Kremlin Uses ‘Time of Heroes’ Program to Ensure Loyalty of Ambitious Veterans

Executive Summary:

• The Kremlin celebrated veterans on Victory Day, portraying World War II and Russia’s war against Ukraine both as fights against Nazism to justify the full-scale invasion, boost public support, and consolidate veterans’ pro-regime sentiment.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin created the “Time of Heroes” program to turn select war participants into loyal elites, using them to encourage enlistment by showing that military service is a potential pathway to securing a prominent government position.
• Putin fears that the return of veterans from his war against Ukraine may cause instability in society due to rising crime and their potential as political rivals.

On May 9, Russia celebrated Victory Day (День Победы, Den’ Pobedy), the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory in World War II, known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War (Великая Отечественная Война, Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina). Veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine took part in Victory Day celebrations (President of Russia, May 9). Their participation is one aspect of the Kremlin’s long-term strategy of linking its war against Ukraine to the Second World War, creating parallels help support Russia’s false claims that it is again fighting a Nazi power. Russian President Vladimir Putin uses the comparison to rally the Russian people, claiming that the country will succeed in Ukraine as it did in the Great Patriotic War (President of Russia, May 9).

On New Year’s Eve in 2024, Putin declared 2025 to be the “Year of the Defender of the Fatherland,” commemorating both veterans of the Second World War and those who have fought in Russia’s war against Ukraine (President of Russia, December 31, 2024, February 23). Despite celebrating veterans of his war against Ukraine, Putin has significant reason to be fearful of them, especially if there were to be mass demobilization in the event of a peace deal. There is growing evidence of an upsurge in crime in Russia associated with returning veterans (see EDM, February 25, April 3; see Strategic Snapshot, March 13). The return of veterans could constitute a larger and better-armed group than those who returned after the Soviet-Afghan war (see EDM, February 25, May 14). Meduza has reported that Kremlin officials believe there is a risk of veterans growing dissatisfied with civilian life and turning to crime, especially ex-prisoners. This could destabilize society, provoking discontent among citizens who become hostile towards veterans as a whole (Meduza, July 19, 2024; see EDM, January 19, July 16, 24, 29, September 24, November 19,  27, December 13, 2024, April 28).

Veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine mirror many qualities of veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war, known as Afgantsy (Афганцы). These similarities not only include difficult reintegration into civilian life but also the roles they fill when they return (see EDM, January 18, 2024, February 25). Civil society organizations for veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War contributed to the decline of Communist Party rule by offering spaces for political activism away from party structures. Moreover, as noted in Novaya Gazeta, “military involvement in politics is not a new phenomenon in modern Russia … following the collapse of the [Soviet Union], in the absence of a strong party system, a military career often served as a valuable reputational asset for candidates” (Novaya Gazeta, December 5, 2024).

Afghanistan-era military figures such as Boris Gromov, Alexander Lebed, and Alexander Rutskoy used the status and renown accorded by their wartime service to advance their political careers. Lieutenant-General Lev Rokhlin entered politics as a member of the Duma after serving as a commander in the First Chechen War. Putin is likely concerned about the risk of similarly ambitious military figures emerging after his war against Ukraine, using their military record as the basis for entry into politics. Moreover, Putin’s rivals are able to use soldiers’ interests to gain popularity. Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin and nationalist military blogger Igor Girkin tried to advance their personal agendas and gain an upper hand in inter-elite feuds by claiming to represent the interests of soldiers (Ukrainskaya Pravda, April 2, 2023; YouTube/@TheTimes, May 5, 2023).

The Kremlin has created mechanisms to co-opt and control returning veterans. In February 2024, Putin announced the creation of the “Time of Heroes” (Время Героев, Vremya Geroyev) Higher School of Public Administration, saying that veterans should be considered “the elite” (President of Russia; Interfax, February 29, 2024; see EDM, March 4, 13, June 10, 2024). He signaled that this new, more easily controlled, generation should replace the older oligarchic elites, asserting that “those who in previous years filled their pockets at the expense of all sorts of processes in the economy of the 90s—they are definitely not the elite” (President of Russia, February 29, 2024). Similarly, in April, Putin announced that, via the “Time of Heroes” program, “new leaders will appear in the country” (President of Russia; RBC, April 21).

The program aims to train “highly qualified, competent managers from among the participants of the special military operation for subsequent work in state and municipal authorities, as well as state-owned companies” (Vremya Geroev, accessed May 20). Of 44,000 applicants, 83 reached the final round (see EDM, June 10, 2024; Novaya Gazeta, December 5, 2024). In April, Putin launched analogues in Russian regions and occupied regions of Ukraine (President of Russia; RBC, April 21; Telegram/@SALDO_VGA, April 30).

Participants in the “Time of Heroes” program gain proximity to Putin, providing him an opportunity to influence them directly. Russian television shows program members engaging directly with Putin, most recently following this year’s Victory Day parade (President of Russia, June 14, 2024; SPB Nevnik, May 9). In October 2024, Putin appointed participant Artyom Zhoga as a presidential envoy and to the Security Council (Novaya Gazeta, October 3, 2024; RIA Novosti, October 25, 2024). Putin appointed another participant, Yevgeny Pervyshov, as Acting Governor of Tambov oblast in November 2024 (Meduza, November 4, 2024). The first cohort will attend this year’s St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, providing more opportunities to network and become embedded in the upper strata of society (Izvestiya, May 7). By creating a political and economic elite who owe their status to the Kremlin, Putin strives to instill loyalty in those likely to become prominent.

The program encourages enlistment into the Russian Army. A source in the Presidential Administration admitted that the program’s main purpose is “to show that going to fight in the war is also a potential pathway to securing a prominent position in a government agency at a later date” (Novaya Gazeta, December 5, 2024).

In his first announcement for the “Time of Heroes,” Putin said the program would only include people who would not “retreat” or “betray” Russia (President of Russia; Interfax, February 29, 2024). Putin is attempting to create a loyal elite that supports his geopolitical goals, using young leaders to advance those objectives. In September 2024, Putin appointed Artur Orlov, a participant in the program, as chair of the “Movement of the First” (Движение первых, Dvizheniya pervykh) youth movement, followed in December by fellow participant Vladislav Golovin (Movement of the First, September 24, December 27, 2024). The European Union has criticized the Movement of the First for giving children military instruction (see EDM, August 18, 2023, February 13, 27, March 25, 2024; European Union, February 23, 2024). This month, Putin appointed another “Time of Heroes” participant, Igor Yurgin, Director of the Department of State Policy of the Ministry of Education (Lenta.ru, May 12).

Concerns about crime and social instability driven by returning veterans will make Putin even more reluctant to end his war against Ukraine. Some Russians have criticized the “Time of Heroes” program for how few veterans can participate and the fact that over 20 percent of participants “already had extensive experience working in government agencies, parliaments, or non-military security structures” (Novaya Gazeta, December 5, 2024). This program is aimed less at handling the broader issues created by veterans’ return, instead meaning to create a loyal new generation of cadres who owe their position to Putin and have adopted his worldview, which they will then pass on to the country’s youth. The program endeavors to motivate ambitious soldiers now and generations to come.