy periods, not answering to the urgency of current requirements.

The US-Ukraine security agreement is the centerpiece among 23 bilateral agreements signed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states with Kyiv this year amid Russia’s war (see EDM, August 6, 7, 14). While focusing on Ukraine’s current wartime requirements, the US-Ukraine agreement also attempts to anticipate Kyiv’s postwar requirements in terms of deterrence and defense against Russia.

The document seeks to anticipate, first, crisis responses in the event of a repeat Russian aggression against Ukraine; second, building the “Ukrainian future force” during the war and after; and third, Ukraine’s future security requirements in the Black Sea (“Bilateral Security Agreement between the United States of America and Ukraine,” The White House; President of Ukraine, June 13). Some of the terminology present in these sections—as elsewhere in this agreement—tends to convey ambiguity and hedging on the part of the US signatories (see accompanying article).

Crisis Response

Under Article II (Defense and Security Cooperation, the agreement’s core), “Any future aggression or threat of aggression against the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of either party would be a matter of grave concern to the other party.” In that case, they “shall, at the request of either party, immediately meet, where possible within 24 hours, at the most senior levels to determine appropriate next steps and additional defense needs.” This provision also applies to pre-crisis threat situations. Moreover, it confers a rare character of reciprocity on this weighty aspect of the US-Ukraine agreement.

Article II contains those provisions in its section on general terms of cooperation but not in its detailed annex on actual implementation. The annex turns the reciprocity into one-way deliveries of US military materiel to Ukraine, subject, however, to conditionalities: “In the event of future armed attack or threat of armed attack against Ukraine, the United States at the request of the Government of Ukraine, and in consultation with allies and partners, intends to coordinate on the potential need to rapidly increase the scope or scale of US security assistance to Ukraine, including potentially the provision of additional weapon systems and equipment.” Plenty of contingency in this section, with “intention” rather than commitment, a “potential” increase in assistance, and “potentially” more weapons to be provided.

Future Force

Article II’s implementing annex broadly outlines the development of “Ukraine’s Future Force Capabilities.” The United States “commits,” “intends,” or “plans” (case by case) to support a wide range of capability goals, the most salient of which include: 

• Deterrence and Defense—“A modern, NATO-interoperable force that can credibly deter and, if necessary, defend against future aggression.” Nevertheless, “Ukraine’s future force is expected to rely on both modern and legacy equipment.” The published document does not address the apparent incongruity between legacy equipment and a NATO-interoperable force for the future.
• Air Defenses—“A layered, integrated air and missile defense system [and] transition to a modern air defense architecture over time.” A transition over time would, however, prolong Ukraine’s devastation by Russian air strikes.
• Fires—“Development of a joint fires capability [with] long-range fires [and] domestic ammunition production capacity.”
• Maneuver Warfare—“Development of movement and maneuver doctrine and capabilities, to include sustainment of legacy armored, mechanized, and motorized capabilities, and work with allies to support the acquisition of modern platforms.”
• Air Force—Supporting an “allied consortium on the modernization of Ukraine’s Air Force [with] fourth-generation fighter capability, including but not limited to F-16 multi-role aircraft.”
• Cyber—“To improve the cyber resilience of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, especially energy facilities, against aerial strikes, and support the quick restoration of destroyed infrastructure.”
• Training and Exercises—“The United States intends to pursue a long-term training program for the Ukrainian Armed Forces … coordinat[ing] with allies to ensure complementarity of training programs. … The United States plans to invite Ukrainian security and defense forces to join US exercises and to support Ukrainian participation in multilateral exercises. … The United States intends to … create conditions for the transition of training efforts to Ukrainian territory. … If and when security conditions allow, both sides plan to consult on possible training and exercise programs in Ukraine.” Washington and many other allies await a postwar situation, however defined, to take the possibility of holding joint troop exercises in Ukraine under consideration.

Black Sea

Türkiye is not among the 23 NATO member states that have signed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine. Moreover, Western naval powers lack access to the Black Sea for the duration of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine (see EDM, August 3, 7, 9, 2023). The US-Ukraine security agreement envisages measures to strengthen Ukraine’s maritime and Black Sea regional security in a broader sense. The document makes it fairly clear that such measures must await the end of current hostilities.

Under the agreement’s Article II (annex), the United States intends to enhance Ukraine’s capacity to defend its territorial waters through capabilities that “could include” coastal defense systems, patrol and riverine craft, naval firepower, and maritime mine countermeasures. Washington and Kyiv also expect those assets to help Ukraine exercise its rights and jurisdiction in its exclusive economic zone. Ukraine has, since mid-2023, gradually decimated the Russian Black Sea Fleet through drone warfare, clearing the sea’s northwestern quadrant, including Sevastopol, of the Russian fleet’s presence (see EDM, August 13 [1], [2]). However, this is only a partial, temporary, and unstable solution as long as Western naval powers, with the United States in the lead, are absent from the Black Sea. 

Despite all their limitations and incrementalism, NATO states’ bilateral security agreements with Kyiv are accomplishing the historic task of excluding Russia from political decisions on Ukraine’s security affairs and reserving that role for Ukraine’s Western partners. Russia’s war represents, in part, an effort to force its way back to the negotiating table over Ukraine’s future. Moscow’s readmission to some version of the Concert of Europe regarding Ukraine would pull the country from the West’s orbit back into the gray zone of Russian interests.