Russia Continues Conservative Pivot in Arctic (Part Two)

(Part One)

Executive Summary:

• Russian analysts have redefined Arctic dynamics within the framework of a global hybrid war, viewing the region as a contested space of economic, military, and cyber confrontation with the West.
• Moscow now conceptualizes Arctic competition through five “circles,” ranging from Arctic nations to distant non-Arctic states and international organizations, each playing roles in the struggle for Arctic resources and influence.
• Amid rising tensions with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russian analysts increasingly frame the People’s Republic of China as a potential military and economic partner in the Arctic, but any dependence on the PRC could provoke internal divisions.

Following the outbreak of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian defence and security community has demonstrated that Arctic-related strategic thinking in the country is aligning along two themes. First, Russian experts extended the boundaries of the ongoing “global hybrid war” to the Arctic. Some Russian authors exploited the narrative that “the West launched an anti-Russian hybrid war in the Arctic” back in 2018 (Nota Bene, October 7, 2018). Those ideas stemmed from earlier writings that construed the Arctic region as an integral part of the “system of the arches of instability” (система дуг нестабильности, sistema dug nestabilnosti). According to Professor Vladimir Kolotov of St Petersburg State University, the “system is forming the geopolitical ‘climate,’ which is fully assisting in the implementation of the regional destabilization of uncontrolled subjects of geopolitics” (Nota Bene, October 7, 2018). In this view, the eight main geopolitical areas of interest to Moscow—Eastern Europe, Middle East, South- and East-Asia, North Africa, Arctic, Caucasus, and Central Asia—become destabilized based on the presence, or absence, of necessary conditions and factors (Saint Petersburg State University September 27, 2016).

In 2022, the mainstream Russian expert community, however, adjusted those ideas to the new reality. This resulted in a new term, “global hybrid war,” defined as a “multilayered inter-civilizational armed conflict during which the sides are deliberately using adaptive military forms of confrontation that include, among others, economic strangulation of the opponent and the use of information and cyber technologies.” “Global hybrid war” as a term signified an important shift in Russia’s earlier perception of hybrid war and its application to the Arctic region (Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, February 24, 2022).

The second important shift in Russia’s Arctic perceptions is through “circles of competition.” This concept entails a struggle for Arctic resources, which, in turn, determines Russia’s place in the Arctic. According to an article published in the Russian specialized military journal Arsenal Otechestva, competition in the Arctic includes five “circles” of countries and international organizations (Arsenal-otechestva.ru, May 4, 2023; Canadian Maritime Security Network, March 2025).

The first circle includes the so-called “Arctic countries,” including Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway, which have direct access to the Arctic and have advantages in competing for Arctic resources. The main struggle for Arctic resources will, at least initially, primarily involve these actors.

The second circle includes near-Arctic states, including Iceland, Sweden, and Finland, which do not to take a direct part in the struggle for Arctic resources but will assist their allies in performing certain functions. For instance, other Russian sources state that Sweden and Finland will play a very important role in adding their technological skills to the Western attempt to challenge Russia in the Arctic (see EDM, May 27).

The third circle includes international organizations consisting of Western countries, such as NATO, the European Union, and Nordic organizations, that have recently become stakeholders in Arctic affairs. Russian authors assume that having initiated the paralysis of the Arctic Council by “cancelling” Russia, Western powers are likely to form alternative regional forums and organizations, such as an emerging Canadian initiative to build a “new Arctic coalition.”

The fourth circle includes the United Nations and specialized subcommittees, including the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the United Nations Environment Programme, the International Maritime Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), that are not directly involved in Arctic affairs but that serve as arbiters in the region.

The fifth circle includes non-Arctic states represented by unspecified East Asian states—most likely including the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—and some European countries, which, while also unidentified, likely include Germany, France, and Poland (Arsenal-otechestva.ru, May 4, 2023; Canadian Maritime Security Network, March 2025).

Some ultra-conservative mainstream Russian security experts, such as Alexander Perendzhiev from the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, attribute developments in the Arctic region—such as Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO in 2023 and 2024, respectively—as a preparatory stage for war with Russia. Russian security experts propose that this stage is allegedly being “prepared” by the United States and France (Ukraina.ru, March 13, 2024). Perendzhiev claimed that a conflict between Russia and NATO is not restricted to Ukraine but is also likely to extend to the Arctic, as he says that NATO is conducting exercises in the region. He also assumed that, should this become the case, Russia could count on the PRC for support because of “Beijing’s desire to establish a joint [Sino-Russian] control over Arctic resources and the NSR.” (see EDM, November 14, 18). According to Perendzhiev, “if in Ukraine, [the PRC] remains indirectly involved, then in the battle for the Arctic, [the PRC] would provide direct military support to Russia” (Ukraina.ru, March 13, 2024).

While Perendzhiev is known for controversial and extravagant forecasts, his opinion may be important for Russia’s Arctic engagement. Prior to the major geopolitical shifts after 2022, the idea of essentially unconditional dependence on the PRC and even giving up part of Russia’s sovereignty over its territory would have been unconditionally rejected by the absolute majority of Russian defense experts. In their pre-2021 analyses many notable representatives of Russian defence and security communities perceived the PRC as a source of “hybrid threats” to Russia’s plans and status in the Arctic (Canadian Maritime Security Network, March 2025). Due to post-2022 events, the situation appears to have changed. The very fact that such ideas are appearing and circulating in Russian media is quite telling concerning not only the state of Russia after 2022, especially vis-à-vis NATO and the West, but also the perception of the PRC. This holds implications for how much Russia might be willing to give up, if not now, then in the future, as it gradually and inevitably weakens.

The most controversial and complex aspect in Russia’s post-2022 Arctic-related thinking will be its relationship with the PRC, which is increasingly demonstrating a growing interest in the region. Weakening and cornered Russia will continue its overreliance on the PRC. It is unclear, however, how this trend will be perceived by Russia’s ultra-conservative—usually nationalistic and chauvinist—circles. Up to a certain point, this will be tolerated—Russia simply does not have any contingency options. In the future, this could increase internal ruptures between various groups within Russian society.