Viktor Orbán to Use Ukraine as Most Important Campaign Issue (Again)

Executive Summary:

• The Hungarian government launched a nationwide advisory referendum on Ukraine’s EU membership, while the ruling Fidesz-KDNP alliance launched the VOKS2025 campaign to rally the public against Kyiv’s potential accession to the European bloc.
• Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, known for his pro-Russian stance, uses anti-Ukrainian rhetoric as an electoral tool vis-à-vis the VOKS2025 campaign to portray Ukraine as a threat and the Hungarian opposition as “pro-war.”
• Fidesz hopes to consolidate its shaken voter base, polarize voters, distract from economic failures, and regain control with this referendum ahead of a pivotal election next year.

On April 15, the Hungarian government announced a nationwide advisory referendum on Ukraine’s EU membership. At the same time, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s ruling Fidesz-KDNP alliance launched the VOKS2025 campaign, a consultative vote, to rally the public against the perceived dangers of Kyiv’s potential accession to the European Union. The paper-based referendum materials are currently being delivered to every Hungarian citizen, along with a government-sponsored pamphlet warning about the alleged adverse consequences for Hungary’s agriculture, public finances, EU funds, public safety, food safety, labor market, public health, and pension system (Government of Hungary, April 15). 

Hungary’s conservative-turned-populist leader has been widely regarded as one of the most Russia-friendly leaders in Europe. Orbán not only chose to remain a top advocate for maintaining close economic and energy ties with the Kremlin after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but has repeatedly spoken out against the European Union’s various sanctions packages against Moscow (Hvg.hu, March 7). In parallel, Hungarian-Ukrainian relations have deteriorated as the pro-government bloc in Hungary has essentially positioned Ukraine and its president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as the reason for the neighboring war. While most of Ukraine’s allies have continued to call for a just peace agreement, Orbán has favored an immediate ceasefire, which would put Ukraine at a disadvantage (see EDM, November 15, December 13, 2024, March 21). Furthermore, bilateral relations have reached a new low after the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) accused Hungary of running a spy network in Ukraine’s northwestern Zakarpattya region, arguing that Budapest was seeking to obtain critical military intelligence (444.hu, May 9). 

The recently launched VOKS2025 campaign, which will run until June 20, should be no surprise given the Hungarian government’s Kremlin-friendly stance. Despite joining other Central and Eastern European EU member states in March 2022 in calling for Ukraine’s EU accession to ensure peace, the ruling Fidesz party quickly changed course (Telex.hu, March 1, 2022). Fidesz has vehemently opposed a “fast-tracked” EU accession path for Ukraine. Hungary’s 2022 Presidency in the Council of the European Union also prioritized EU enlargement in the Western Balkans over the bloc’s eastern neighborhood (Infostart.hu, September 9, 2024).

This state-funded anti-Ukrainian campaign aligns with the Kremlin’s interests in terms of a prospective peace agreement to end its invasion of Ukraine. While the Kremlin suggested that it would accept Ukraine’s EU aspirations, the Hungarian government’s position ensures that accession negotiations will not be started anytime soon, in line with what Russia would prefer in the long run (President of Russia, June 17, 2022; Index.hu, April 14). 

The real reason for launching this campaign, however, has little to do with Ukraine and is much more linked to Hungary’s parliamentary election scheduled for April 2026. Having returned to power in 2010, the ruling Fidesz-KDNP bloc has faced various opposition parties and alliances, none of which were able to push Orbán and his party out of power during the last three elections in 2014, 2018, and 2022. Next April’s election will be different since it is widely considered the first nationwide electoral contest in 15 years that Fidesz could potentially lose. This comes after the rise of government insider-turned-opposition figure Péter Magyar, whose Respect and Freedom Party (TISZA) became Hungary’s main opposition party only three months after entering national politics in early 2024 and is now consistently polling ahead of Fidesz in independent polls (24.hu, May 6). A center-right formation focused on domestic issues, TISZA is also the first individual party to poll higher than the ruling bloc in 12 years. At the same time, government-linked pollsters say that Fidesz is still in the lead, although even they believe that the gap between the two blocs is closing (Index.hu, April 15). 

During the last parliamentary election campaign in 2022, which coincided with the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Fidesz was quick to position itself as “the party of peace” and frame the then six-party opposition alliance as “the party of war.” Employing a set of disinformation tactics, the pro-government bloc made the unsubstantiated claim that the 2022 opposition alliance wants to “drag Hungary into the war” by sending Hungarian soldiers to Ukraine. This disinformation campaign was essential in Fidesz’s 2022 victory (DRI Hungary Chapter, November 21, 2024). Orbán now seems to have chosen—or at least seems to be actively experimenting with—a similar campaign narrative. After nearly 12 years of Russia-friendly policies, coupled with state-sponsored pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns in recent years, a significant share of the Hungarian electorate has become critical of advancing Hungary’s relations with Ukraine (Szabad Európa, July 5, 2024). Simultaneously, the majority of Fidesz voters have a firmly hostile attitude towards Ukraine, with nearly two-thirds of ruling party voters believing that either the West or Ukraine is responsible for the war (Telex.hu, May 11, 2023). This provides fertile ground for an election environment where Ukraine can be the central subject, which is exactly what the ruling party needs. Accompanied by an accelerating cost-of-living crisis, slow or virtually no growth, and one of the highest inflation rates in the European Union in recent years, the lack of sufficient government responses to public policy challenges has been fueling the rise in TISZA’s popularity (European Central Bank, accessed May 8; G7.hu, December 6, 2024) 

In parallel, Fidesz is pushing to portray Magyar’s TISZA as a pro-Ukrainian front. Following the SBU announcement about the alleged Hungarian spy network in Ukraine, Hungarian government and ruling party officials made the unsubstantiated claim that the opposition’s leader is colluding with the Ukrainian secret services (444.hu, May 9). Unlike the 2022 opposition alliance, however, TISZA, which has repeatedly condemned Russia’s aggression and has since become a member of the Ukraine-friendly European People’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament, is taking a different approach. The party has also warned against supporting a fast-tracked accession bid for Ukraine, citing the potentially negative economic impact on Hungary’s agriculture and Ukraine’s unreadiness to become an EU Member State in a recent open letter to the EPP (Hvg.hu, May 7). While the opposition party’s own VOKS2025-style nationwide survey, which was conducted in March and attracted more than 1.1 million Hungarians, found that 60 percent of TISZA supporters are in favor of Ukraine joining the European Union in the long run, the opposition party will likely aim for campaigning against Fidesz on domestic issues, learning from the mistake of the 2022 opposition alliance (444.hu, April 13).  

Hungarian and international observers agree that Ukraine’s prospective EU membership is not an immediate possibility, as there is still a lot to be done to prepare Kyiv for membership in the European bloc. In the meantime, Fidesz’s position is unlikely to change anytime soon, leaving Ukraine’s EU prospects entirely uncertain. Consequently, the Hungarian government’s advisory referendum was not likely aimed at measuring public opinion on Ukraine. Instead, it was designed to mobilize support for the ruling bloc in the wake of a never-before-seen and charismatic opposition challenger, whom Fidesz seeks to portray as a “pro-Ukrainian agent.” By positioning Ukraine as a central campaign issue, Fidesz also hopes to consolidate its shaken voter base, retake the initiative from Magyar, and attract third-party and independent voters to support the ruling bloc as Ukraine-Hungary relations remain a contentious issue.