Crimea as Ukraine’s Trump Card Against Russia

Executive Summary:

• This year, Ukraine has taken the initiative at sea and focused more strikes on Crimea and Russian positions in the Black Sea. With new tactics and weaponry, these attacks have become more difficult for the Russian military to counter.
• The end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024 proved fatal for the Russian Black Sea Fleet, as Ukraine has destroyed or seriously damaged at least one-third of the fleet’s vessels, including the Rostov-na-Donu submarine targeted on August 2.
• Ukraine’s continued strikes against the Russian surface fleet, air defense facilities, airfields, and ammunition and fuel depots in Crimea could give Ukrainian forces an opening to gain a much stronger position in reclaiming the peninsula.

On August 2, residents of occupied Crimea said that they heard explosions and reported an alleged strike on a shipyard used to repair ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) positioned off the Bay of Sevastopol (The Kyiv Independent, August 2). The Telegram channel “Crimean Wind” also shared footage of burning debris in Sevastopol and claimed that smoke was rising from the BSF’s 13th Ship Repair Plant in Kilen Bay (T.me/Crimeanwind, August 1). Earlier this year, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that in 2024, Crimea and the related battle in the Black Sea would become the war’s center of gravity. According to Zelenskyy, the isolation of occupied Crimea and the weakening of the Russian military potential in the region “is extremely important for us because it is a way to reduce the number of attacks from this region.” A successful operation would be an “example for the world” and would have a significant effect inside Russia. The loss of a central element of Kremlin propaganda would show that “thousands of Russian officers died only because of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s ambitions” (Ukrainska Pravda, January 1; Kuzio, “Crimea: Where Russia’s War Started and Where Ukraine Will Win,” July 8). This year, strikes from Ukrainian defense forces on military units and facilities in Crimea have become more frequent, both on land and at sea. With new tactics and weapons, these attacks have become more difficult for the Russian military to counter. As a result, Russia’s military losses in Crimea have increased. Ukraine’s focus on Crimea demonstrates its resilience and dedication to reclaiming the occupied territories and how it is gaining the initiative at sea (see EDM, August 13).

The BSF’s basing in Crimea became risky in the summer of 2022 when Ukraine first received cruise missiles and kamikaze drones. Already after the first drone attacks on Sevastopol, the Russian High Command canceled the Navy Day parade in July 2022 and introduced an increased “yellow” threat level for the population (Defence.ua, July 31, 2022). Moscow additionally began checking the readiness of Sevastopol’s bomb shelters, which was never done even during the Cold War (VKontakte, August 22, 2022). Mobile concrete shelters have even appeared on the streets of Crimean cities. The attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge on October 8, 2022, demonstrated Russia’s growing vulnerability in Crimea (24TV, October 8, 2023).  

After successive Ukrainian strikes, the BSF leadership decided to relocate the fleet’s newest ships, submarines, and part of the headquarters to Novorossiysk. By the beginning of 2023, a few ships and submarines built after 2014 were relocated to Novorossiusk: two Project 1135.6 frigates, three Project 21631 Buyan-class corvettes, four Project 22160 patrol ships, three Project 636.3 submarines, and a large Project 11711 Ivan Gren-class landing ship. At least two-thirds of the fleet continued to be based in Sevastopol, mainly due to the large number of auxiliary fleet vessels (Focus, October 24, 2023). Russian command also considered more distant basing points for the withdrawal of its forces. Thus, the Ochamchira naval base appeared on the territory of the breakaway Republic of Abkhazia in Georgia (see EDM, October 11, 2023, January 17). The port holds potential for the Russian fleet, as it was recently modernized and can accommodate up to a dozen small minesweeper-class ships. Its location, however, is rather far from the BSF’s current operational zone. The movement of ships there would essentially mean their withdrawal from participation in ongoing operations (ZN.ua, October 11, 2023).   

The end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024 proved fatal for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. During this period, five Russian surface ships and one submarine were either destroyed or seriously damaged, primarily in Crimea (see EDM, March 11, 26). The cause of these losses was asymmetric Ukrainian attacks with a combination of missiles and kamikaze drones on ships in the Crimean ports and at the roadstead nearby (see EDM, September 26, 2023, June 27). Due to the extraordinary risk of further losses, the Russian Navy decided to withdraw Soviet missile ships from Sevastopol. Only two 40-year-old Project 1135 Krivak-class frigates and two 25-year-old Project 1239 Bora-class guided-missile corvettes were left in Sevastopol. To free up space for these large ships, some smaller class vessels were relocated from Novorossiysk to ports on the Sea of Azov.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian attacks on Crimea have continued. On August 3, the submarine Rostov-na-Donu, which had been under repair in Sevastopol Bay since September of last year, was hit by a Ukrainian missile strike (UNIAN, August 4). With this successful strike, a total of three Russian naval platforms carrying Kalibr missiles have now been destroyed or damaged, with a total salvo of 20 missiles aboard. All of them, a submarine and two corvettes, were attacked by Ukrainians while docked at Crimean bases in Sevastopol and Kerch. Russia still poses a threat to Ukraine, however, from its operationally ready Kalibr missile ships and submarines in the eastern Black and Caspian seas with a potential salvo of 80-plus missiles.

Russia still keeps some of its surface fleet in Crimea, with at least three landing ships under repair, about 18 maneuverable anti-diversion boats, several small corvettes for sea control, minesweepers, and reconnaissance vessels (RBC Ukraine, August 6). Nevertheless, almost all of the BSF is in a state of operational constraint, as tasks at sea are performed very rarely and with significant additional security. At the beginning of the war (Euractiv, July 9). In recent months, however, there have often been no Russian ships at sea. Simultaneously, Russian naval aviation is operating very intensively, patrolling coastal areas in search of Ukrainian kamikaze drones.

Continued and increased Ukrainian strikes against the Russian surface fleet, air defense facilities, airfields, ammunition, and fuel depots in Crimea could give Ukrainian forces a much stronger position for reclaiming control and sovereignty over Crimea and could trigger the de-occupation of the Sea of Azov region. The overall situation for Ukrainian forces could gain even more tempo with further surprise asymmetric actions aimed at isolating and weakening the Russian grouping in Crimea from the north. New opportunities are emerging in Ukraine for taking back the initiative, with efforts concentrated on areas where Russian forces are weakest and attacks would be least expected.