Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is Professor of Strategy in, and a core founding member of, the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the Naval War College Review’s Editorial Board. Since 2008 he has been an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Erickson is also an expert contributor to the Wall Street Journal’s China Real Time Report and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2012 the National Bureau of Asian Research awarded Erickson the inaugural Ellis Joffe Prize for PLA Studies. In 2013, while deployed as a Regional Security Education Program scholar aboard USS Nimitz, he delivered twenty-five hours of presentations. In 2014 Erickson helped to escort the Commander of China’s Navy and his delegation on a visit to Harvard. He subsequently helped to establish, and to escort the first iteration of, NWC’s first bilateral naval officer exchange program with China, which he continues to support. Erickson has testified before the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. He is the author of the book: Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development (Jamestown, 2013) and coauthor of two additional books: Gulf of Aden Anti-Piracy and China’s Maritime Commons Presence (Jamestown, 2015), as well as Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions. He has published extensively in such peer-reviewed journals as China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China, Asian Security, Asia Policy, Journal of Strategic Studies, and Acta Astronautica. Erickson received his Ph.D. and M.A. from Princeton University and studied Mandarin at Beijing Normal University’s College of Chinese Language and Culture. He can be reached through www.andrewerickson.com.
Part 1 of this series discussed Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong’s background, meteoric rise, and recent promotion to PLAN Commander. However, his appointment raises a number of questions about his role
A new leader has just taken the helm of the world’s largest navy. Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong (沈金龙) reportedly replaced Admiral Wu Shengli (吴胜利) as PLAN Commander on January 17,
Powered by the world’s second largest economy and defense budget, China has implemented a consistent, incremental strategy of upholding its outstanding territorial and maritime claims in the Near Seas (Yellow,
Note: This piece is based on a longer article published in The Washington Quarterly (Fall 2015, available here). Beginning after the global financial crisis in 2008, and transforming further with
Now Available from the Jamestown Store Well over six years of Chinese anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have directly supported People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) modernization goals and provided
Nearing the Twilight of Somali Antipiracy? The global antipiracy mission off Somalia, a hallmark for collective 21st-century international security, is gradually moving toward a close. There have been no successful
Part One of this article covered the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force’s (PLASAF) conventional arsenal and the “conventionalization of deterrence”—the creation of doctrines that rely on
The Second Artillery has made significant progress, particularly in modernizing its hardware, but also operations and training. Its main mission remains deterrence, especially toward U.S. intervention in a regional conflict.
Andrew Erickson's report, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development was featured in an article by Want China Times.
Chinese planners were seriously concerned about logistical and operational challenges associated with anti-piracy missions near Somali waters long before the first People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships were deployed in
Numerous institutional factors have driven and incentivized China’s participation in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Central to executing China’s first instance of protracted Far Seas naval operations has
Jamestown's Andrew Erickson's report, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories and Strategic Implications was cited by China Times.
China’s deployment of the world’s first operational anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) has just been confirmed with unprecedented clarity by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). The ASBM’s development path was
China’s anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), the DF-21D, has reached the equivalent of Initial Operational Capability. Although it probably has been deployed in small numbers, additional challenges and tests remain. This
China’s DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) is no longer merely an aspiration. Beijing has successfully developed, partially tested and deployed in small numbers the world’s first weapons system capable of
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) made history with the news on February 25 that the frigate Xuzhou, one of the navy’s most modern warships, had been dispatched to waters
New satellites are enhancing Chinese command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. These systems will enable the Chinese military to strengthen cueing, reconnaissance, communications, and data relay
China’s military planners covet the ability to prevent U.S. and allied forces from intervening effectively in the event of a future Taiwan Strait crisis and to constrain the latter’s influence
The extent and nature of Chinese defense spending can serve as the parameters for the future course of China’s military power and China’s intentions as it continues military modernization. Recent
Although China has traditionally avoided basing its troops abroad, the People's Republic of China's (PRC) growing global interests and its military's evolving missions are leading some Chinese analysts to suggest
China wants to achieve the ability, or at minimum the appearance of the ability, to prevent a U.S. carrier strike group (CSG) from intervening in the event of a future
China’s undersea deterrent is undergoing a generational change with the emergence of the Type-094, or Jin-class, which represents a substantial improvement over China’s first-generation Type-092, or Xia-class, nuclear-powered ballistic missile
The development of China’s nuclear and conventional missile power has been among the most impressive and most closely watched aspects of Chinese military modernization over the past two decades. During
In recent years, senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders and high-ranking military officers have repeatedly emphasized the importance of naval modernization. Most prominently, CCP General Secretary, President and Central Military