U.S. Role in Armenia-Azerbaijan Transit Corridor Sparks Controversy

Executive Summary:

• Tensions linger between Armenia and Azerbaijan over a proposed transit route, better known to many as the Zangezur Corridor, through Armenia that would restore a Soviet-era connection between Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan.
• Reports alleging that the United States had proposed that an American commercial company could manage the Armenian part of the route at first sparked denials from both sides before raising technical and political concerns within the region.
• For Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the route through Armenia’s territory is already politically sensitive ahead of next year’s elections. Now there are concerns about regional fractures in the case that it is not handled with caution.

Almost five years following the November 2020 trilateral ceasefire statement that ended the 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the two sides remain at odds over outstanding issues. This includes disagreement over the restoration of regional transportation, as outlined in the ninth part of the Russian-brokered agreement (President of Russia, November 10, 2020). Central to this is the proposed, but still unrealized, Zangezur Corridor, a transit route that would connect mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s southernmost Syunik region.

The corridor was initially considered a way to introduce economic interdependency into the post-war environment (Modern Diplomacy, January 2024). It has since become a geopolitical flashpoint, reflecting not only competing national interests but also shifting power dynamics in the region (see EDM, November 3, 2023, January 24, 25, 2024). Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia hold fundamentally different views on the matter, as do the European Union and the United States (see EDM, July 17, 23, 29).

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has been adamant that the restoration of this Soviet-era road and rail transit link must be unimpeded, as stipulated in the 2020 agreement, which Baku interprets as free from Armenian checkpoints (see EDM, March 7, 2023). With the construction of the necessary infrastructure on its side of the border expected to be completed by the end of this year, moreover, Baku has also signaled growing frustration with Yerevan’s failure to agree to those terms (see EDM, February 24).

To counter Baku’s demands and Russia’s role, Armenia has since introduced its own initiative, the Crossroads of Peace, that seeks to transform Armenia into a regional logistics hub between Iran, Georgia, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and beyond (see EDM, April 15, 2024). It is also now opposed to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) oversight on the route, as had been initially agreed.

On July 10, Pashinyan and Aliyev met in Abu Dhabi, which many believed would be pivotal to resolving this particular issue (see EDM July 23). The five-hour meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan was seen by many observers as the most direct and unmediated interaction yet (see EDM, July 17). Comments from U.S. Secretary of State Mark Rubio, made just a day before the meeting, that a peace deal could come soon, also added to expectations (Azatutyun, July 9). For Pashinyan, with his domestic ratings at an all-time low, securing a signed agreement ahead of elections next year could be pivotal to securing a third term in office (Azatutyun, July 22). Following his meeting with Aliyev, Pashinyan made a trip to Istanbul on June 20 to meet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, where it was also reported that he seemed to be softening on the issue of the corridor (Carnegie Politika, July 1; Caucasus Watch, June 23; Armenian Report, July 7).

Reports had also already emerged that the United States might step in to control the route (see EDM, July 29). According to these reports, the Donald Trump administration had proposed that an American company manage any transit route linking Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan through Armenia. The story was quickly dismissed, however, as “fake news” by a senior figure in Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party and did not gain traction (X/@ArsTorosyan, July 10).

The notion of third-party oversight for politically sensitive corridors is not new. A similar arrangement involving a Swiss company was proposed between Russia and Georgia in 2011, involving the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That agreement was never implemented (Jam-News, February 6, 2019; see EDM, February 22, 2019). The closest parallel is perhaps found in a proposal from former European Council President Charles Michel, who in 2023 floated the idea of involving the World Customs Organization in overseeing transit between Armenia and Nakhchivan (European Council, May 14, 2023).    

Following the Abu Dhabi summit, the U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye, Thomas Barrack, casually remarked that a U.S. company could manage the Armenian section of the Nakhchivan route with a 100-year lease, though he also referred to the 44-kilometer (around 26-mile) route as measuring only 32 kilometers (around 20 miles) (News.am, July 14). Pashinyan’s later remarks appeared to confirm the reports (Azatutyun, July 16). Both the opposition and local analysts, nonetheless, were quick to criticize him for failing to mention any reciprocal arrangements for Armenian transit via Azerbaijani territory and undermining national sovereignty despite repeated assurances that he would not (Azatutyun, July 16 [1], [2], 17 [1], [2]).

Speaking at the recent Shusha Global Media Forum on July 19, Aliyev rejected any idea of an American company operating on its territory at the start and end of the Armenian section (President of Azerbaijan, July 19). His statements also cast doubt on Armenia’s Crossroads of Peace initiative, which he suggested would not transform Armenia into a genuine transit country. Tehran has also warned against any attempt to alter the regional status quo, particularly adjacent to its border (Azatutyun, July 17, 23, 28).

This growing complexity is precisely what Baku’s proposed bilateral peace track, ostensibly supported by Armenia, sought to avoid (Anadolu Agency, July 10). The opacity surrounding the potential U.S. involvement has also raised technical and political concerns. Armenian analysts question whether such a corridor could function effectively in the absence of reciprocal guarantees and clear economic incentives. Though Pashinyan has mentioned infrastructure elements such as electricity and communications lines, and possibly pipelines, the lack of public details on the U.S. proposal has done little to clarify matters (YouTube/@PressklubTV, July 17). Some Armenian commentators have argued that the proposal is less about logistics and more about geopolitics, casting the United States as a security guarantor (Civilnet, July 19). This would mirror the recent U.S. mineral deal negotiated with Ukraine (see EDM, March 7).

Even though many believe a resolution to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict is closer than ever, including on unblocking and restoring regional transportation, it is also more vulnerable to disruption. For Yerevan, this includes disruptions from the opposition, foreign interests, and geopolitical missteps. With elections approaching, another factor is disinformation. On July 22, a Spanish news site claimed to have obtained a secret memorandum stating that Yerevan had agreed to hand over management of its section of the route to the United States for actions against Iran (Periodista Digital, July 22; Fact Investigation Platform, July 24). The Armenian government was quick to deny the report and then to openly reject the proposal, but it demonstrated the increased risks associated with this stage of talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Armenpress, July 23; Azatutyun, July 25). Moving forward, clarity, coordination, and caution in the peace process will be more essential than ever.