Russian ‘Code’ and Stalin’s Rehabilitation Highlight Kremlin’s Ideological Turn

Executive Summary:

• Sergey Karaganov, one of the founders of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, has created the “Code of the Russian” to codify an analogue of Soviet ideals adapted to Putin’s Russia.
• Stalin’s image is being rehabilitated in Russia through new monuments and official praise that reinforces strongman traditions in Russian leadership and compares the Russian fight against the Nazis in World War II to the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Karaganov’s code fits into the broader revival of historical conservative and imperial ideologies in Putin’s Russia, of which Stalin’s rehabilitation is a central part. The cult of a strong central leader and sprawling state power has once again become the dominant motif of Russia’s public and official discourse.

On September 11, Russian scholarly journal Russia in Global Affairs highlighted a new research project, “Russia’s Living Idea-Dream: The Code of the Russian in the 21st Century.” The project aims to build on a similarly titled report published by Sergey Karaganov, one of the founders of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and his like-minded colleagues (Faculty of World Economy and World Politics, July 11). Karaganov’s research is meant to provide a “general ideological platform, which would guide state-building and societal and individual development [and] should be a key criterion for selecting [Russia’s] governing elite” (Russia in Global Affairs, September 11). The initial report emphasizes that great powers must have a grand unifying idea of national identity or face collapse.

Karaganov’s work is meant to codify a renewed set of norms for Russian citizenship and identity in the making of a new world order (Russia in Global Affairs, July 2025). It aspires to become a new moral-political guide for Russian society; an analogue of Soviet ideals adapted to modern conditions. The key provisions include an emphasis on spiritual values, humanism, preservation of nature, and service to the Motherland. Karaganov also stresses strong patriotism and undivided loyalty to the state.

The newly formed Russian code calls for continuity in Russia’s historical mission as a global leader and spotlights unity in diversity, albeit on Moscow’s terms. Karaganov points to Russia’s special mission—namely, to save the world from a “new age of wars” and preserve humanity (Russia in Global Affairs, July 2025). Russians are proclaimed to be a “warrior people, armed peacekeepers” who prevent global domination by aggressor states. In terms of diversity, Karaganov notes that the path of Russian identity decidedly breaks with Western values and culture. He calls for Russia to become the “civilization of civilizations,” though it comes with the veneer of “Russification.”

Karaganov positions his code not as the final truth but as a starting point for broad public discussion and the development of a new national idea. The wider research project is meant to build on his initial ideas and solidify tenets of the code that can then be incorporated into school and university curricula (Russia in Global Affairs, September 11). This effectively means an attempt to introduce a state ideology, despite the formal ban on ideology in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, Karaganov asserts that the Basic Law is so vague that it does not prohibit the development of a “supported ideology” that moves the country forward (EurAsia Daily, July 14). His code aspires to combine patriotism, traditional values, and great-power ambitions with elements of moral humanism.

The new Russian code has come to the forefront of public debate at a time of marked resurgence in rehabilitating Stalin’s image (see EDM, September 9). This rehabilitation has manifested in the installation of new monuments to the Soviet dictator and favorable public statements from Russian officials. For example, in December 2024, a full-size statue of Stalin was unveiled in the city of Vologda, where he was sent in exile in 1911. Georgy Filimonov, governor of Vologda oblast, personally initiated the monument’s installation, calling it a “public demand.” He characterized Stalin as a man who left “an indelible mark on the history” of Russia (RBC, December 21, 2024).

More recently, at the end of June, a bust of Stalin appeared in the city of Nikolsk in the Vologda region, next to a monument to Lenin (Fontanka.ru, July 1). Local officials emphasized that the installation was initiated by residents themselves. Filimonov responded enthusiastically to this grassroots action: “The people of Nikolsk are great … The people see to the root and separate the wheat from the chaff,” meaning they understand what is essential to Russian history. These actions highlight not only the top-down but also the bottom-up nature of Stalin’s rehabilitation (see EDM, September 9).

The process is gaining momentum in other regions as well. For example, in Buryatia, the first monument to Stalin was unveiled in May in the republic’s capital of Ulan-Ude (RBC, May 6). The ceremony took place on the eve of the 80th anniversary of Victory Day. The monument was installed next to busts of Lenin and Marx, once again, as the “result of a grassroots initiative,” according to the press service of the local branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Numerous Communist Party deputies and veterans attended the event, emphasizing the connection to the Soviet past. The image of Stalin is increasingly returning to public spaces, often with the blessing or direct involvement of local officials.

