Central Asia’s Water Crisis Becoming Russia’s Problem

Executive Summary:

• Water shortages in Central Asia are becoming a problem for Russia as the drought and its effects spread into Russian territories, and Central Asians call for Moscow to send water from Siberian rivers or face massive immigration.
• Russians overwhelmingly oppose the revival of Siberian river diversion because of their own water needs and because Central Asia cannot pay as much as the People’s Republic of China could for water.
• Tensions between Moscow and Central Asia are growing over water disputes, as is the prospect of large and uncontrolled Central Asian migration into Russia.

Water shortages in Central Asia are becoming a problem for Russia as the crisis, generated by climate change-induced drought and rapid, albeit slowing, population growth in Central Asia, spreads into Russian territory (see EDM, November 8, 2023; Federal City, June 19; The Times of Central Asia, June 26; Bugin Info, June 30). Central Asian countries believe that the only solution is for Moscow to divert water from Siberian rivers and have threatened Moscow with the prospect of massive migration of Central Asians into Russia if the Kremlin does not agree. Despite technical changes on Soviet-era river diversion; Russia’s need to cultivate regional goodwill following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; and the belief of some Russian scholars that river diversion would disproportionately benefit Russia, most Russian officials are staunchly opposed to any Siberian river diversion. This aversion stems from concern about domestic Russian droughts brought into focus by increasing forest fires and falling water levels in Russian rivers (see EDM, June 3).

Russia is not willing to send water abroad unless it is well compensated, something the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can afford, but Central Asian countries cannot (Sibir Realii, January 14, 2019; Window on Eurasia, February 26). Russian proposals to help Central Asia deal with water shortages remain underfunded, leading to intensified tensions between Moscow and Central Asian capitals (Podrobno.uz, July 16, 2024; Bugin Info, June 24). There is an increasingly real prospect of large and uncontrolled Central Asian migration to Russia, which would change the ethnic makeup of Russia, especially east of the Urals, threatening the social and political stability of the Russian Federation (Ia-centre.ru via Stan Radar, July 18, 2024; Versia, December 11, 2024; World Bank Group, accessed July 2).

Drought is acute across Central Asia due to global warming and the growing demands the region’s still-rapid population growth imposes on the environment. Central Asian officials and commentators are increasingly vocal in calling on Moscow to revive Siberian river diversion plans, warning that if Russia refuses them, millions of thirsty Central Asians will move into the Russian Federation in the coming decades. The water shortage crisis in Central Asia is becoming a serious political issue for Russia, as Central Asian governments recognize the potential impact on Russia should the situation worsen. Central Asians have raised the stakes by discussing how their peoples will respond if the water situation worsens. Their appeals and threats have become more frequent as the water shortage intensifies. Central Asian governments grow more convinced that Moscow needs them as allies, given Russia’s isolation as a result of its war against Ukraine. Some Russian experts say that their country would benefit from diversion because of flooding in some places and fires in others, and because new technologies, which would involve pipelines rather than canals, now make the project more attractive (Voenno-Politicheskaya Analitika, June 16, 2022; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 29, 2023; Window on Eurasia, February 1, 2023, August 21, 2023; Podrobno.uz, July 16, 2024).

Discussions about the possibility of diverting Siberian river water have increased both in Central Asia and in the Russian Federation. This is partly because of the PRC’s growing involvement in the region and dam construction in Afghanistan and Kazakhstan, which are affecting river flows into the region and Russia as well (see EDM, March 7, July 11, 2024; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 25; Voenno-Politicheskaya Analitika, March 1; Window on Eurasia, March 2). There is little evidence, however, that there has been any change in overall Russian opposition to the idea, opposition that appeared to have killed the Siberian river diversion at the end of Soviet times. (For a rare exception to that pattern, see the arguments of a Russian official in Omsk that Siberian river diversion could be “the new BAM [Baikal-Amur Mainline]” and re-energize Russian economic development at Window on Eurasia, July 6, 2022.) Instead of taking Central Asian complaints seriously, Russians have been dismissive, arguing that Central Asians have not done enough to use water efficiently and that they should not be trying to order Russia around. Russia should recognize not only its own responsibility for its problems but also how other countries are using their calls for Siberian river diversion to weaken Russia (Window on Eurasia, March 2). As a result, Moscow experts on Central Asia are saying that there is little or no prospect that Moscow will come up with the money or accept it from anyone else to build the infrastructure for the diversion of Siberian river water to Central Asia at any time before the end of the 21st century (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 15).

That hardline Russian position, one likely to continue as long as Moscow continues its war against Ukraine, will increase tensions between Russia and Central Asian governments. This will be the case despite occasional acknowledgements by Russian commentators that the Kremlin’s position is costing it friends and that the prospect of a massive influx of Central Asians into the Russian Federation, especially east of the Urals, is all too real. They even admit that such a development will change the ethnic map of Russia and threaten social and political instability, given rising Russian xenophobia against Central Asians (see EDM, May 15, 2024). If millions of Central Asians eventually flee from their water-short homelands, that will only add fuel to the fire of ethnic conflict in the Russian Federation and likely provoke more violence not only between Russians and Central Asians but also between Russians and indigenous Muslim nations, which Russians all too often lump together with the Central Asians (see EDM, October 15, 2024).  

To the extent that happens—and Moscow’s behavior makes such an outcome ever more probable—three developments are almost certain. First, the Central Asian countries are likely to distance themselves from Moscow, even as an ever-increasing number of their citizens migrate to Russia to access sufficient water. Second, the PRC, Afghanistan, and possibly other countries further from the scene will expand their influence in the region at Russia’s expense (see EDM, November 15, 2022, May 24, 2023, November 21, 2024). Third, Russia will likely become the site of more ethnic conflict and the political instability that such a development entails (Federal City, June 19). Had Moscow taken a different position on diverting some Siberian river water to Central Asia or even shown itself more sympathetic to the problems of Central Asians, it might have avoided all these unwelcome outcomes. It may now be too late for the Kremlin to recover, however, given all the attention and money it has spent on Ukraine and its neglect of countries that until recently were all too anxious to curry favor with the Russian government. That opens up new possibilities for others, including both those Russia deems its friends and allies, such as the PRC, and others it views as its geopolitical competitors.