Viral Documentary Exposes CCP’s United Front Operations in Taiwan

Executive Summary

• The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s united front tactics include recruiting Taiwanese content creators and youth through cultural exchanges, financial incentives, and networking opportunities, according to a viral Taiwanese documentary released in December 2024.
• CCP officials target Taiwanese individuals, including those who have never visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC). They have also offered social media influencers with large followings all-expenses-paid trips to the PRC, and to facilitate the provision of PRC identification documentation for other Taiwanese citizens.
• Taiwan’s response has been mixed. Public awareness of and student activism against united front activities have increased, but some political figures have downplayed the documentary or echoed CCP talking points.

In December 2024, Pa Chiung (八炯; aka 温子渝), a Taiwanese Youtuber known for his opposition to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), released a two-part documentary exposing the Party’s united front tactics that target Taiwanese influencers and society at large (YouTube/攝徒日記Fun TV, December 6, 2024; December 28, 2024). The documentary quickly gained traction in Taiwan, with the first part garnering over two million views in three days and the second approaching a similar number within a week. It features the influencer and rapper Chen Po-yuan (陳柏源; aka Mannam PYC/閩南狼), a previously pro-CCP figure who studied at Huaqiao University, an institution affiliated with the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Huaqiao University, Accessed January 10). Chen’s firsthand accounts and conversations with UFWD-linked officials provide evidence of the CCP’s united front strategies and their usage as a tool to influence Taiwan. The revelations sparked widespread debate over the CCP’s tactics and their broader implications for Taiwan’s sovereignty and societal resilience.

Party Uses Taiwanese Influencers to Boost Support

The documentary highlights how cross-strait exchanges are often calculated maneuvers by the CCP to advance “reunification” rather than genuine cultural or political engagements. This is despite Taiwan never having been part of the PRC. Events mentioned in the documentary, like the 16th Cross-Strait Tea Industry Expo (第十六届海峡两岸茶业博览会) and the First National Tea Brewing Festival in Wuyishan (武夷山首屆全国围炉煮茶节), serve as platforms for the CCP to promote its united front agenda (Xinhua, November 16, 2024; China Taiwan Net, November 21, 2024). Similarly, youth entrepreneurship programs, like the Taiwan Youth Entrepreneurship Base (台湾青年创业基地), are funded by a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—a key united front organization (YouTube/攝徒日記Fun TV, December 28, 2024). In the documentary, a Wuyishan UFWD official states that they are “mass recruiting Taiwanese youth to work in the PRC (我們現在大面積的有在招台灣的青年就業)” (YouTube/攝徒日記Fun TV, December 6, 2024).

In the documentary, officials discuss their united front work. Lin Jingdong (林靖东), a management committee member of the Strait Herald (海峡导报), a state-owned media company affiliated with Fujian Province’s party committee, describes facilitating connections for those who are interested in working in the PRC with the Taiwan Affairs Office (YouTube/攝徒日記Fun TV, December 6, 2024; Mirror Media, December 10, 2024). The Wuyishan UFWD official Chen talked to in the documentary also suggests that those seeking to engage with the united front system should join organizations like the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (台湾民主自治同盟; 台盟) and the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots (中华全国台湾同胞联谊会; 台联), confirming that those organization organizations are part of the united front system.

The Party leverages existing connections in Taiwan to expand its networks. In the first part of the documentary, UFWD and state media officials ask Chen to connect them with other Taiwanese, especially influencers with large followings and those who have never visited the PRC. For example, in November 2023, a Wuyishan UFWD official texted Chen, requesting his help with organizing a visit for Taiwanese youth to Wuyishan, prioritizing those without prior PRC experience. The following month, the same official asked Chen to identify potential attendees for events geared toward increasing cross-strait ties, including the China (Wuyi Mountain) Travel Service Providers Conference (中国（武夷山）旅行商大会). During a call, the official asks Chen to bring his friends to an industry expo. She emphasizes the importance of inviting influencers with many followers, noting that standard guests would receive complementary accommodation but that she would also cover travel expenses for influencers with a substantial following, provided they created content about the event. In the second part of the documentary, a middleman discloses that recruiting Taiwanese individuals to acquire PRC identification documents is also “part of the united front plan directed by the Central [Party](中央下的統戰計畫之一)”, estimating that over 100,000 Taiwanese already have been issued PRC IDs.

