Level of Violence in Russia Reaches New High as Veterans Return From War

Executive Summary:

• As veterans from Moscow’s war in Ukraine return to Russia and are lauded as the “new elite,” crime rates are drastically increasing, creating a surge in violence across Russian society.
• The Kremlin’s loss of the monopoly on violence, combined with reduced numbers of police and the recidivism of criminals returning from the front, has led to violence becoming the “new norm” in Russia.
• The army is increasingly becoming a breeding ground for crime, including drug trafficking. Pro-war propagandists are normalizing the situation and advocating for soldiers to keep fighting despite this corruption.

Independent Russian media outlet Vot Tak posted an article on September 8 containing statistics on the criminal activities of veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine. While Russian President Vladimir Putin touts these returning veterans as the “new elite” of Russia, reports show that there are hundreds of criminals among them (see EDM, March 13). An uptick in violence in Russia has been exacerbated by the return of former prisoners from the front who, upon coming home, have returned to their previous criminal activity, including rape and murder. Since the beginning of 2024, no fewer than 15 people—including children—have been murdered by these veterans (Vot-tak.tv, September 8). Numerous cases of rape and attempted rape have been reported, including a case of a 70-year-old woman who was attacked in Moscow by a 25-year-old veteran in July (MK.ru, July 18). Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, not only has there been a growth of violence, but also it has transitioned to a fundamentally different level (see EDM, January 29, February 29). Numerous shootouts have occurred in Moscow, and the army is increasingly merging with organized crime. The growing violence in Russian society will only increase as the long war continues, further contributing to Russia’s rupture.

This uptick in violence in Russian society has become so serious that even the Russian government has discussed the issue. According to statistics from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, more serious crimes were committed from January through August 2024 than during the past 13 years (Deutsche Welle–Russian service, September 12). On September 18, there was a massive shootout not far from the Kremlin, which left seven people wounded, including three police officers. The incident arose from a conflict between the married owners of the “Wildberries” company, one of which was supported by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov. he other secured the patronage of Suleiman Kerimov, a member of the Federation Council and “shadow cardinal” of Dagestan (Kazkaz.Realii, September 19). As a result, an attempt to split up a family business turned into a large-scale, 1990s-style reorganization of the spheres of influence between two competing clans (Novaya Gazeta–Evropa, September 18).

The General Director of “Transparency International–Russia,” Ilya Shumanov, suggests that against the backdrop of growing state weakness, armed showdowns over assets will increase as people return from the war and the “shadow sector” of the economy expands. He opines that this is the direct result of the government surrendering its monopoly on violence, which was best on display during former Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s uprising (see EDM, August 3, 2023; Novaya Gazeta–Evropa, September 20). These tendencies are especially evident against the background of the dwindling size of the police force in Russia, largely a result of low pay. Police officers frequently prefer to leave the service and go to the front as contract soldiers than serve in Russia itself (Istories.media, September 16).

The front in Ukraine itself is becoming a separate “hotbed” of organized crime. Not only has there been the removal of an internal barrier to violence and killing in Russia among people who have been to war, but there has also been a trend of common crimes within the Russian Army. Notably, a video created by two Russian soldiers—unmanned reconnaissance specialists Dmitriy Lysakovskiy and Sergey Gritsay, known by the call signs “Goodwin” and “Ernest,” respectively—has gained the attention of the pro-war “Z-community.” In their video, the soldiers accused their command of allowing drug trafficking, looting, and theft of equipment to occur in the regiment under the direct supervision of the commander. According to them, the command ordered that information obtained during reconnaissance not be used, and the best drone specialists in their unit were transferred to assault troops, who were sent to their deaths because they tried to prevent this lawlessness. “Goodwin” and “Ernest” recorded this message in case they did not return from battle (YouTube/@Monte-Kristo, September 14). According to Russian war correspondents, both soldiers died in a Ukrainian drone attack (Smotrim.ru, September 17). Their deaths caused a wave of unrest among journalists and bloggers who favored the war. War correspondents were not so much outraged by the information provided by the authors but instead because they found evidence that the crimes listed by “Goodwin” and “Ernest” were common occurrences.

The pro-war resource “Stalingrad Channel” (Канал Сталинград) published a selection of statements by Z-propagandists listing similar episodes. The Telegram channel “News: Crimea, Donbas” (Новости: Крым, Донбасс) confirms that “this is not an isolated case” and “commanders kill soldiers they do not like.” “North Channel” (Северный канал) noted that transferring qualified soldiers to assault troops “continues everywhere.” The Telegram channel “Rybar” (Рыбарь)—considered quite credible in the Z-community, with an audience of over a million subscribers—also states that along the entire front, with the appearance of assault units, “scoundrel commanders remain in power, while truth-telling soldiers and officers die.” This is echoed by Anastasia Kashevarova, the former advisor to Chairperson of the State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin, noting that “we regularly receive letters about similar situations in various departments” (Stalingrad.life, September 15).

These testimonies demonstrate the true state of the Russian Army, where torture and violence against servicemen have long been rampant (see EDM, December 11, 2023, June 27, July 29). Now, crime has reached a new level as commanders have effectively been given the power to send anyone they see as a threat to certain death on the battlefield so that they do not interfere with the officers’ own corruption and drug trafficking. Several propagandists are trying to use the example of “Goodwin” and “Ernest” to normalize this situation, emphasizing that the soldiers themselves committed a crime by recording the incident and that, as a part of the armed forces, it is necessary to fight, even if you are sent to certain death (YouTube/@Borovskih, September 19). This trend of normalizing crime both on and off the battlefield will undoubtedly continue in Russia as criminals return from war and corruption runs rampant among troops.