Putin Tossing Generals Exposes Fractures in Presidential Control Over Russian Military

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s appointment of Colonel General Andrey Mordvichev as Commander in Chief of Russia’s Ground Forces highlights tensions in the Kremlin’s political-military leadership while sidelining critics of notorious Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov.
• The concurrent sentencing of popular Major General Ivan Popov and lesser-known cases involving Generals Gennady Anashkin and Mikhail Teplinsky reveal growing internal Russian military fractures and underscore Putin’s tight yet strained control over the country’s military leadership.
• Mordvichev’s success and the overall stability of Russia’s military command hierarchy will hinge on how well he balances loyalty to Putin with the operational demands and frustrations of field commanders.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent appointment of Colonel General Andrey Mordvichev as Commander-in-Chief of Russia’s Ground Forces highlights the Kremlin’s intentions and tensions within the political-military leadership. Pro-Kremlin Russian media and Russian military bloggers label Mordvichev, aged 49, as a younger-generation “breakthrough general” (Argumenty i Fakty; Interfax, May 22).  Even some Western analysts tend to agree that Mordvichev’s elevation signals preparations for significant offensives (Radio Svoboda, May 16). Beneath this surface-level narrative, however, Mordvichev’s appointment indicates a deeper struggle for Putin’s presidential control over the Russian military.

This change in strategic-operational level commanders indicates that Putin is taking precautions against challenges to his strategy, including the choices of political and military leadership. Mordvichev has been a prominent figure in Russia’s military operations in Ukraine. He commanded the 8th Combined Arms Army during the siege of Mariupol and later led the “Center” Group of Forces in Ukraine, which occupied Avdiivka (Telegram/mod_russia, February 17, 2024). Mordvichev was also reportedly close to a network of military figures who had previously aligned with the late Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, who unsuccessfully revolted against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2023. This faction of military figures was known for its criticism of Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov and for advocating more aggressive military strategies (see EDM, July 11, 24, 2023).

Russian military blogger Semyon Pegov wrote that Mordvichev had been nominated for the position of Commander of the Central Military District by General Sergey Surovikin, former commander of Russia’s military forces in Ukraine, who reportedly enjoyed good relations with the Wagner group (see EDM, January 26, 2023). According to Pegov, Mordvichev had once been “exiled” to Syria for stating the truth about the situation on the frontline in his reports (Telegram/Wargonzo, November 1, 2022).

Mordvichev’s new position as Ground Forces Commander primarily entails responsibility for troop readiness, rather than warfighting. This lack of direct involvement on the ground could signify Mordvichev’s exile from meaningful engagement at the strategic-operational level. Russian military analyst Yury Fedorov stated that the Ground Forces glavkomat (главкомат, meaning Command) holds a relatively weak position in Russia’s command system, as units are subordinated in peacetime to military districts and in wartime to grouping commanders (Youtube/@Populyarnaya Politika, May 16).

Mordvichev’s appointment coincides with the demise of Russian Major General Ivan Popov, the former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army (Gazeta.ru, June 23). On April 24, a Russian military court sentenced Popov to five years in prison, imposed an 800,000 ruble ($10,000) fine, and stripped him of his rank following accusations of fraud involving the theft of 1,700 tons of rolled metal products in the occupied Zaporizhzhia region (Telegram/TASS, May 24).

Military Counterintelligence branch of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly drove Popov’s prosecution, which is believed to be a presidential watchdog over the military leadership (Telegram/Dva Mayora, May 21, 2024). Russian hardline commentators widely labeled the court proceedings as groundless (Kommersant, May 6). Popov appealed personally to Putin to no avail and even reportedly sought deployment to Ukraine as an assault trooper (Kommersant, March 23, April 9).

Popov is even more popular among Russian “patriots” than Mordvichev. Russian military bloggers credit him as a popular commander for effectively countering Ukrainian offensives on the Zaporizhzhia front. Pro-war military and political commentators have praised him for prioritizing the welfare of soldiers and frontline effectiveness over bureaucratic compliance (Telegram/Politnavigator, July 12, 2023).

The sentencing of Popov signals a crackdown on independently minded commanders who have challenged the established military leadership, especially Gerasimov. In 2023, Popov openly accused Gerasimov and the Russian MoD of negligence and poor strategic decisions that led to high casualties due to inadequate artillery reconnaissance and counter-battery fire capabilities. (Kod Pamyati July 13, 2023). Popov was supported by pro-Wagner media, and his criticisms echo similar accusations made by Prigozhin (Telegram/@Greyzone, August 13, 2023). This underlines a persistent factional divide within the Russian military.

Major General Popov’s sentencing has not sparked any notable protests in Russia—a sign of the Kremlin’s tight control over “patriotic” media. The Russian authorities, nevertheless, seem to be experimenting in some cases with quieter changes of senior commanders who may hold political ambitions. One example is Commander of the Southern Military District Colonel-General Gennadiy Anashkin, another top Russian general who has been accused in Russian media of lying about the situation on the front (Gazeta.ru, November 26, 2024). At the same time, Russian media also stated that “with all his service to the Motherland, Colonel-General Anashkin fully deserved to head the Academy of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation” in “planned rotation” (RBC, November 23, 2024).

Another outspoken general that was reportedly critical of Gerasimov, Colonel-General Mikhail Teplinsky, Commander of Dniepr Grouping and the Airborne Forces, was simply defamed in the media. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Teplinsky had initially promised to support Prigozhin’s coup, but later backed down (Tsenzor, December 26, 2023).

Some Russian bloggers have speculated that Gerasimov now overshadows the newly appointed civilian Minister of Defense, Andrey Belousov (Telegram/Deti Arbata, April 30). Gerasimov, rather than Belousov, appeared twice on Russian television in April to make important announcements. The first was to publicly declare the Easter truce, and the second was on the “liberation” of  Kursk oblast (RIA Novosti, April 19, 26).

Media cases, such as Popov’s, however, underscore how Putin’s strategy for maintaining control may inadvertently deepen fractures within Russia’s military establishment at some point. While Putin’s presidential control remains tight at present, Popov could fit into the Russian imperial historical narrative of loyal Russian (then-Soviet) generals and Marshals, including Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Georgy Zhukov, who were unfairly punished and thus sacrificed themselves to Russia’s greatness. (For more information on Tukhachevsky and Zhukov, see TASS, June 11, 2017 and  Lenta.ru, June 9, 2021.)

As Mordvichev steps into his role as the Ground Forces Commander, his ability to balance loyalty to Putin with the operational demands and frustrations of field commanders could determine both his endurance and the overall stability of Russia’s military command hierarchy.