Islamic State Increasingly Targeted and Threatened Western Sporting Events in Advance of the Paris Olympics

Executive Summary:

• Islamic State (IS) and its Afghan affiliate, Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), have become increasingly active in terms of operations and propaganda since Hamas’s assault on Israel on October 7, 2023 and the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow on March 22. This rhetoric disproportionally targeted sporting events, especially the July 26–August 11 Paris Olympics and the June 14–July 14 UEFA Euro Football Championship in Germany.
• While instances of sabotage and vandalism by currently unidentified actors did occur during the Olympics, there were no large-scale attacks. Nevertheless, this may be owed in part to heightened Western security, which foiled numerous plots and made several arrests in the period leading up to the event.
• It remains to be seen whether this will prompt a change in IS’s strategy, or if Western sporting events will continue to be a key target for the group in the years to come.

Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) and pro-Islamic State (IS) propagandists have ramped up efforts to direct external operations against the West in 2024 (x/@lucasadwebber, February 11). They have exploited sentiments fueled by the Israel–Hamas war since October 7, 2023, and leveraged momentum from the March 22 assault on Crocus City Hall in Moscow (see Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 28). During this period, IS has increased the volume of its propaganda output calling for attacks against Israel, Jews, and the West. However, IS rhetoric has more recently targeted sporting events, especially the Paris Olympics, which ran from July 26 to August 11.

This surge in IS media has coincided with several attacks, foiled plots, and arrests in the West. Consequently, several Western countries have raised terrorism alert levels, and the threat of officially directed IS attacks is increasing (EurActiv, March 20). While a major attack was fortunately avoided at the Olympics and a recent soccer championship, IS may continue to target sporting venues and areas where fans congregate, in an attempt to capitalize on high-density soft targets.

IS Propaganda Post-October 7

IS’s latest campaign targeting the West first intensified following Quran-burning incidents in multiple Scandinavian countries in early 2023. This was further amplified following the Hamas attack and subsequent Israeli military invasion and aerial bombardment of Gaza in October 2023. Shortly after the onset of the conflict, IS published an editorial titled “Practical Steps to Fight the Jews” in its weekly al-Naba newsletter, which called for attacks on Israeli, Jewish, and other Western interests. ISKP also published an English translation of the article in its Voice of Khorasan magazine with an infographic titled “Practical Steps to Confront the Jew,” which advised supporters on what weapons to use to attack Jewish economic, educational, and entertainment targets and encouraged its readers to conduct cyber attacks (Militant Wire, December 24, 2023). The post-October 7 campaign was much more successful than the earlier blasphemy-focused efforts, inspiring attacks in France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Australia—with many additional plots foiled (SWI swissinfo, March 25).

IS also placed a greater emphasis on centrally directed external operations than it has in recent years, carrying out attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia. These efforts have largely been run through ISKP (Afghanistan International, January 19). Following the double-suicide bombing in Kerman in January—the deadliest terrorist attack in Iran since 1979 (see Terrorism Monitor, March 1)—IS spokesman Abu Hudhayfa al-Ansari called upon followers to target “Jews, Christians, or their allies, on the streets and roads of America, Europe, and the world” in an audio statement titled “And Kill Them Wherever You Find Them.” Al-Ansari instructed followers to “detonate explosives, burn them with grenades and fiery agents, shoot them with bullets, cut their throats with sharp knives, and run them over with vehicles.” The spokesman released a subsequent statement after the Moscow Crocus City Hall attack to praise the attacks in Kerman and Moscow as well as the January 28 church shooting in Istanbul, exhorting followers to commit further violence in the West and around the world.

