Moscow’s Ties with Post-Soviet States Possibly Transforming in Fallout of Azeri Airlines Flight Downing

Executive Summary:

• When an Azerbaijani airliner was shot down over Russian territory last December, chilled relations between Baku and Moscow caused some analysts to expect a collapse in ties and attempts by  Moscow to regain its former influence. Neither outcome is likely.
• Azerbaijani-Russian relations are becoming increasingly balanced and pragmatic, despite the confrontation over the downing of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243, likely due to the mutual benefits both Russia and Azerbaijan derive from their relationship.
• Other states in the region may view Azerbaijan’s assertiveness toward Russia as a means to challenge Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aspirations to dominate that space. This, in turn, could prompt Moscow to pursue ever more radical and aggressive moves elsewhere before this trend spreads.

On December 25, 2024, Russian anti-aircraft guns shot at an Azerbaijani civilian airliner on its way from Baku to Grozny. The plane, Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243, then crashed in northwestern Kazakhstan. As a result, 38 of the 67 passengers and crew aboard were killed. Azerbaijanis were outraged, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev demanded Moscow take responsibility, punish those responsible, and pay compensation (YouTube/@AZTV, December 29, 2024; see EDM, January 15). These were steps which Aliyev’s Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, was not prepared to take, at least to the extent which Baku thought was necessary (Meduza, February 12). As a result, Baku responded with a laundry list of actions demonstrating its displeasure, including closing the Russian House cultural center in the Azerbaijani capital, shuttering Russian news agencies in Azerbaijan, refusing to admit a Russian Duma deputy who had criticized Azerbaijanis in Russia, and rejecting Moscow’s demands that it extradite a judge to Russia (Caucasian Knot, February 24, March 10; Tsargrad.tv, March 24).

The anger in the Azerbaijani population, fully echoed in Aliyev’s words, continued to grow. Analysts in both Baku and Moscow began predicting that relations between the two countries, which had appeared to be growing in a positive direction over the last several years, were headed toward a break with Moscow losing much of its influence not only in Azerbaijan but elsewhere in the Caucasus (Caucasian Knot, December 27, 2024; Meduza, February 12). Moscow took several steps in response, including sending Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko to Baku and announcing plans to erect a statue in Russia of Haidar Aliyev, the father of the current Azerbaijani president, in the hopes that such moves would restore relations to what they were before the shoot down (Mir24, March 23).

Three months later, relations have neither worsened nor have they drastically improved, and it does not appear that this stagnation is likely to change anytime soon. Moscow and Baku have too many interests in common to allow a complete break. Even as the war of words continued and even on occasion appeared to escalate, both Baku and Moscow took steps to shore up these common interests.  Azerbaijan has confirmed its readiness to support the further development of the North-South trade corridor to Iran and the Indian Ocean, which Putin is seeking (APA.az, January 22). Baku also has backed away from its earlier support of Ukraine, something the Kremlin leader also wants but that has become easier now that Aliyev gives up nothing as far as his ties with the United States are concerned given Washington’s changed position on Kyiv (Caucasian Knot, March 19, 20; Meydan.tv, March 20). Still, Moscow’s official visit and statuary promises have not restored relations in a way that reflects Russian influence in Baku before the shootdown. Azerbaijanis remain angry, and official Baku has learned that it can express outrage on such issues without Moscow taking harsh actions against it (Tsargrad.tv, March 24). Aliyev appears to have concluded that his expression of anger at the shootdown not only has won him points from his own population but has forced Moscow to offer advantages to Baku to gain reciprocal benefits from  Azerbaijan (President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, February 11; Azernews, February 16; Kommersant, February 17).

As a result, the relationship between Baku and Moscow is likely to become ever more pragmatic and mixed, a development furthered by Azerbaijan’s geographic location, natural resources, and political leadership. The effects of these new dynamics have spread to other countries in the region, as they observe both the advantages and the lack of serious costs associated with standing up to Moscow (Bloknot, March 24). One Russian commentator, Aleksey Gusev, has gone so far as to argue that what has happened between Baku and Moscow in the wake of the Azeri plane shootdown is “the new normal” in relations between Moscow and the former Soviet republics, “a defining moment in [their] evolving ties,” and one in which “instead of a relationship between an ‘imperial center’ and ‘satellites,’ we are increasingly seeing a more complex system of mutual agreements” (Carnegie Politika, January 17).

Gusev points to examples across the former Soviet space, and one can only hope his optimistic assessment is correct. There are reasons, however, to think that he may be overly optimistic. As Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated, Putin is committed to restoring imperial or neo-imperial relationships between the Russian Federation and a number of the former Soviet republics. Consequently, challenging Moscow as boldly as Aliyev has could result in a similar conflict to the one Ukraine has experienced.  This reality is certainly on the minds of many leaders in countries that lack the advantages Azerbaijan so clearly possesses. This trend, while certainly true, may not develop as quickly as Gusev suggests, let alone become “the new normal” in the post-Soviet space anytime soon, especially if Putin concludes that he is winning in Ukraine as peace talks ensue between the United States, Ukraine, and Russia.

The reaction of the Azerbaijani people and government to Russia’s actions, which led to the downing of the Azerbaijani passenger plane, suggests just how much genuine support there is for a more nationalist line in opposition to Russian pretensions. This is perhaps especially strong in Azerbaijan but not absent anywhere else. Western policy toward this region needs to take this lean toward nationalism into account, lest Western actions lead Putin to conclude that he can act with impunity, as he appears to believe in the case with Ukraine. The Azerbaijani reaction in this case should serve as a reminder that nationalism, including its anti-Russian element, is stronger in these countries than it was a generation ago. This fact is sometimes obscured by Moscow’s manipulation of the political leaders and systems of neighboring countries. If the growth in nationalism is not recognized, there is a danger that Western countries may take actions that could lead to an even more cataclysmic transformation in Eurasia than what we are seeing in Ukraine, a transformation that would affect not only that region but the rest of the world by depriving it of the oil and gas many countries they now receive and the markets that they hope to acquire.