Türkiye-Russia Trade Declines Amid Western Sanctions

Executive Summary:

• Trade between Russia and Türkiye has dropped significantly in 2024 due to Western sanctions, indicating a weakening economic partnership as Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to isolate it from global partners.
• Ankara is increasingly aligning with Western powers, as evidenced by the postponement of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visits to Ankara. This is straining Turkish-Russian relations.
• Türkiye remains a key importer of Russian energy, despite improving ties with the West, with a notable increase in fuel imports and its participation in re-exporting Russian oil products to Europe.

Türkiye’s Statistics Department reported in July that exports to Russia had shrunk by 28 percent from the previous year due to continuous pressure from US sanctions against Russia (RBC, July 31). The value of these exports reached only $4.16 billion in the first quarter of 2024, representing a decline from a peak of $5.80 billion the previous year (The Turkey Analyst, June 26, 2023). Imports surged in 2021 to a peak of $27.7 billion just before the outbreak of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and have since fallen, though they still remain far above 2020 levels (RBC, July 31; Ukrainska Pravda, July 31).

Since Russia’s invasion, the West has imposed harsh economic sanctions on the country to exert pressure on the country. Since then, however, Moscow has gone to enormous effort to circumvent those sanctions and maintain international trade. In this regard, Türkiye, a long-time Russian energy importer, has become an outlet for the Russian global economy. Turkish-Russian relations have fluctuated over the course of the war, as Türkiye tries to maintain a balanced position between the West and Russia, as well as with other regional players in the Middle East.

Western pressure has constrained Türkiye’s openness to Russia. Initially a viable “window” for Russian international banking transactions, local Turkish banks began blocking payments from Russian companies earlier this year (Mind, February 20). Türkiye’s decision to block Russian payments illustrates Ankara’s goal to maintain access to the US financial system and avoid being penalized with secondary sanctions. Türkiye is also maneuvering for a gradual rapprochement with the Biden administration in Washington through deepening military ties, which could also worsen its relations with Moscow (Al-Monitor, March 5). Part of this rapprochement involves acquiescing to US demands for Ankara to cut down its export to Russia of dual-use goods such as electronics, chips, semiconductors, printed circuit boards, communications and navigation equipment, and optical equipment (Middle East Eye, January 30). To date, Moscow has used Türkiye as a vital hub for importing Western products, including for its defense industry (The Moscow Times, October 1). Moscow views deteriorating relations with Türkiye with concern, as it could lead to extensive isolation and loss of access to the European market.

Türkiye maintains a careful balance in its foreign policy, keeping relations neutral with Western states while openly showing support for Middle Eastern and Turkic states. Following Türkiye’s 2023 presidential elections, Erdogan appeared to signal a desire for better relations with the West (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 22, 2023). This has yielded positive results, as the United States recently greenlit Türkiye’s purchase of additional modernized F-16 fighter jets, while Norway lifted roughly half a decade of defense export restrictions on the country (Al-Monitor, September 11). Türkiye also appears willing to cooperate with the West on critically important issues such as energy, logistics, finance, and defense, and particularly its stance on the war in Ukraine, could lead to significant benefits. This stance has led to Moscow’s growing irritation. Russian President Vladimir Putin has postponed a planned state visit to Ankara several times since February 2024. In September, he requested he be escorted to Türkiye with Russian fighter jets, but reports show that Türkiye is unlikely to grant this request (Middle East Eye, February 9, September 10).

One potential area of friction between Türkiye and the West is the extent of its energy dependence on Russia, which it is reluctant to reduce. From February 2023 to February 2024, Türkiye increased its Russian fuel imports by 105 percent (Turkish Minute, May 16). In terms of diesel and oil, Türkiye imported approximately 13.5 million metric tons in 2023 (Daily Sabah, February 6). This, in part, helped Türkiye become the world’s top buyer of Russian gas that year, with Russian oil accounting for 72 percent of the country’s total oil imports. Not all of these imports are for Türkiye’s own consumption, however. The country has participated in re-exporting Russian oil products to Western markets, allowing Russian producers to circumvent the West’s sanctions regime (Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air [CECA], May 15; Intellinews, May 17).

Moscow is now seeking to further its energy ties with Ankara by constructing a natural gas hub on Turkish soil. The project, a partnership between Russia’s state oil company Gazprom and Türkiye’s state-owned BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, would also create a trading platform for the sale of natural gas in Istanbul (Interfax, May 27). It would also allow Russia to reroute gas exports after losing direct access to most of the European market (Anadolu Agency, June 8). Türkiye’s current foreign policy priorities, however, suggest that no significant progress in the construction of the trading center will emerge any time soon. Russia is not in a position to allow relations with Türkiye to deteriorate, however, and so will likely restrain from criticizing Ankara.

Türkiye’s relationship with Russia remains a delicate balancing act as Ankara seeks to navigate its geopolitical and economic priorities. While the country has been a critical outlet for Russian trade and energy exports amid Western sanctions, Türkiye’s growing alignment with the West, particularly the United States, has started to complicate these ties. Türkiye’s energy dependence on Russia, however, remains a point of tension. Looking ahead, while Russia seeks to deepen energy cooperation through initiatives like the proposed natural gas hub, Türkiye’s shifting foreign policy suggests a careful, albeit slow, pivot toward the West. Nonetheless, both countries will likely avoid a complete deterioration in relations, recognizing the strategic importance of maintaining economic and diplomatic ties.