Post-Crocus City Hall Campaign Targeting Sporting Events

The assault on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall marked a new phase, with IS, ISKP, IS’s province in Pakistan, and an array of pro-IS media outlets beginning to call for violence and providing advice on striking sporting events in the West. The push specifically emphasized attacks on the UEFA Euro Football Championship in Germany (June 14–July 14) and the Olympics in France (DW, June 6). This was particularly concerning given IS’s record of attacking sporting events across multiple continents, such as the IS attack on the Stade de France during an international football match in 2015 or the suicide bombing against a local soccer game in Iraq in 2016 (France24, November 25, 2015). Likewise, ISKP attempted to carry out an operation against the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar (Washington Post, April 2023).

Days after the Crocus City Hall attack, ISKP and pro-IS outlet al-Battar Media co-published an image stating “After Moscow … Who is next?” and listed Paris, Rome, Madrid, and London as potential targets (x/@lucasadwebber, March 28). The pro-IS media group Hadm Alaswar threatened to come to the Olympics with dynamite, knives, guns, and Molotov cocktails, while another pro-IS media group al-Adiyat threatened that “Lone wolves’ Olympics have begun with the Will of Allah” over an image of a drone carrying explosives targeting the events in Paris (Militant Wire, April 15). In the April edition of ISKP’s Voice of Khorasan magazine, a full-page image depicted a jihadist in military clothing standing on a train beside a box of dynamite with a sign reading “Welcome to Europe, Last Call Before Exit” (x/@lucasadwebber, April 8). The ISKP-partnered Halummu network published an image saying “To the stadiums … Launch o Muwahhid [Monotheist],” and Al-Azaim Foundation for Media Production singled out Madrid’s Santiago Bernabeu and Metropolitano stadiums, Paris’s Parc des Princes, and London’s Emirates Stadium as targets. ISKP further published an image of a drone carrying explosives over Real Madrid’s arena captioned: “If they construct and oppress you on the ground, then strike them from the sky” (x/@lucasadwebber, April 9).

Furthermore, other content from these outlets provided other directives to attack sports venues. Halummu, a pro-IS propaganda outlet, urged supporters to attack the “bleachers and games in stadiums.” ISKP and its partnered pro-IS groups advise militants to simultaneously strike “three entrances” of the Emirates Stadium and/or the “players’ point of arrival” (x/@lucasadwebber, April 8). Another image stated: “My Muwahhid Brother: Recreate the glory of the Paris 2015 raid and subdue the Crusaders in masses” with Parc des Princes in Paris in the background (Militant Wire, April 15).

IS’s province in Pakistan has likewise been active in this coordinated global campaign by:

• Placing particular focus on the Twenty20 International cricket tournament hosted in the United States, publishing an image reading “You wait for the matches …. And we wait for you” showing a fighter with a rifle and drones flying around Nassau Coliseum in New York (x/@cozyduke_apt29, May 15).
• Displaying a photo of a jihadist holding a gun while explosives detonate in a cricket stadium behind him.
• Publishing another threat, which depicted a hooded IS militant among a crowd inside a soccer stadium as well as an image threatening the Paris Olympics, showing fire engulfing police emergency responders (x/@cozyduke_apt29, June 6).

Activities, Networks, and Plots

Since October 7, 2023, there has been a surge in attacks and plots in the West, with new incidents and arrests occurring frequently.

• On October 13—Hamas’s so-called “Day of Rage”—a man from Russia’s northern Caucasus region murdered a teacher with a knife at a school in Arras, France. In a video posted before the stabbing, the militant referenced the Hamas attack and identified with IS (France 24, October 17, 2023; see Terrorism Monitor, October 31, 2023).
• On October 16, a Tunisian militant shot and killed two Swedish soccer fans in Brussels, Belgium (France24, October 17, 2023). The gunman likewise declared that he was acting on IS’s behalf on video.
• On December 3, an IS supporter killed a German tourist and injured two others with a knife and hammer near the Eiffel Tower, telling police it was in response to Israel’s war in Gaza (BBC, December 4, 2023).
• In March 2024, a 15-year-old male IS sympathizer stabbed an Orthodox Jew in Zurich, Switzerland.
• On April 15, 2024, a 16-year-old male—part of a broader Australia-based IS network—stabbed the bishop at Christ the Good Shepherd Church in a suburb of Sydney, Australia while the bishop was giving a sermon during a live stream (SWI swissinfo, March 3; Australian Broadcasting Corporation, June 13).
• Additionally, investigators are considering the fatal June 2 stabbing of a police officer in Mannheim, Germany as an Islamic extremist attack (DW, June 4).

