Kremlin Formalizing Cossack Mobilization Reserve

Executive Summary:

• The Russian Ministry of Defense and the All-Russian Cossack Society (VsKO) drafted an agreement in June that would formally establish a Cossack mobilization reserve.
• Cossack forces are already active in Russia’s Combat Army Reserve (BARS) system, with about 25,000 Cossacks in 18 battalions. Recent expansions suggest that the Kremlin is deepening ties between Cossack organizations and military infrastructure.
• The Kremlin continues to use the Cossack identity as a political tool, promoting a state-controlled, inclusive “registered Cossack” framework to boost military manpower and suppress independent cultural or ethnic Cossack identity.

Nikolai Doluda, the former Ataman of the All-Russian Cossack Society (VsKO) and current United Russia Duma deputy, announced on June 9 that the “formation of a [Cossack] mobilization reserve has already been worked out by the government of the Russian Federation” (TASS, June 9). The draft agreement between the Russian Ministry of Defense and VsKO, which follows up on previous proposals, would establish a Cossack mobilization reserve in 2025 (see EDM, May 1, 2024). Once the agreement is finalized, it will be sent to regional Atamans who will then sign it with the appropriate regional military leadership. The initial contract will be for three years, and the Ministry of Defense and VsKO are in the process of determining the percentage of each Cossack host that should be enrolled. The initial contract would be for a period of three years (URA.ru, June 9).

The Cossacks have played a crucial role in the Combat Army Reserve of the Country (BARS) forces since Russia’s war against Ukraine began, with Doluda estimating that there are approximately 25,000 soldiers in 18 Cossack BARS battalions (VsKO, October 3, 2023). The Russian military established a new reserve battalion, BARS-39, in April this year in Kaliningrad. While there is no definitive link to the Cossacks, the timing could suggest a connection since BARS-39’s formation coincides with the recent creation of the North-West Cossack Host, which includes both Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg (see EDM, January 30; URA.ru, April 19). The Cossacks also added a “furthest northern” Cossack society to their ranks when the Ataman of the North-West Cossacks, Maxim Buga, helped a group in Murmansk to join the register (VsKO, June 24). Regardless of whether Cossacks will serve in BARS-39, the move to institutionalize the Cossack mobilization reserve is an indication that the government will continue to encourage Kremlin-controlled Cossack militarism.

The word “Cossack” originally referred to a warrior caste that was used to settle the borders of the Russian Empire, acting as an unpaid anchor to keep these regions aligned with Moscow (O’Rourke, The Cossacks, August 2007). Some Cossacks claimed ethnic Khazar ancestry, while others claimed a more general ethnic and cultural identity. There are still many adherents of the ethnic definition of Cossackdom, but the Kremlin has been taking steps to control Cossack identity, erasing the Cossack autonomy movement and co-opting Cossack organizations for Moscow’s ends (see EDM, March 14, 23, 2023). One of the last well-known ethnic Cossack activists, Vladimir Melikhov, was recently shot down by the governor of Rostov oblast, Yuri Slyusar, in a dispute about whether a statue represented former Cossack Ataman and Nazi collaborator Pyotr Krasnov, according to Slyusar, or was a representation of any Cossack, according to Melikhov. The disagreement seemed contrived to discredit any Cossack identity not controlled by the Kremlin (Kavkaz-Uzel, April 29; Russia Post, May 9).

The creation of a Kremlin-constructed Cossack movement, the “registered Cossacks,” is another way Moscow is co-opting Cossack identity. Far from being an organization exclusively dedicated to ethnic Cossacks or those who can claim an authentic affiliation with the culture, the “registered Cossacks” appear to have no restrictions on membership other than participating in a ceremony. Fourteen members of the BARS-Kursk unit decided to “take the Cossack oath” earlier this year, in an example of Cossack identity as an instrument of the state rather than a strictly ethnic or cultural designation (Rossiyskoe Kazachestvo, January 4). At the same time, the ceremony underlines the degree to which Cossack identity was already integral to the mobilization reserve forces of the Russian Federation.

In Russia, there are two different kinds of military reserves. The first is the “total reserve,” which includes all individuals who are fit enough to serve and fall within the military’s age range. Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, stated that the total reserve size is 25 million. Former conscripts and those with military experience, however, are called up and obligated to service before the rest of the reserve (Nova.news, September 21, 2022). The “mobilization reserve,” however, is constituted of individuals who train at regular intervals and have explicitly signed contracts with the Ministry of Defense to substitute for regular soldiers when needed (Rambler Novosti, January 11, 2023). There are currently no plans to increase the size of the mobilization reserve, which estimates put at two million people  (Parlamentskaia Gazeta, January 11, 2023). Given that the registered Cossacks who meet the requirements for service are currently only 60,000 strong, the Cossacks would only constitute a fraction of the mobilization reserve forces (Parlamentskaia Gazeta, October 9, 2023). This proportion could be increased if those who join the mobilization reserve also become “registered Cossacks,” but it seems that Russia’s need for manpower on the battlefield would still far outstrip the size of the Cossack movement.

Members of the Cossack mobilization reserve would certainly meet the requirements of handling modern weaponry and undergoing regular exercises with the army and other military institutions. Cossacks of the Irkutsk oblast recently took part in training with the military, and 350 Cossacks from the Orenburg oblast took part in war games held in conjunction with military forces earlier this month (VsKO, June 9, 23). Cossacks entering into the mobilization reserve and formalizing the Cossack status already held in some 18 battalions—in other reports, as many as 27 volunteer Cossack units—will greatly increase Cossack battalions’ ability to procure weapons (VsKO, June 17). The Kremlin’s efforts to institutionalize the Cossack mobilization reserve, combined with its involvement in Cossack culture in Russian society, suggest that if Russia’s war against Ukraine ends soon, Cossack associations could play a role in facilitating the transition of its veterans back into civilian life.