The Party also seeks to promote pro-Beijing narratives and influence public opinion. In May 2024, the same Wuyishan UFWD invited Chen to attend its cross-strait youth exchange activities, claiming that many other Taiwanese influencers had also been invited. According to the documentary, the Strait Herald’s Lin frequently sent Chen content, expecting him to produce songs critical of Taiwan and the Democratic Progressive Party. Li Dongxian (李東憲), a pro-CCP Taiwanese Taekwondo coach who became a PRC citizen in 2024 and attended the National Day reception in Beijing, suggested on a call with Chen that he should say in his video that he would “rather live in the mainland than in the very dictatorial Taiwan (寧願住在大陸也不要住在那麼獨裁的台灣).”

Taiwan’s Mixed Response

The documentary has elicited mixed reactions in Taiwan. For many, it has raised awareness of united front activities, reflecting growing public scrutiny of Beijing’s influence tactics. During an exchange event hosted by the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation (馬英九基金會) in early December, PRC students encountered demonstrators, including students from National Taiwan University and National Tsinghua University, holding signs referencing the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, freedom of expression, and supporting a democratic China, while advocating for equal and democratic exchanges (YouTube/Radio Free Asia, December 3, 2024; RW News, December 4, 2024). [1] In mid-December, at the Taipei Shanghai City Forum, two minor Taiwanese political parties staged protests demanding the rejection of united front tactics and urging the CCP to “get out (滾蛋)” (YouTube/Stan from Poland 斯坦-波蘭ê台灣囡仔, December 18, 2024).

For others, the documentary has provided an opportunity to attack political opponents or echo CCP narratives. A Kuomintang legislator dismissed the documentary as “an incident involving influencers attacking each other (網紅互相攻擊的事件),” accusing the Democratic Progressive Party of perceiving the PRC “as an adversary, framing exchanges and dialogue as infiltration, and taking casual comments as a united front (把中國大陸當敵人，把交流對話當滲透，把無心之言當統戰)” (SETN, December 7, 2024). The Kuomintang’s official response included calling the two influencers behind the documentary “pro-CCP influencers (舔共網紅)” as they applied to join Kuomintang (YouTube/陳柏源-(閩南狼PYC), December 30, 2024; Facebook/KMT, December 30, 2024). While the KMT said it wouldn’t accept pro-CCP members, a Kuomintang councilor from Taoyuan said he was “not anti-communist” and praised Xi (Youtube/Formosa TV News network, January 2). Meanwhile, former Legislative Yuan head Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) launched a think tank called the “Middle Way Peace Alliance (中道和平聯盟)” two days after the documentary’s release and two weeks after his meeting with Taiwan Affairs Office head Song Tao (宋涛) (Money.udn.com, November 20, 2024). Wang proposed a so-called “new cross-strait narrative (兩岸新論述),” asserting that “governance is mutually independent, while sovereignty is shared and indivisible (治權互不隸屬 主權同而不分)” (Central News Agency, December 8). Members include Kuomintang vice-chair Andrew Hsia (夏立言) and New Party vice-chair Lee Sheng-feng (李勝峰) (China Times, November 13, 2024).

Conclusion

The documentary exposes the CCP’s systematic tactics to shape Taiwan’s society and political landscape. While public backlash and the documentary’s widespread impact indicate growing awareness, some voices continue to downplay these risks. Moving forward, it is crucial to track the CCP’s evolving tactics and Taiwan’s responses to safeguard its sovereignty and democracy. Supporting those willing to share their experiences with the united front system will be instrumental in countering these influence efforts.

Notes

[1] The Ma Ying-jeou Foundation claims to be a public policy platform that aims to “find the right direction for the country (為國家找出正確方向),” providing a channel for discussions on important issues like disadvantaged, youth, culture, energy, cross-strait, and diplomacy.