Through numerous incitements to violence, guided plots, and external operations, ISKP represents a serious threat to the West (Le Monde, March 25). As previously stated, since the beginning of 2024, ISKP has been involved in international attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia. Germany is an emerging hub for ISKP’s European operations. For example:

• In 2020, four Tajik nationals in contact with IS members in Afghanistan and Syria were arrested after plotting to attack U.S. bases in Germany;
• In July 2023, an ISKP-linked network in Germany and the Netherlands was taken down while plotting violence;
• In December 2023, Tajik and Uzbek nationals were arrested in Austria and Germany for preparing attacks during Christmas and/or New Year’s Eve in Vienna and Cologne;
• On March 19, 2024, German officials stated that two suspects had been arrested while planning an attack against the Swedish parliament in Stockholm; and
• After the Moscow attack, French President Emmanuel Macron revealed that multiple plots linked to ISKP had been foiled (France24, March 25).

More recently, the European IS and ISKP networks have shifted their targeting priorities to align with the strategy of attacking sporting venues and fan events.

• In April, a 16-year-old male was arrested for plotting to conduct a suicide bombing at the Olympics.
• On May 31, an 18-year-old Chechen in contact with IS was arrested in Saint-Étienne for plotting an attack against a football match during the games (Sky News, April 24).
• In early June, an ISKP-linked man was arrested in Germany for potentially targeting the UEFA Euro soccer tournament (DW, June 6).
• In mid-June, eight Tajik IS operatives with alleged links to ISKP were arrested in New York, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia after illegally crossing into the United States via Mexico (Los Angeles Daily News, June 11).
• Days later, Interpol, the FBI, and the Spanish Civil Guard took down a network associated with the major IS propaganda archive I’lam Foundation, which encouraged attacks against Real Madrid’s stadium (Euronews, June 18).
• On June 19, an Iraqi national suspected of preparing an attack on behalf of IS was arrested near where the Euros are being held in Germany.
• In early July, it was reported that French security forces foiled multiple suicide bombing plots targeting the Paris Olympics (Daily Mail [United Kingdom], July 6).
• On July 14, the day of the England vs. Spain Euro Cup final, German security forces arrested three IS supporters and seized devices with pictures of a Berlin church as well as the city’s famous Breitscheidplatz plaza, where fans had been gathering to watch the match (The Standard [United Kingdom], July 21).
• On July 23, an 18-year-old was arrested by France’s General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI) in the capital for expressing his intent to attack the Paris Olympics (ACTU Forces de l’Ordre, July 23).

Conclusion

It is known that unidentified actors attempted to sabotage the Paris Olympics with seemingly coordinated incidents of arson and vandalism. The names and motives of those involved have not been established at the time of writing, so any confirmed connection between these attacks and IS or ISKP remains to be seen. Nevertheless, from July 26 to August 11, there were attacks on France’s rail infrastructure and fiber optics cables, as well as an increase in the incidence of cyberattacks (Le Monde, July 27, 29; France24, August 14). Given IS’s renewed emphasis and success in external operations, its increased propaganda output aimed at inciting attacks in the West, and the rise of ISKP as both a media force and the new spearhead of officially directed IS attacks, France was fortunate not to have suffered a lethal attack during the Olympics. It remains to be seen whether the failure to launch a major attack against the Paris Olympics will prompt a change in IS’s strategy, or if Western sporting events will continue to be a key target for the group in the years to come.