Xi Jinping’s Central Position in Official Media Starts to Erode

Executive Summary:

• The relative absence of supreme leader Xi Jinping in authoritative media could indicate that his power, though still unassailable, is waning.
• There were no references to Xi or his eponymous ideology in coverage of crucial trade talks with the United States, the announcement of a new policy to boost social welfare, or at a ceremony where Premier Li Qiang and others pledged allegiance to the state constitution.
• Xi continues to face problems in two important areas: the military and the techno-industrial complex. In the former, purges have eroded his bases of support. In the latter, the unveiling of a third “big fund” for bankrolling the semiconductor industry indicates that return on investment—in the form of critical breakthroughs—has been underwhelming.
• In a first for a Party leader, Xi invited his daughter to join a dinner hosted for Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The rationale behind Xi Mingze’s appearance is unclear, though it could indicate he is making preparations for a partial retirement.

Supreme leader Xi Jinping is in no danger of losing his top spot as the “core” (核心) of the leadership before the CCP’s 21st National Congress in late 2027. According to the CCP charter, a general secretary can only be removed by either a Central Committee plenum or a full-fledged Party Congress. Most members of the CCP Central Committee confirmed at the 20th Party Congress in 2022 are Xi loyalists, so it is unlikely they will want to abandon Xi at the forthcoming Fourth Plenum (rumored to be scheduled for the autumn), or in subsequent plenary sessions.

Xi’s power increasingly appears to have peaked, however, with the high point coming at the Party’s 20th National Congress at the end of 2022. This was the moment at which “Xi Jinping thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for the new era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想) was enshrined as state dogma and Party members vowed to “safeguard the ‘core’ of the Party leadership” (维护 … 党的领导核心) (China Media Project, February 2, 2022). Since then, Xi has lost a sizable swathe of power in foreign as well as domestic affairs. This is despite that fact that opposition among many countries to the isolationist and quasi-unilateralist rhetoric and actions from the Trump administration in the United States has provided a platform to the super-nationalist hawk President Xi to show the world that the PRC should be a leader of a new world order of free trade and just international intercourse.

Xi’s desired new world order is one ruled supposedly by Confucianist principles. He often discusses the world as being “one big family” (一个大家庭) (CCTV, October 10, 2022). This family is one in which the PRC sits as patriarch—a message that was broadcast during Xi’s recent visits to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia as well as on-going meetings in Kazakhstan with participants in the second China-Central Asian summit (FMPRC, April 17; Xinhua, April 17; Xinhua, June 18).

Xi Conspicuously Absent From Frontline Policy

In the PRC’s most important diplomatic mission this year, Xi apparently failed to demonstrate strong leadership. Following negotiations with the Trump administration in Geneva on May 11–12 and then in London on June 10–11, neither Xi’s name nor Xi Jinping Thought was mentioned in comments from either the Foreign Ministry, the Commerce Ministry, or Vice-Premier He Lifeng (何立峰)—a close Xi ally and lead negotiator with the Americans (BBC Chinese, June 11).

After the London negotiations, the PRC side made a limited concession by re-opening exports of rare earth materials to the United States. The readout of the framework from the U.S. side—which was not disputed by the Chinese—claimed that Washington would levy 55 percent tariffs on PRC exports while Beijing’s duties on U.S. imports would be set at only 10 percent. A key point of leverage for the United States appears to have been allowing PRC citizens to maintain access to student visas—something that had not been a bone of contention in bilateral talks during the first Trump Administration or during the previous Biden or Obama administrations. While Trump mentioned the possibility of further talks with President Xi, PRC officials continued to avoid reference to either Xi or Xi Jinping Thought (Xinhua, June 11; FMPRC, June 12).

Domestically, citations of Xi’s name have become thinner and thinner in authoritative official media, including in the People’s Daily, Xinhua, and CCTV. For example, an article on the front page of the June 10 issue of the People’s Daily announced the release of an Opinion from the General Office of the CCP Central Committee on improving people’s livelihood. The measures discussed include boosting medical and social welfare handouts. Here, too, there was no mention of either Xi Jinping’s guidance or that cadres must follow Xi Jinping Thought while executing this important series of policies (People’s Daily, March 2).

Reference to Xi was also absent from a ceremony held by the State Council in early June. At the event, nearly 50 central government officials including ministers and department heads pledged their loyalty to the PRC Constitution (Xinhua, June 11). Premier Li Qiang (李强) oversaw the ceremony and called for implementing the plans of the CCP Central Committee but made no mention of Xi Jinping. The event itself—honoring the state constitution—is unusual in the Xi era. Since coming to power in late 2012, Xi has schemed to sideline central government units under the State Council and put all decision-making relating to both socio-economic and foreign policy concerns under CCP departments that report directly to him. Xi has seldom made reference to the PRC Constitution, despite the fact that the PRC has always claimed to be a constitutionally governed country. The most attention he has paid what is nominally the highest law in the land was in 2018, when he decided to abolish the clause limiting the tenure of the state president and premier.

