
Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Process Gains Momentum with Abu Dhabi Summit
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue:
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Executive Summary:
- The July 10 summit between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Abu Dhabi marks a significant step in the ongoing peace process between the two countries.
- The summit reflects a broader shift in the South Caucasus, as Armenia and Azerbaijan strive for strategic autonomy rather than dependence on foreign powers such as the European Union or Moscow.
- While the summit was notable for its constructive atmosphere, disputes over the Zangezur Corridor, as well as domestic pressure against Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, could stall further progress
On July 10, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met in Abu Dhabi, marking a historic milestone in their ongoing peace process (President of Azerbaijan, July 10). This summit, as the first bilateral meeting in recent decades without the mediation of a major power, signaled a new phase of direct dialogue between Baku and Yerevan, and followed a format of relations proposed by Baku in December 2024 (Caspiannews.com, December 12, 2024). Unlike previous talks held in EU capitals or Moscow, the United Arab Emirates provided a neutral and geopolitically unaligned platform, enhancing the credibility and focus of the negotiations. The choice of Abu Dhabi, proposed by Azerbaijan, underscored a push for strategic autonomy and a departure from stalled, externally brokered talks that have historically struggled to deliver results.
The Abu Dhabi summit, which lasted approximately five hours, involved both expanded discussions with delegations and one-on-one talks between Pashinyan and Aliyev (President of Azerbaijan, July 10). The identical press releases shared by the foreign ministries of the two countries confirmed that both leaders consider bilateral negotiations to be the most effective format for addressing normalization issues and agree to continue pursuing result-oriented dialogue (Armenian Foreign Ministry; Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, July 10). It was also reported that both sides committed to furthering confidence-building measures and continuing the border delimitation process.
According to Taron Chakhoyan, deputy head of the Armenian Prime Minister’s Office, a consensus was reached on several issues, with further details to be disclosed soon (Sputnik Armenia, July 14). Chakhoyan noted that statements partially revealing the topics of discussion and areas of agreement would be issued in the coming days. This constructive atmosphere, as reported by both Yerevan and Baku, points to significant progress in the peace process.
The summit reflects a broader shift in the South Caucasus, where Armenia and Azerbaijan are increasingly prioritizing sovereignty over reliance on great power intermediaries. Azerbaijan’s strained relations with Russia, exacerbated by incidents such as the Yekaterinburg raids at the end of June and the unresolved crash of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 in December 2024, have prompted Baku to seek greater autonomy in its foreign policy (see EDM, January 15, July 7). Similarly, Armenia, under Pashinyan’s leadership, has distanced itself from Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and is pursuing new partnerships, creating a rare alignment of interests between Baku and Yerevan (see EDM, February 9, 2023, March 5, August 5, 2024). Russia’s war against Ukraine and rising tensions between Iran and Israel further highlight the strategic importance of a stable South Caucasus, elevating the peace process to a regional imperative.
The Abu Dhabi summit marked another milestone toward signing the peace treaty, which includes mutual recognition of territorial integrity, non-use of force, and non-interference in domestic affairs per a proposal submitted by Baku in March 2022 (Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, March 14, 2022, March 13). Two major hurdles, however, remain unresolved. The first is Azerbaijan’s demand that Armenia amend its constitution to explicitly renounce territorial claims over Karabakh, a legal loophole that Baku views as a potential flashpoint for future conflict due to lingering nationalist sentiments in Armenia. While Pashinyan has expressed openness to constitutional reform, legal and political challenges within Armenia, including opposition from nationalist factions, could delay this process beyond 2026 (See EDM, May 21). Hikmet Hajiyev, foreign policy advisor to the Azerbaijani President, reiterated days before the summit that no peace deal would be signed without this amendment (Report.az, July 8). He highlighted, however, that the agenda of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations no longer contains elements of military confrontation, which is a critical accomplishment for the two formerly warring countries.
The Zangezur Corridor, a proposed transit route through Armenia’s Syunik region, aims to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave, presenting a second issue that needs to be resolved (see EDM, October 19, 2021, January 28, 2022, October 11, 2023, April 15, September 12, 2024, March 19). Azerbaijan views the corridor as critical for economic and strategic connectivity, while Armenia has raised concerns about sovereignty and resisted demands for unimpeded passage. Recent unconfirmed reports suggest a tentative agreement may have been reached, potentially involving an international security mechanism rather than Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), which had been proposed in the November 2020 trilateral statement (APA.az, July 10). Aliyev’s earlier remarks in April 2024 hinted at flexibility, noting that Azerbaijan would accept an international control mechanism if Armenia opposed Russian involvement (President of Azerbaijan, April 23, 2024). While speculation about an American security provider has surfaced, both sides seem committed to avoiding geopolitical entanglements, making such an arrangement unlikely. The involvement of an international mechanism in place of Russia’s FSB, however, appears more plausible.
The Abu Dhabi summit builds on the incremental progress achieved in recent months and, as such, raises hopes for a tangible breakthrough in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations in the near future. Recent developments further reinforce this optimism. On August 30, 2024, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a bilateral agreement on the joint activities of their state commissions for border delimitation, adopting the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration as the basis for defining their shared border (Azertag.az, August 30, 2024). This marked the first bilateral legal document signed by the two nations, a significant step toward formalizing their relations (Prime Minister of Armenia, September 26, 2024). Armenia’s willingness to dissolve the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, which Azerbaijan has raised as another condition for signing a peace treaty, further reflects a pragmatic shift in Yerevan’s approach (Civilnet.am, April 15).
While the Abu Dhabi summit represents a historic opportunity, it is not the final step. Resolving the constitutional issue and finalizing the Zangezur Corridor arrangement will require political courage, particularly in Armenia, where domestic opposition to Pashinyan’s policies remains strong. Nevertheless, the summit’s bilateral format, neutral venue, and reported consensus on key issues demonstrate that both nations are taking ownership of the peace process. With geopolitical conditions favoring stability in the South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan have a unique chance to transform decades of conflict into a new era of cooperation. If they can overcome the remaining obstacles, the region could emerge as a model of reconciliation, with far-reaching implications for regional stability and integration.