Xi Struggles to Keep Military Construction Reform on Course at Two Sessions

Executive Summary:

• Corruption within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has stymied efforts to deepen coordination in the military-industrial sector and related military equipment departments.
• The substance of Xi Jinping’s speech to military delegates at the Two Sessions was similar to his 2019 speech, focusing on issues related to the military-civil fusion and the “integrated national system.”
• No previous meeting has featured such a comprehensive list of participants involved exclusively in the military development process. This year’s participants also were mostly front-line unit personnel rather than high-ranking officers, suggesting Xi may be suspicious of information provided by the upper echelons of the military.

In early March, the annual “Two Sessions” (两会) meetings took place in Beijing (2025 Two Sessions, accessed March 4). Beyond the headline gatherings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference are a number of smaller meetings. In the military domain, one of the key events is the plenary meeting of delegations from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP). Since 2013, President Xi Jinping has attended the meeting, listening to representatives’ opinions and suggestions and delivering speeches.

This year, Xi for the first time addressed the July 2023 investigations and dismissals of numerous PLA and defense industry officials for corruption in the procurement of military equipment, disciplinary issues, and other charges (China Brief, September 20, 2023). This coincided with the announcements that several senior PLA deputies were dismissed from their posts and the news that dozens of generals and admirals were absent from the meetings, likely because they too are under investigation. This resulted in a noticeable decrease in the number of PLA attendees (Financial Times, March 1).

According to the press release published after the meeting, Xi proposed enhancing military efficiency, strengthening cross-unit coordination, and improving the management system. These statements align with the concept of the “integrated national strategic system and capabilities” (一体化国家战略体系和能力), also known as the strategy of “military-civil fusion development” (军民融合发展) (People’s Daily, December 13, 2017; PLA Daily, March 8, March 10). While this is a common topic for Xi’s speeches, the degree of focus it received and the level of urgency with which Xi delivered his message were not (China Brief, April 14, 2023). This suggests that Xi’s efforts to reform the military system still faces stubborn challenges that thus far he has failed to resolve.

2019 Redux: Xi Refocuses on Military Coordination

Since 2013, Xi has led 13 meetings at the Two Sessions with representatives from the PLA and PAP. The themes have generally been positive, as indicated by the press releases from each meeting (see Table 1). The titles of eight of the meetings (2015–2018, 2020, 2022–2024) mention specific policies, including the military-civilian fusion development strategy, innovation-driven development, normalized epidemic prevention and control, law-based governance of the military, integrated national strategic systems and capabilities, and strategic capabilities in emerging fields. Among the five years that did not focus on a particular theme, 2013 was the year Xi was made state president; 2014 came before he had implemented major military policies or responded to disasters; and 2019, 2021, and 2025 marked either the beginning or end of the 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans, as referenced in the press releases’ titles. However, for these latter three, context suggests that the lack of emphasis on specific initiatives may be due to ongoing issues within the PLA at those times—a topic that likely took up a large part of the meetings but that, for obvious reasons, was not declared in the public readouts.

The substance of Xi’s speech in 2025 exhibits a high degree of overlap with his 2019 speech—much more so than with other years. Recurring key terms include “cross-departmental” (跨部门), “cross-disciplinary” (跨领域), “cross-military-civilian” (跨军地), “bottlenecks” (堵点), “funding” (经费), “auditing” (审计), and “corruption” (腐败). These all indicate that Xi wants to prioritize the integration of the military and civilian domains to simultaneously advance military modernization while increasing efficiency and reducing corruption. The main difference between the two years’ speeches is that the rhetoric in 2025 is more urgent, suggesting that problems outlined in 2019 have persisted and are yet to be resolved.

Table 1: News Releases of Xi Jinping’s Attendance at the Plenary Meetings of the PLA and the PAP Delegations During Each Two Sessions

(Source: Compilation by the author based on news reports)

Policy coordination is particularly difficult in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This is in part due to the tiaokuai (条块) system, in which authority extends vertically and horizontally at every level of government and each group has its own interests and obligations (Mertha, 2005). Xi’s push for an “integrated national strategic system and capabilities” aims to break down these barriers. In the 2019 press release, Xi used all of the terms listed above to emphasize the need for deeper integration and coordination to unblock “chokepoints,” and resolve “difficulties” (难点). In the 2025 news release, Xi similarly urged accelerating the resolution of bottlenecks and obstacles. Improving coordination requires the removal of obstacles, but it also necessitates constructive instruments that can shape a more integrated system. In the 2019 press release, Xi emphasized the need to improve overall coordination and properly manage plans and resources. Six years later, Xi continues to make similar points, this time calling for the use of modern management concepts and methods to help enhance systematization and coherence in the process. He also reiterated the need for cross-departmental, cross-disciplinary, and cross-military-civil coordination to fully streamline planning and execution.

A responsibility system, along with appropriate supervision, is also key to encouraging large-scale, cross-unit, and cross-regional policies. This is especially true given the inefficiencies of the tiaokuai system and endemic corruption in the military. The 2019 press release called for a strict system of responsibility for implementing plans and intensified inspection and oversight efforts to resolutely prevent and overcome “formalism and bureaucracy” (形式主义、官僚主义)—bywords for paper-pushing and shirking actual responsibility. Xi also called for holding those found guilty of such behavior accountable and enforcing financial discipline to mitigate misconduct. The 2025 release, mindful of the spate of disciplinary and corruption scandals in the intervening years, exhorts officials to further double down on supervision to root out malpractice and facilitate and promote the execution of plans. This speaks to Xi’s overriding concern regarding corruption: While such malfeasance may indicate a lack of loyalty and attendant loss of power and stability for Xi, the negative impact corruption has on military modernization is at least as big a concern.