Xi Faces Pressure From PLA Turmoil and Economic Woes

Xi also continues to face problems in two important areas: the military and the techno-industrial complex. Within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), evidence has emerged of infighting between generals loyal to Xi and those who have strayed to follow Xi’s foes. Since early 2025, three top generals deemed protégés of Xi—and on whom Xi relied to maintain his hold over the defense establishment—were removed by his opponents. They were General He Weidong (何卫东), the second-ranked vice-chairman of the CMC; General Miao Hua (苗华), the head of personnel and ideological inspection in the army; and the Commander of the East Theatre Command General Lin Xiangyang (林向阳). All three have disappeared from public functions since late February. Since Generals He, Miao, and Lin first earned their spurs in the now-defunct 31st Group Army based in Fujian Province, they have been close cronies of Xi when the latter served in the “frontline province” (前线省) in 1985–2002 (China Brief, March 15, April 11, April 23).

On the technology front, a state-directed investment initiative associated with Xi is not functioning as planned. Results of policies that have earmarked tens of billions of dollars to develop high-tech sectors such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, electric vehicles (EVs), and green technologies have been disappointing. For example, in mid-2024, Xi personally approved a “Big Fund 3” to invest $45 billion to subsidize chosen technologies, in particular the chip sector. This built on two previous funds set up in 2014 and 2019, respectively (Cailianshe, May 31, 2024; Nikkei Asia, January 5). Despite heavy propaganda, however, this revival of Soviet-style industrial policy has failed to achieve desired breakthroughs. Instead, corruption has been rampant. In May, Zhao Weiguo (赵伟国), the former billionaire chairman of top chip firm Tsinghua Unigroup, was given a suspended death sentence for corruption and embezzlement (Xinhua, May 14). He is only the most recent CEO of a firm that has secured subsidies from the “Big Funds” over the last decade to be found guilty of corruption (The China Project, January 4, 2023; Tom’s Hardware, May 14). Continued reliance on foreign technology in this sector was underlined earlier this year as the PRC raced to import at least $20 billion-worth of chips from Western firms before the Trump administration could take any measures to restrict access to cutting-edge technologies (Nikkei Asia, May 14; CNBC, May 30). The EV industry is in similar turmoil, entering a new round of a brutal price war, which the authorities appear powerless to stop. According to industry reports, over 400 EV firms in the PRC have shut down since 2018, a drop of 80 percent (EVBosters, April 29; Xinhua, June 4).

Party Figures Push For Policy Pivot as Xi Signals Possible Step Back

Major leaders in the party want an overall shift to the “right.” In other words, they are pushing for a pivot toward the policy of reform and opening championed by Deng Xiaoping and largely led by the Communist Youth League Faction once headed by ex-president Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and the late premier Li Keqiang (李克强). This could be one reason for Xi’s slight decline in prominence in recent times.

On June 10, at the height of U.S.-PRC trade negotiations in London, the People’s Daily ran a front-page article by Ren Zhengfei (任正非), the founder and CEO of hi-tech pioneer Huawei. The article is headlined “The More Open the Country, the More Progress we can Make” (国家越开放，会促使我们更加进步) (People’s Daily, June 10). As with other recent prominent news items, Ren’s article did not mention either Xi Jinping or Xi Jinping thought. Ren’s article—foregrounding the country’s most famous entrepreneur—was highly unusual. The last time someone from the private sector received front-page treatment in the People’s Daily was Jack Ma, back in August 2015 (People’s Daily, August 11, 2015).

Another incident reinforces the notion that Xi is taking a small step back in the run-up to the 21st CCP National Congress. At a “home banquet” thrown for the visiting Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka on June 4, Xi was unexpectedly joined by both his wife, PLA singer General Peng Liyuan (彭丽媛), and his daughter, Harvard graduate Xi Mingze (习明泽). The unusual event was not reported in PRC media and was initially reported by Belarusian state media, citing the country’s First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Snopkov. The Belarusian coverage has since been removed (Belta, accessed June 10). No CCP leader, including Mao Zedong, has ever brought his children to diplomatic functions (China Times, June 12; Lianhe Zaobao, June 11). While there is no substantial evidence to help observers understand why Xi decided to show off his daughter at this “family banquet” (家庭晚宴), there is a tradition in Chinese politics in which appearing in public with one’s children can be interpreted as a sign that a once-authoritative father is making preparations for at least partial retirement (Lianhe Zaobao, June 11; Radio French International, June 11).

Conclusion

With the Party’s putative number one apparently losing his clout in major areas of decision-making, PRC politics have entered an intriguing period. Uncertainty is exacerbated by the lack of obvious challengers to Xi Jinping—figures apparently favored by the party elders, the military, and the “red second generation” (红二代) are either deemed not heavyweight enough or are not interested in the job (Asia Society, February 14, 2024; Financial Review, February 18).

Failure to sufficiently nurture domestic technological innovation—Xi’s signal policy goal—could cripple the country’s long-standing agenda for national rejuvenation. At the same time, delays in programs to inject more investment into social security systems could hamper consumer spending, which has for decades been a weak link in the PRC’s economy. Worse, at a time when an authoritative figure could effectively parry the threats of a strongman antagonist such as Donald Trump, Xi’s relative absence could disadvantage the PRC, and further harm Beijing’s desire to contest U.S. leadership in anchoring a new world order in trade, finance, and global affairs.