Putin’s Courts Playing Central Role in Keeping Russians Under His Thumb

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin has made the Russian courts part of his repressive machine, transforming them from being potentially the last line of defense of Russians’ constitutional rights into agencies to suppress those rights and keep Russians from protesting.
• Putin has done so partly by restoring some of the more notorious aspects of Soviet-era jurisprudence, but he has succeeded by engaging in practices such as court- and even judge-shopping to ensure his opponents are punished regardless of their rights.
• The Kremlin leader has largely succeeded, but the fact that he has felt the need to take these steps demonstrates that there are judges within the Russian system who oppose what he is doing, which gives at least some hope for the future.

Repression in the Russian Federation under President Vladimir Putin is usually thought of as being enforced by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and other security agencies. Putin, however, has made the Russian court system a key part of his repressive apparatus. He has transformed what had been, at least occasionally, the last line of defense of Russians’ constitutional rights into Kremlin agencies whose primary function is to suppress those rights and keep Russians from protesting. Putin has succeeded to the point that he now feels free to gloat about it, praising the Russian judiciary on February 20 for preventing Russians from protesting (URA.news, February 20).  He has done so in part by reinforcing Soviet-era practices and increasingly restricting rights through trial by jury and many kinds of appeals that Russian citizens gained after 1991. In part, the Kremlin leader has introduced new practices, including having defendants tried far from home, especially, but far from exclusively, in the case of non-ethnically Russian protesters. This ensures that there are fewer demonstrations in support of such defendants and that non-Russian protestors will face judges more inclined to convict them (Novaya Gazeta Europe, February 17). That Putin has had to continue to make efforts in this direction, however, demonstrates that some judges in the Russian judicial system are prepared to uphold the law and that their existence may give some hope for some improvement in the post-Putin era. 

In a speech on February 20, reviewing the actions of the Russian judiciary over the past year, Putin explicitly linked the actions of judges to peace and stability in his country. If Russians see that the courts are just, he argued, they will see their government as just and not listen to those who call on them to protest (URA.news, February 20). The Kremlin leader said that this is what is now happening. There is good reason to conclude, however, that Putin is overstating his case and that despite his efforts, Russians now view the courts less as dispensers of justice as the 1993 Russian Constitution promised but as agents of Russian state power who, just as was the case in Soviet times, can be counted on to find almost everyone the government charges with a crime guilty and impose draconian sentences. The courts are helping to instill fear, and it is that rather than anything else that keeps people off the streets.

To achieve what he has so far, Putin has increasingly restored Soviet-era practices that Russia was moving away from in the 1990s. For example, he has restricted the ability of Russians to choose to have jury trials, quite obviously because Russian juries acquit as many as 25 percent of those charged, while Russian judges currently find far fewer than one percent of those on trial not guilty (Yesli byt’ tochnym, May 23, 2024; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 26). He has restricted appeals and has limited the ability of defense lawyers to offer extenuating evidence or seek appeals for their clients (IQ Media, April 18, 2016; Window on Eurasia, January 29). He has dramatically increased the number of trials held behind closed doors to a level not seen since Stalin’s time (Mediazona, April 27, 2023). He has moved more cases from the civil courts to military ones, thus increasing the likelihood of conviction and more draconian punishments (URA.news, February 20). He has failed to appoint enough judges—today, there are 20 percent fewer of them than authorized—and has thus encouraged trials to be handled in a rushed and rubber-stamp fashion that benefits prosecutors (Akcenty, February 1).  

Far more than his Soviet predecessors, Putin has increasingly had criminals tried not in their home areas or where the crimes were committed but far away to limit the ability of their supporters to come and demonstrate on their behalf. Protesters in Ingushetia and, more recently, in Bashkortostan are exhibit A for this practice (Fortanga, April 13, 2021). The greatest innovation of Putin’s courts has been to adopt a system often used in other countries—court and even judge “shopping.” In the United States, for example, lawyers often seek to bring suits in jurisdictions or before specific judges they believe will be more likely to rule in their favor. Such selection, even by prosecutors, however, is generally impossible in criminal cases. In Putin’s Russia, in contrast, as a new study from Novaya Gazeta Europe that examined thousands of such cases finds, it is instead prosecutors who are identifying jurisdictions and even specific judges who can be counted on to take positions the Kremlin approves of that the state and sending those charged with political crimes to be judged there rather than anywhere else. That study found that there are now jurisdictions and even judges who are viewed as specialists in these crimes, given that they have heard so many cases and because they have a record of handing down sentences that the Kremlin approves of (Novaya Gazeta Europe, February 17).

Despite the restoration of Soviet-era practices and the introduction of this new one, Putin has not achieved all he wants in the judiciary. There is a great variety of sentences Russian judges hand down in the cases of those charged with the same crime, including politically sensitive offenses (Yesli byt’ tochnym, October 27, 2023). For example, Russian jurists differ widely in rulings about vacating charges if the accused agrees to serve in Ukraine, and they vary in the fines they levy for those who engage in anti-war protests (Sever.Realii, March 15, 2023; Verska, March 1, 2024; see EDM, August 7, 2024).

Almost certainly, given his celebration of what he has achieved via the courts so far, Putin can be counted on to try to ensure that Russian courts will play an ever more prominent role in that direction in the future. The enormous size of the Russian judiciary and the Russian Federation, however, likely means that he will not fully achieve his goal of complete subordination and homogenization of that branch of the Russian government. For him, that will be a disappointment or even a defeat, but for the future of justice in Russia after he passes from the scene, such diversity in judicial responses is a hopeful sign that that country will ultimately be able to recover from Putin’s repression.