Xi also voiced concern about efficiency, a chronic problem for large bureaucracies. In the 2019 press release, Xi stressed the importance of project evaluations but signaled a need to improve the way in which projects are approved. He also mentioned the need for a frugal mindset and to strictly implement the spirit of rules meant to ensure self-discipline, such as the “Eight-point Austerity Rules” (八项规定) and the “Ten Regulations of the Central Military Commission” (军委十项规定) (MND, December 22, 2012; 12371, accessed March 11). In the 2025 press release, Xi called for adhering to the principle of building the military with frugality, scientifically allocating national defense resources, and improving the precision of fund usage and cost-effectiveness.

Speakers Include Front-line Personnel in Military Development

The 2025 meeting focused on the entire process of PLA military development (军队建设), in a departure from previous years. It covered resource allocation and usage, military-industrial production, equipment testing, and logistics support. Participants in the meeting possessed relevant backgrounds for each of these areas, as are briefly introduced below:

• Li Dong (李东): The political commissar of the School of System Engineering at the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT). He works in a department primarily responsible for operational planning and task coordination (NUDT, June 8, 2023, March 15, 2024).
• Feng Yan (丰艳): A representative of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Logistics Support Department. He likely has a background in financial management (People’s Daily, March 9).
• Liu Shuwei (刘树伟): The commander of the PLA Air Force’s 95861 Unit, responsible for testing new weapons and developing new combat tactics (Air Force News, March 31, 2021; WeChat/Jinta County Propaganda Department, February 3, 2023).
• Cui Daohu (崔道虎): A sergeant in a Rocket Force brigade that works on frontline defense engineering projects (China Military Online, March 2).
• Zhou Gang (周刚): Chief engineer of the PLA’s 63650 Unit, which engages in technical research on special materials and equipment development (China News, June 2, 2021; NUDT, November 18, 2021).
• Zheng Yuanlin (郑元林): Deputy commander of the Air Force. He previously led the unmanned aerial vehicle flight management pilot program in the Shenzhen area as chief of staff of the Southern Theater Command Air Force in 2018. He has relevant experience in using emerging resources and advancing military-civil fusion (Civil Aviation Administration of China, July 28, 2021; PLA Daily, March 10).

No previous meeting has featured such a comprehensive list of participants involved in the military development process. For example, although the 2017 meeting readout had the highest number of mentions of “military-civil fusion” (军民融合) and “technology” (科技) of any year, only four out of nine speakers had backgrounds related to the military-industrial sector or national defense technology. These included Li Yanming (厉延明), political commissar of the Navy Equipment Department; Tang Hong (唐宏), a professor at Air Force Engineering University; Li Xianyu (李贤玉), the director of a research institute at the Rocket Force Equipment Research Academy; and Zhang Yulin (张育林), deputy director of the CMC Equipment Development Department (PLA Daily, March 11, 2018; China Military Online, March 9, 2016, March 14, 2017; Kunming Institute of Botany of Chinese Academy of Sciences, September 27, 2017). These four speakers all represented the technology development and equipment sectors—a small portion of the military development process.

Military development similarly was on the agenda in 2019, though still to a lesser extent than in 2025. At that meeting, officials related to military development included Wang Huiqing (王辉青), director of the CMC Strategic Planning Office; Zhu Cheng (朱程), director of the Air Force Equipment Department; Li Jun (李军), chief of staff of the Rocket Force; and Zhang Yihu (张义瑚), deputy commander of the Central Theater Command (People’s Daily, March 12, 2018, March 13, 2019 [1], [2]; PLA Daily, March 12, 2018, March 12, 2019; China Daily, May 16, 2019). Although these officials were involved in military development, equipment demand planning and management, branch development, and theater readiness planning, they were primarily concerned with the planning process.

Another difference with the personnel invited to speak at this year’s meeting was their military grades. In 2019, all speakers were high-ranking officials at the CMC, military branches, and theater commands, whereas in 2025 most of them were front-line unit personnel. This shift suggests that Xi may be suspicious of information provided by the upper echelons of the military. This may be because previous information has been incomplete or biased—a speculative interpretation, but one that accords with analysis Xi has become less trusting of information submitted to him by those at the top of the military (Foreign Affairs, September 26, 2023). Through bypassing those officials and listening to the opinions of those who are directly involved in or responsible for military development, Xi perhaps hopes to acquire a more accurate sense of where things stand.

Conclusion

Intractable problems in the PRC system tend to be caused by stubborn vested interests and protectionism. This appears to be the case for the military-industrial sector and related military equipment departments, and would explain Xi’s difficulties in implementing his desired reforms (The Diplomat, September 12, 2024, November 5, 2024). In 2025, Xi has sought to tackle the problem head on by engaging in a comprehensive review of the issues in national defense and military development rather than focusing solely on specific aspects. He has coupled this with purges of PLA generals and senior officials in the military-industrial sector.

Xi’s reforms will not necessarily be more successful than those announced in 2019. At the Two Sessions meeting in 2023, Xi also declared the need to promote the development of the “integrated national strategic system and capabilities.” However, within a few months numerous PLA generals and senior officials in the military-industrial sector were investigated or removed from their positions. Even the representative of the CMC Equipment Development Department, Rao Wenmin (饶文敏), who had spoken at the meeting in 2023, had his status as a People’s Congress deputy revoked (Xinhua, March 8, 2023; People’s Daily, December 29, 2023). The crucial question in 2025 is whether Xi has been able to break entrenched practices and networks within the PLA and the military-industrial sector. If not, barriers to improving coordination, military-civil fusion, and efficiency are likely to persist, as is the ongoing anti-corruption drive.