Iran and Belarus Boost Their Partnership

Executive Summary:

• Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, on August 19, met with Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Minsk following a string of previous high-level visits that expanded bilateral relations in commercial and military spheres.
• Tensions with the West have pushed Belarus and Iran to seek alignment in the late 2010s, and Russia’s war against Ukraine has accelerated this trend.
• The growing relationship between the Islamic Republic and Belarus factors into their aims to combat Western influence and aspirations to build a multipolar world.

On August 19, the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian paid a visit to Belarus, where he met with his counterpart, Alyaksandr Lukashenka (President of Iran, August 19). The visit was originally scheduled for early June, but due to the confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv, it was postponed until August. The two countries signed 12 cooperation documents, pledging greater cooperation in areas such as politics, tourism, media, investment, and special economic and industrial zones (Tehran Times, August 20). Additionally, the two presidents signed a joint statement to deepen the development of relations between Belarus and Iran. The two sides also expressed satisfaction with the dynamic development of bilateral cooperation, as reflected in the increased frequency of high-level visits in recent years. More importantly, the Iranian president also suggested that the Islamic Republic of Iran could consider developing a strategic partnership model with Belarus (President of Iran, August 20).

The visit is not a standalone event in Iran–Belarus relations. Instead, it follows previous high-level visits, which included a March 2023 trip by the Belarusian president to Tehran. During this trip, the two countries signed the “Roadmap for Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and the Islamic Republic of Iran for 2023–2026” (Belta, August 20).

Belarus and Iran have been cooperating in scientific and technical spheres, including medicine and medical equipment, microbiology, nanotechnology, and energy (Newsweekly.by, June 26). In 2024, the two established permanent trade offices to limit exposure to the U.S. dollar and increase the use of local currencies (TINN.ir, December 9, 2024).

The expanding ties are loosely based on a strategic cooperation agreement reached in 2007 (President of Belarus, May 21). It provided Belarus with access to Iranian oil, while Tehran benefited from Minsk’s nuclear expertise (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 21, 2007). This was also the period when both countries began facing isolation from the West. In mid-2015, both Iran and Belarus experienced some thawing of relations with the West. Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Western countries, the People’s Republic of China, and Russia, while Belarus’ ties with the European Union thawed (Islamic Republic News Agency, October 18, 2015; Council of the European Union, October 29, 2015).

This somewhat slowed down the alignment between Tehran and Minsk. The opening in relations with Western countries, however, was short-lived, and by 2018, both countries again began facing major Western pressure, both economically and politically (see EDM, February 24, 2016, July 26, 2017, November 8, 2018, February 22, 2019; U.S. State Department, April 4, 2019). This paved the way for another round of growing cooperation between Minsk and Tehran, especially since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, when relations evolved from purely transactional to a deeper alignment (President of Belarus, September 7, 2018). For example, Belarus and Iran have begun to rely on each other in mitigating the effects of Western sanctions (West Asia News Agency, August 20).

Tehran and Minsk’s cooperation became more pronounced and increasingly rooted in their common understanding of global problems and the need to limit the West’s influence in both the former Soviet space and the Middle East (see EDM, December 12, 2019, January 28, October 1, 2020, July 14, September 11). Russia’s war against Ukraine also pulled Belarus and Iran closer in other ways. Both were indirectly linked to the conflict. Belarus openly supported Russia, allowing its territory to be used for overland military maneuverings, while Iran supplied Moscow with high-tech Shahed drones (see EDM, March 6, April 10, December 12, February 22, April 25, 30, 2024, March 18, June 4).

A shift is also taking place in the military cooperation between Belarus and Iran. In 2023, a defense memorandum was inked between Belarus and Iran (Tehran Times, July 31, 2023). Around the same time, media reports emerged that Belarus was interested in manufacturing Shahed drones in a factory near the border with Ukraine (Ukrainska Pravda, May 8, 2023; Kyiv Post, August 1, 2023). In March 2025, the defense ministers of Iran and Belarus signed a defense cooperation agreement (Iranpress, March 12). Later in May, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces, Vladimir Nikolaevich Kupriyanyuk, visited Tehran for meetings with Iranian high officials (Rasim News Agency, May 21).

Belarus and Iran also cooperate within multilateral organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, of which Iran is a member and Belarus is a partner country  (President of Iran, August 20). [1] Iran and Belarus became members of the SCO in 2023 and 2024, respectively (see EDM, July 12, 2023, July 15, 2024). Both countries have expanded their engagement with these organizations, which aligns with their vision of looking eastward to Asia as a counterbalance to the West.

Minks and Tehran enjoy a close relationship with Moscow economically and politically. Belarus’ membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Iran’s interest in developing closer ties with the organization strengthen this relationship (see EDM, February 28, 2024, February 26). In March, the Islamic Republic and the EAEU agreed to establish a free trade agreement (Eurasian Economic Commission, May 15). Iran and Russia have a shared interest in the effective operation and expansion of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which is often viewed as a link between major Russian cities, Iran, and the Indian Ocean (see EDM, June 7, 2023, March 6, May 7, 2024). Given Minsk’s close ties with Moscow, the connectivity from Belarus to the Islamic Republic appears to be a viable route.

The alignment between Belarus and Iran is likely to remain strong. Their engagement within the SCO and BRICS, as well as their close ties with Russia, will serve as a powerful incentive to expand bilateral relations in both political and economic spheres. Enmity with the West, coupled with the emphasis on a multipolar world order, will also play a large role in bringing Minsk and Tehran closer together, despite their geographic distance.

Note:

[1] BRICS is a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, the PRC, South Africa, and has since expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates.