Security Competition Intensifies on the Caspian

Executive Summary:

• The Caspian Sea is becoming a site of geopolitical conflict as Russia is rapidly losing its dominance over the four other littoral states: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.
• Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have been expanding their fleets and are now entering into security accords with each other, making them individually and collectively forces to be reckoned with by the other littoral countries and all who want to use the Caspian.
• In response to increased naval expansion and cooperation among the three Turkic littoral states, Russia is expanding its Caspian naval cooperation with Iran, setting the stage for serious competition between the three Turkic countries and Moscow, allied with Tehran.

The Caspian Sea is rapidly ceasing to be a Russian lake. The other littoral countries have grown their navies and increased cooperation amongst themselves, upending the Russian Flotilla’s preeminence in the Caspian (see EDM, June 24, 2021). Over the last few years, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have all significantly expanded their fleets. The three Turkic countries bordering the Caspian are forming more security cooperation agreements and increasing their individual and collective leverage relative to Russia. Türkiye’s backing also increases the three countries’ bargaining power vis-à-vis Russia and countries, including the People’s Republic of China and the European Union, who want to use the Caspian for transit or development (Kaspiyskiy Vestnik, July 8 [1], [2]). In a transparent effort to recover some of its former influence, Russia announced on July 14 that it will be expanding naval cooperation with Iran (Izvestiya, July 14). This announcement sets the stage for competition in the Caspian between the three Turkic countries and Türkiye, on the one hand, and Moscow and Tehran, on the other (see EDM, April 11, August 1, September 5, 2023).

The Soviet navy was the only force that mattered on the Caspian before the Soviet Union disintegrated. Since 1991, Moscow has worked hard to maintain that position, securing an agreement on territorial delimitation in 2018, which stipulated that the littoral countries would cooperate in the Caspian but not allow others to participate in naval operations (Window on Eurasia, June 23, 2018; see EDM, September 16, 2021). In the years since 2018, however, the four other littoral states have expanded their navies, with Türkiye facilitating the naval expansion of the three Turkic countries of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan (see EDM, August 1, September 5, 2023, January 21). The increase in the Turkic littoral states’ naval power has intensified since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the Kremlin can no longer take their deference for granted. The three Turkic countries have expanded their ties with outside powers, most notably Azerbaijan, which earlier this year became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Maritime Security Center (NATO MARSEC), based in Türkiye (Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, February 25; Kaspiyskiy Vestnik, July 16).

Cooperation among the three Turkic littoral states, excluding Russian involvement, has been a significant development in the Caspian Sea in recent years. Some of this cooperation has been directed at other countries, most commonly Russia and Iran. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan conducted joint naval maneuvers on the Caspian near the Russian border, and Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are moving to do the same (see EDM, April 24, July 3; Caspiyskiy Vestnik, July 8). These steps have eclipsed earlier Russian efforts to promote naval cooperation among the littoral states (Vestnik Kavkaza, July 22, 2024). While relations between Russia, its neighbors, and the West have deteriorated since 2022, the three Turkic littoral countries have expanded their cooperation on the Caspian. In response, Moscow is expanding its partnership with Iran despite past friction, including when Tehran signed but did not ratify the 2018 Caspian delimitation accord (Window on Eurasia, July 22, 2022).

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan conducted joint exercises in May and June to improve the coordination of their fleets, especially in the context of increased drone use and the need for defense against them (Kaspiyskiy Vestnik, May 19, June 18). These joint exercises build on earlier cooperations and, as a result, have attracted less attention than might otherwise be the case (see EDM, April 24, July 3). More recent developments in the naval relationships between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, as well as between Moscow and Tehran, may represent a more significant shift.  

On July 3, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev received Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister, Rashid Meredov, to discuss a wide range of issues. Media reports focused on humanitarian discussions, but also mentioned the development of expanded protection for pipelines and oil and gas platforms on the Caspian (Kaspiyskiy Vestnik, July 8). These reports suggest that Baku and Ashgabat will use their joint naval forces to protect pipelines on the floor of the Caspian and platforms on its surface against attacks or other disruptions. Just a few years ago, Azerbaijani–Turkmen cooperation would have been unthinkable, given the bilateral disputes over oil and gas fields. Now, partnership has become essential, given the changing relationship with Russia and Iran. Ties between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are warming as they seek to cope with Tehran’s plans to resume oil drilling on the Caspian after a 30-year hiatus and accordingly expand Iran’s navy (Kaspiyskiy Vestnik, May 19).

Moscow and Tehran’s July decision to conduct joint naval exercises is the most dramatic recent development in the Caspian littoral region (Izvestiya, July 14). While official government spokesmen claim that the exercises will be for “search and rescue” procedures, pro-Kremlin commentators stressed that the decision to hold joint maneuvers is a response to recent attacks by Israel and the United States on Iran’s nuclear facilities (Izvestiya, July 14). The Russian experts with whom Izvestiya spoke noted that similar joint maneuvers have been held, asserting that they are entirely normal for neighbors sharing a common sea. The analysts, however, explicitly contrasted the seriousness of the Russian–Iranian relationship with their more distant ties with the other littoral states, particularly Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (Izvestiya, July 14).

This comparison suggests Moscow now views Iran, rather than the former Soviet republics, as its key ally in the Caspian region. This shift raises the possibility that Russia and Iran, two international outcasts, are preparing for potential clashes with the three other littoral states, which are Turkic and Türkiye-backed. There is a very real risk of naval conflict between these two growing alliances, especially as Iran expands its economic and military presence on the Caspian. Moscow sees Tehran, rather than Baku, Ashgabat, or Astana, as its more reliable partner. This attitude could become a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, especially if the three Turkic states believe they can rely on their growing ties to Türkiye and the West. Shifting allegiances may put another nail in the coffin of the post-Soviet order as Moscow increasingly relies on a non-Soviet country to try to keep the Turkic Caspian littoral states in line.