Extradition Treaty Signals Beijing’s Wider Designs in Hungary

Executive Summary:

• Beijing and Budapest have reportedly finalized the details of an extradition treaty that reflects Beijing’s growing involvement in Hungary’s internal security.
• The new treaty comes as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has begun investing heavily in various sectors of the Hungarian economy. It builds on the presence of “illegal Chinese police stations” in Hungary and an agreement that allows PRC police to patrol jointly with Hungarian law enforcement.  
• Beijing is implementing a strategy similar to that seen in the Balkans and elsewhere and will likely use the foothold in Hungary to monitor citizens abroad and hunt down dissidents.
• Beijing has used a global network of spies and political pressure to target and hunt down dissidents—especially those of the Uyghur and Tibetan diasporas—and represents the PRC’s willingness to violate international law and other countries’ domestic laws for political ends.

In late July, Chinese media began reporting on a meeting between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Hungary to hammer out the details of an extradition treaty (Global Times; 163.com, July 20; Baidu Baijiahao, July 21). The talks took place from July 14 to 16 in Budapest between PRC representatives from various government bodies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Supreme People’s Court, and Hungarian officials from the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Prosecutor General. The two sides apparently reached a consensus on all matters and initialed the text, promising to “facilitate the early signing, ratification, and entry into force of the treaty.” Interestingly, state-owned Hungarian media has been mute on the latest talks, with the most extensive coverage seemingly coming from opposition parliamentarian Márton Tompos of the Momentum Movement (Facebook/TomposM, August 3; Momentum, August 4).

The latest progress in finalizing the Hungarian-PRC extradition treaty reflects Beijing’s growing involvement in Hungary’s internal security. Similar to the approach employed in the Balkans and elsewhere, the PRC has taken steady steps to “strengthen the legal foundation for law enforcement and judicial cooperation” between the two countries (Guardians of the Belt and Road, November 20, 2023; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 25, 2024; Global Times, July 20). 

Beijing’s wider strategy focuses heavily on increased security cooperation with potential partners in Europe. Official reasoning suggests the need to secure routes for prospective One Belt One Road (OBOR) projects and combat transnational crime (China Daily, February 18, 2024). The wide scope of past agreements, secretive negotiations, and the growing presence of overseas “police stations,” however, point to the likelihood of more nefarious purposes—namely, monitoring citizens abroad and hunting down dissidents (see China Brief, June 12, 2024; Jamestown Perspective, March 31). 

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been accommodating of Beijing’s efforts. In February 2024, he welcomed PRC Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong to a private meeting in Budapest. During the joint press conference that followed, Orbán declared, “Respect is increasingly diminishing in international diplomacy, but it has always remained between Hungary and China, and we will build our further cooperation on this long-standing friendship” (Government of Hungary; Telex, February 16, 2024). Wang stated that Hungary and the PRC were “setting an example of building a new type of international relations.” He voiced his hope that the two governments would “deepen cooperation in … counter-terrorism, combating transnational crimes, [and] security and law enforcement capacity building” for OBOR projects, specifically mentioning the Budapest-Belgrade railway (State Council of the People’s Republic of China; China Daily, February 18, 2024; Telex, December 9, 2024). 

Shortly thereafter, the German newspaper Die Welt reported that Hungary and the PRC had reached a security agreement allowing Chinese police to patrol with Hungarian law enforcement (Telex; Index.hu, March 6, 2024; Die Welt, March 15, 2024). The report pointed to a similar agreement between Beijing and Serbia but emphasized that the Hungarian-PRC arrangement was the first with an EU member state. Hungary’s Ministry of Interior confirmed independent Hungarian outlet Telex’s reporting on the matter. The official statement read, “In the future, police officers from the two countries will be able to provide joint patrol services, thereby facilitating more efficient communication between the citizens and authorities of the two countries, improving internal security and public order” (Telex, March 6, 2024). 

The reporting on these joint patrols also mentioned the possible use and expansion of “illegal Chinese police stations” throughout Hungary (see China Brief, April 12, 2024). In 2022, human rights organization Safeguard Defenders released initial findings on over 50 (later expanded to over 100) “overseas police service centers” operating across five continents (Safeguard Defenders, September 12, December 13, 2022; see China Brief, June 12, 2024; Jamestown Perspective, March 31). Independent Hungarian media outlets used the information to confirm the existence of two “service stations” in the Budapest suburbs of Józsefváros and Kőbánya (Telex, October 30, 2022; Hvg, November 1, 2022). Initially, investigators documented signs with Chinese inscriptions on both stations. Once the Hungarian government became aware of the investigations, however, the signs conspicuously disappeared with officials denying any Chinese police presence. 

The July 2025 extradition agreement builds on the declaration of intent signed by Orbán and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping during the Hungarian premier’s visit to Beijing in July 2024 (State Council of the People’s Republic of China; Index.hu, July 8, 2024; 24.hu, November 26, 2024). The declaration came on the heels of Xi’s visit to Budapest in May 2024, where he elevated Hungarian-PRC relations to the level of an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” (National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, May 10, 2024; see China Brief, September 20, 2024). 