In addition, Russian officials are increasingly resorting to Stalin-era toponyms. In April, by decree of President Vladimir Putin, Volgograd International Airport was officially renamed “Stalingrad International Airport” in clear reverence to Stalin (TASS, April 29). In the run-up to the 2025 Victory Day celebrations, the name Stalingrad was heard in many patriotic events, indirectly rehabilitating Stalin as the “supreme commander-in-chief” (RBC, May 15).

The rehabilitation of Stalin and his “cult of personality” underscores Karaganov’s attempt to reconcile the Soviet past with modern Russian identity. His “Code of the Russian” coincides with a rise in belligerent rhetoric meant to transform Russia into a besieged fortress united around its leader, Putin. In his report, Karaganov calls Russians “a warlike people” who know the price of war and are ready to “go into bayonet charge if needed” (Russia in Global Affairs, July 2025). This invocation of a militaristic spirit and self-sacrifice for the Motherland echoes Stalin-era appeals in which the people were called to fight to the death against the enemy.

The revived Soviet rhetoric has also played a role in Moscow’s war propaganda. Russian propagandists regularly compare Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine with World War II, known as the “Great Patriotic War” in Russia, drawing parallels between Putin and Stalin as strong commanders-in-chief (see EDM, February 2, 2023, May 6, 8). Putin’s war speeches have been reminiscent of Stalin-era rhetoric in branding opponents as “national traitors” and “a fifth column,” evoking images of internal enemies of the Russian people (The Insider, May 25). Official rhetoric that divides society into “patriots” and “enemies” points to a committed revival of totalitarian patterns of thought. Such propaganda seeks to strengthen Putin’s own personality cult, displaying the image of a wise and decisive leader who must be trusted unconditionally.

Some observers point out similarities between current repressive measures in Russian society and Stalin-era practices (see EDM, July 25, 2023, February 26, 2024, September 9). While the scale is incomparable, the methods of punitive cases for dissent and increased rhetoric about “cleansing society” of enemies invite historical parallels. Since the beginning of Moscow’s full-scale invasion, the Kremlin has tightened internal control through new articles of the Russian Criminal Code that have been used to punish thousands of citizens, introducing charges for “discrediting” the army or war effort (Meduza, January 22, 2024; Novaya Gazeta Europa, April 21). Opponents of the regime, including journalists, activists, and opposition figures, are regularly branded on federal channels as “saboteurs” and “spies,” further reinforcing the image of political opposition as “enemies of the people” (The Moscow Times, December 20, 2022). Furthermore, Moscow has expanded its surveillance powers and introduced heavy penalties for alleged “misuse” of the Internet (see EDM, July 29).

Karaganov’s attempt to craft an official state ideology centers on Putin’s own cult of personality. Pro-Putin leaders consistently place the Kremlin leader’s legacy alongside some of Russia’s most prominent historical leaders. Throughout 2024, pro-Kremlin figures extolled Putin in terms reminiscent of Stalin. Federation Council Chair Valentina Matviyenko called Putin a “gift of fate for Russia,” while state propagandists compared his war strategy to the feats of Peter the Great (TASS, December 20, 2024). Filimonov, governor of Vologda oblast, called Putin a “gatherer of Russian lands,” a historical moniker for Russian leaders with imperialist ambitions, an image Putin actively cultivates (see EDM, March 4, July 8, 2024; The Moscow Times, May 19).

Putin’s cult also extends to wider Russian society. Patriotic rallies and concerts are held regularly, and crowds of thousands chant slogans in support of their president (Meduza, May 11, 2022; The Moscow Times, September 10, 2023). State television airs glowing documentaries about Putin, his quotes become slogans, and criticism is effectively taboo (Meduza, May 5; see EDM, July 24). Taken together, these trends show that the country is taking demonstrative steps toward reviving an atmosphere of ideological monolithism, leader worship, and suppression of dissent.

Karaganov’s code fits into the broader revival of historical conservative and imperial ideologies in Putin’s Russia, of which Stalin’s rehabilitation is a central part (Miloserdie.ru, October 19, 2024). This new ideological course is actively taking shape and combines patriotism, traditional values, and the glorification of state power. How deep the restoration of Soviet and totalitarian thinking will lead remains to be seen. For now, one thing is clear: the cult of a strong central leader and sprawling state power has once again become the dominant motif of Russia’s public and official discourse.