Yemen’s Wildcard General—An Updated Profile of Brigadier Tariq Saleh

Yemen’s Wildcard General—An Updated Profile of Brigadier Tariq Saleh

Tariq Saleh, the nephew of former Yemeni President Ali Abdulla Saleh, is a proverbial wild card in Yemen’s interconnected wars. The former commander of Yemen’s now defunct Presidential Guard controls one of the best organized and best armed militias in Yemen, known as the National Resistance Forces (NRF). The NRF control much of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, from the port of Mocha to the outskirts of the port-city of Hodeidah. This region, known as the Tihama, is of great strategic importance due to its position between the highlands and the sea. The question is, where will Brigadier General Tariq Saleh lead the NRF as Yemen’s internationally recognized government comes under further pressure?

Brigadier Saleh is nominally allied with Yemen’s internationally recognized and Saudi-backed government-in-exile. This tenuous alliance was formed after Ali Abdullah Saleh switched sides, breaking away from the Houthis and allying himself with Saudi Arabia. Ali Abdullah Saleh was assassinated by the Houthis in December 2017. Following his uncle’s assassination, Tariq Saleh managed to flee Sana’a and subsequently form the NRF with the stated aim of avenging his uncle’s death and retaking the Yemeni capital (The National, January 12, 2018). These goals led him to form a loose alliance with the Hadi government and its primary supporter, Saudi Arabia. However, at the same time, Tariq Saleh is a favored ally of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Hedging his Bets

The government led by Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi has seen its already limited control and influence erode over the last year. Forces loyal to the Hadi government have steadily lost ground to the Houthis in the governorates of Marib and al-Jawf, while, at the same time, they are under pressure from Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces in southern governorates. Hadi-aligned forces have been largely evicted from their temporary capital of Aden by STC forces. The STC is battling Hadi’s forces in the governorates of Abyan and Shabwa (Arab News, May 18). The STC, whose leadership largely supports the recreation of an independent southern Yemen, announced that it intends to establish self-rule over the territory it occupies (Middle East Monitor, May 6).

The STC’s relationship with Tariq Saleh is ambiguous and this ambiguity has served the brigadier well over the last two years. The STC and the NRF have engaged in skirmishes over disputed territory and resources, but these have been limited. Saleh’s forces, which number between 3,000 to 4,000, continue to rely on the UAE for most of their funding and supplies. Over the last two years competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE for influence in Yemen has intensified.

Despite what is now open war between the Hadi government and the STC, Tariq Saleh and the NRF have remained on the sidelines. The NRF’s reluctance to become involved in the conflict between the STC and the Hadi government is due to the influence of the UAE. It is also a shrewd strategy on the part of the brigadier. As a favored and trusted nephew of long-serving Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Tariq Saleh had ample opportunities to learn from a master of Machiavellian tactics who possessed a comprehensive and intuitive understanding of Yemen’s tribal politics. While Tariq Saleh lacks his uncle’s charisma, he has proved himself to be a capable commander who has managed to knit together an unlikely coalition of forces.

As the only senior member of the Saleh family active on the battlefields in Yemen, some of the allies and supporters of Ali Abdullah Saleh have rallied around Tariq Saleh. Many of these men are from Yemen’s Republican Guard, which was the best trained military force in Yemen and functioned as the Saleh family’s Praetorian Guard. It is these well-trained and capable officers and NCOs that make up the core of the NRF. These men ensure that the NRF, unlike almost all of the other non-Houthi forces in Yemen, maintains a clear and responsive chain of command.

Outside of his core force, Tariq Saleh has assembled a loose alliance of regional militias. Chief among these is the Tihama Resistance Force. This group was formed in response to the Houthis’ takeover of the port city of Hodeidah in October 2014. The objective of the Tihama Resistance Force is, first and foremost, to defend the region from further incursions by the Houthis. The secondary objective is, at least for some members of its leadership, to create an independent Tihama. Most of the leadership knows that this is unlikely, though not without historical precedent, and consequently supports Saleh and the NRF in their efforts to thwart Houthi advances and their stated aim of reunifying Yemen.

Hard Choices

The reunification of Yemen, while still possible, is unlikely over the medium-term and even long-term. At best, Yemen may at some point be reunified under some kind of re-worked federal structure that grants a large degree of autonomy to southern Yemen. No single power in Yemen has the capability to dominate the whole country. While the Houthis are the preeminent military force in Yemen, their politics will limit their ability to extend control much beyond the northwest highlands and parts of the Tihama. Despite claims made by the Hadi government and those forces allied with it, Houthi control of northwest Yemen will only be eroded by internal divisions among the Houthis, popular unrest, loss of tribal support, or some combination of these three. As the last five years demonstrate, the expenditure of billions of dollars by the UAE and Saudi Arabia and a devastating aerial campaign have failed to defeat or even substantially weaken the Houthis and their allies.

Tariq Saleh, like his uncle, is a political realist who must know that he faces hard choices in the near future. While the NRF is a relatively well-run and cohesive force—at least its core fighters are—it is no match for the Houthis on its own. Without money and supplies from the UAE, the NRF would be greatly weakened and the alliances it has formed with regional militias like the Tihama Resistance Force will likely disintegrate. Yet, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are determined to reduce their involvement and expenditures in Yemen, and were so even before the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic. The UAE, which withdrew almost all of its troops from Yemen in 2019, continues to fund its proxies, of which the NRF is one. However, this support will undoubtedly continue to be reduced as the UAE faces a severe economic crisis at home (Middle East Eye, July 8, 2019). Saudi Arabia is already limiting its support for the Hadi government and its forces as it tries to extricate itself from Yemen. The reduction in outside support by Saudi Arabia and the UAE for their various proxies is already altering the political landscape in Yemen. This is most evident in the fragility of the Hadi-aligned forces.

Over the coming months, Tariq Saleh will have to decide how he will use the NRF. So far, he has successfully charted a course between the STC and the Hadi-aligned forces while continuing to engage the Houthis in limited skirmishes. Reductions in aid from outside powers, the steady weakening of Hadi’s forces, and an increasingly assertive STC will limit the options of Tariq Saleh and those of the NRF. If Hadi’s forces are pushed out of Marib by the Houthis and out of the southern governorates by the STC, the Houthis and their allies will have more resources to devote to the frontlines in the Tihama. This will put pressure on the NRF, whose core troops are already thinly spread across much of the Tihama. Without steady infusions of money and supplies, NRF forces would likely be overrun by a concerted Houthi-led offensive. This is in no one’s interest, apart from the Houthis, so it is likely that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will aid the NRF, albeit at much reduced levels. While the STC has relations with the Houthis, it is not in their interest to see the Houthis takeover parts of the Tihama. It is therefore likely that the STC would support the NRF by reinforcing vulnerable areas in the southern half of the Tihama.

Conclusion

As a talented commander and strategist, Tariq Saleh must see that his options are increasingly limited. Yet, the NRF could still play a significant, if ancillary role, in Yemen. It is the NRF that keeps the Houthis from taking the Tihama. Saleh will leverage this position to maintain at least some aid from the UAE and Saudi Arabia over the short-term. However, over the medium- and long-term, the brigadier and the NRF are likely to be little more than a placeholder force whose strength and capabilities will diminish over time.