Later, in November 2024, Orbán called on Hungarian Justice Minister Bence Tuzson and Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártö to make the necessary arrangements and submit a draft text to the government in preparation for completing the extradition agreement with Beijing (Hungarian Gazette, November 25, 2024). At the time, an anonymous Far East expert for the independent, conservative Hungarian newspaper Magyar Hang warned that while official discourse points to cracking down on organized crime networks, the arrangements “could also target the political opponents” of the CCP (Magyar Hang, November 28, 2024). 

Cooperation between the PRC and Serbia on extradition matters sheds some light on how these measures may play out in Hungary. An extradition treaty was inked during Xi’s state visit to Belgrade on May 7 and 8, notably coming right before his trip to Budapest. Once made public, Laura Harth, a director at Safeguard Defenders, warned, “Anyone who is considered by Beijing to be a critic of the regime should think twice before traveling to Serbia” (Radio Slobodna Europa, May 15, 2024). 

Her words were somewhat corroborated in December 2024 when Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Balkan Service published evidence that Serbia had already extradited at least five Chinese citizens without the formal treaty (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 5, 2024). The report also pointed to the potential for Beijing to target vulnerable groups, such as Uyghur and Tibetan diaspora communities. Thus, while the ratification process is still awaiting approval in the Serbian parliament, extraditions will likely continue.  

PRC actions in Hungary and Serbia are illustrative of Beijing’s global designs to hunt down alleged “corrupt citizens” and dissidents. In April, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) released a report detailing the story of Businessman H., who was arrested by French authorities based on an Interpol red notice alleging his complicity in a money laundering and embezzlement scandal in China (ICIJ, April 29). Despite the charges, in reality, Beijing wanted H. extradited to testify in an unrelated corruption case against former Vice Minister of Public Security, Sun Lijun, and used Chinese tech titan Jack Ma to pressure H. to return home. Beijing’s weaponization of international law enforcement and misuse of Interpol red notices have become common practice in terrorizing citizens abroad and bringing back alleged criminals for political ends.

The PRC also uses a global network of spies and political pressure to hunt down dissidents, including those in the Uyghur and Tibetan diasporas. For example, Operation Fox Hunt, which was launched by Xi in 2014, was meant to be the cornerstone of Beijing’s so-called “anti-corruption” campaign and even involved operations on U.S. soil (ProPublica, July 22, 2021). Instead, Chinese fugitives accused of financial crimes were located and returned to the PRC, with many allegations being fabricated to prosecute and interrogate CCP critics. Earlier this year, Beijing pressured Thai authorities to forcibly deport 40 Chinese citizens, who are Uyghur, back to the PRC’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) despite credible evidence of “repression and egregious human rights violations against the Uyghur population” in the XUAR (United Nations; ICJ, February 27). 

Beijing has used such operations, and many others, to “brazenly persecute[e] Chinese people around the world” and “defy other nations’ laws and borders with impunity” (ProPublica, July 22, 2021). The PRC’s growing surveillance and intelligence presence in Europe builds on networks already established by other nefarious actors, including Russia (see China Brief, April 12, 2024). As a result, PRC citizens on the continent are being increasingly targeted and will likely be extradited in higher numbers should other European countries follow Hungary and Serbia’s example. 

Overall, the Hungarian-PRC extradition treaty highlights Budapest’s pivot to the East (see EDM, June 25; Hungarian Parliament, July 25; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, July 29). Beyond security cooperation, the PRC has begun investing heavily in various sectors of the Hungarian economy. On July 27, Szijjártó, in a meeting with PRC officials, claimed that in 2024, “one-third of all Chinese investments in Europe came to Hungary” and that “four out of the five largest Chinese corporate investments underway in Europe are taking place in Hungary” (Magyar Nemzet, July 28). 

The massive battery plant being built by Chinese battery giant Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., or CATL, in Orbán’s favored city of Debrecen, was supposed to represent the single largest foreign investment in Hungarian history at 7.34 billion euros (CATL, August 12, 2022). The project, however, has been suspended and pared down on multiple occasions, and Telex claims CATL intends to fire most of the plant’s Hungarian workers (Telex, July 2; Index.hu; Világ Gazdaság, June 26; 24.hu, July 15). Additionally, locals are increasingly incensed with environmental damage and the massive influx of migrant workers from the PRC and elsewhere. 

The Fidesz government is scrambling to maintain domestic support and trigger short-term economic growth in the lead-up to the April 2026 parliamentary elections. Orbán’s tenuous hold on power and a failing economy may mean he is willing to “play ball” with Beijing when it comes to the surveillance and extradition of Chinese citizens in Hungary. Hungarian law enforcement’s use of Huawei and ZTE technology has already raised alarm bells of PRC surveillance (24.hu, February 18, 2019; Atlatszo, August 15, 2023). The extradition treaty may further weaponize those tools as the Hungarian authorities increase coordination with their PRC counterparts. In a wider sense, Beijing’s growing security presence in Hungary means that the PRC now wields not only significant economic leverage but also an intelligence and surveillance foothold on the soil of an EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member.