Ukraine Targets Russian Forces in Sahel

Executive summary:

• Ukraine is alleged to be providing military equipment and training to the Tuareg separatist coalition CSP-DPA in its armed struggle against Russian-backed Malian government forces.
• This support is framed as a strategic move by Ukraine to counter Russian influence in Africa, particularly targeting Russian forces and mercenaries in Mali.
• This commitment reflects Kyiv’s growing interest in subversive tactics to distract and weaken Moscow as Ukraine is engaging in a worldwide manhunt for Russian forces as recruitment for the military dwindles.

In mid-October, an investigative article by French news outlet Le Monde alleged that Ukraine has been supplying military drones to Tuareg rebels operating in northern Mali. The recipient of these drones is said to be the Tuareg separatist coalition known as CSP-DPA (Cadre Stratégique pour la Défense du Peuple de l’Azawad). The French publication describes this support as “discreet but decisive” (Le Monde, October 13). Ukraine’s foreign ministry rejected the article’s accusations on October 14 as “false narratives of … the aggressor state Russia,” allegedly going as far as requesting the French government to prevent its publication (Kyiv Independent, October 15; Le Pays [Ouagadougou], October 20). The report also claimed, citing a source close to Ukrainian intelligence, that some Tuareg have been trained in Ukraine while several Ukrainian specialists have trained rebels in the Sahel. Never known for presenting a unified stand, Mali’s Tuareg remains divided between separatist, Islamist-Jihadist, and pro-government militias. Calling out Ukraine for its alleged support of “international terrorist organizations,” Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova declared that Ukraine’s support for Malian separatists was tantamount to “interference in the internal affairs of African countries” (Le Pays [Ouagadougou], October 20).  As Russia’s military continues to deteriorate due to its war in Ukraine, Kyiv is using a broader strategy to chip away at Russia’s armed forces by targeting those beyond the war.

According to Le Monde, light quadcopter drones were used in September and October to drop explosives on Russian camps at Goundam (twice) and Léré, creating casualties before returning to base (Le Monde, October 13). Mali’s army, likely with assistance from their Russian advisors, is also engaging in drone warfare. On the night of October 5–6, Malian drones struck what was described by the army as a column of vehicles bearing “terrorists” in CSP-DPA territory. Local sources instead reported that the strike hit a convoy of civilian vehicles carrying Nigerien gold miners (Kyiv Post, October 9). 

During an interview in September, CSP-DPA spokesman Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane emphasized the efforts of his group to establish relations with external partners, citing, in particular, a common cause between the peoples of “Azawad” (the Tuareg name for the northern half of Mali) and Ukraine against Russian mercenaries. He stated, “Ukraine sees enemies where the Wagners are, and we, in Azawad, are [also] facing this organization that is the cause of misfortune and destruction in many countries, in Libya, Syria, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and, of course, in Ukraine” (Contre-Poison, September 9).

Describing cooperation with Ukraine as being “in its first phase,” the CSP-DPA spokesman requested arms and military training from Ukraine, placing the struggle of the Azawad separatists in the context of a wider war against Russian imperialism. Ramadane spoke of a “global fight because Russia is a threat to the entire world. … The entire international community must get behind us and help us put an end to this Malian and Russian occupation of our territory” (Contre-Poison, September 9).

Even though Russian troops in Africa continue to be called “Wagner” in common parlance, Prigozhin’s mercenary forces in Africa were reorganized as the “Africa Corps” after his death, coming under the direct command of the Russian Defense Ministry (see Terrorism Monitor, July 9; see EDM, October 9, November 14). Accusing the Russians of participation in extrajudicial executions of civilians, population displacement, theft of all-important livestock, and the destruction of infrastructure, the rebel spokesman warned that the changing status of Russian troops in Mali would have “legal consequences.” Ramadane described, “It should be noted that since Wagner’s mercenaries have been dependent on the Russian Ministry of Defense, Moscow is directly and legally responsible for their actions, unlike when Prigozhin was alive” (Contre-Poison, September 9).

Colonel Hamad-Rhissa Ag Hamad-Assalah, who led CSP-DPA fighters in the successful attack on Malian regulars and Russian mercenaries at Tinzawatène, has been more reticent on the issue of Ukrainian military assistance (see EDM, September 11). He stated, “We are not aware of any assistance from Ukraine in terms of intelligence and drone support.”  The colonel has, however, called for help from France, which, at the time of independence in 1960, imposed Azawad’s narrow link to southern Mali and its much larger population, which is culturally and linguistically very different from the pastoral and semi-nomadic communities of Tuareg, Arabs, Fulani (Peul), and Songhay (Ayneha) in the arid north. Hamad-Assalah additionally stated, “If there is one African country whose sovereignty must be recognized by France, it is Azawad. It is France that brought us together with Mali in the past, and today, it is France that must separate us from Mali” (Contre-Poison, August 16).

Some Malians see a reciprocal connection between French support for Ukraine and Ukrainian intervention in the former French colonies. Others perceive an effort by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to punitively destabilize West Africa after a recent decline in Western influence (Burkina24.com, October 19). Experts on Russian influence in the Sahel actively promote these views.

During peacetime, Russia could realistically muster the troops and weapons needed to support a decisive push by the Malian junta. The situation is so dire for Russia in Ukraine, however, that North Korean troops have been called to feed the manpower-starved Russian military in its effort to reverse Ukraine’s Kursk incursion (see EDM, October 30).

If Le Monde’s report is accurate, Ukraine is making good on a promise to bring the war to Russian forces—official and unofficial—wherever they are deployed, including Syria, Sudan, or Mali (Kyiv Post, October 9). Ironically, it is the Malian junta’s invitation to the Russians that has brought the Tuareg separatists aerial power in the form of drones that they need to defeat government forces and their allies on the battlefield.

For the Tuareg separatists, receiving diplomatic support from a European state would be a much more significant development than what would be notional military assistance from Ukraine. To this point, the separatists have designed their pitch to appeal to European governments, offering to act as roaming “border guards” along the Sahel corridor, capable of controlling the flow of migrant and drug trafficking through the region were they to gain independence (Contre-Poison, September 9). Until then, however, observers must not underestimate the potential impact for the separatists of receiving advanced, combat-bred drone technology from the Ukrainians, especially when operating in open terrain like the Sahel. There is a strong possibility that Ukraine’s over-taxed military intelligence force may be forced to divert resources from distant Mali to interfere with the more immediate threat created by the flow of North Korean troops to the Ukrainian front.