Azerbaijan-Georgia Ties Strengthened by Shared Stances on Key Regional Issues

Executive Summary:

• Georgian President Mikheil Kavelashvili’s first official foreign visit to Azerbaijan reflects a pivot in Georgia’s foreign policy toward regional partnership amid strained relations with the European Union and Western partners.
• Georgia and Azerbaijan reaffirmed their opposition to foreign intervention in South Caucasus affairs, underscoring a mutual belief that regional challenges should be addressed internally without external influence.
• Tbilisi and Baku emphasized collaboration on strategic energy and transport corridors, such as the Middle Corridor, while exploring trilateral engagement with Armenia, signaling potential for a more cohesive and independent framework in the South Caucasus.

On April 15–16, the newly elected President of Georgia, Mikheil Kavelashvili, paid an official visit to Azerbaijan. The visit was of notable symbolic importance since it was Kavelashvili’s first foreign visit as president. The Azerbaijani side appreciated this gesture, as Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated in the joint press conference with Kavelashvili, “It once again reflects the essence of Azerbaijan-Georgia relations and the friendship and brotherhood between our peoples” (President of Azerbaijan, April 16). Earlier on January 17, the re-elected Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze also paid his first official visit to the Azerbaijani capital after the elections (President of Azerbaijan, January 17). Aliyev characterized this as the emergence of a “wonderful tradition” and underlined its symbolic importance of the relations between the two countries (President of Azerbaijan, April 16).

This shift in Georgian politics has come on the heels of the country’s deteriorating relations with its Western partners, particularly the European Union, which used to be the first destination of Georgian leaders after their election in the recent past. Most Western states have yet to recognize the legitimacy of the new Georgian government given allegations against the ruling party of falsifying last year’s election results (see EDM, October 28, November 5, 2024, January 13). No positive development has been marked yet in this context, although the Georgian government was optimistic about a potential reset in relations with the United States under U.S. President Donald Trump (see EDM, April 9).

This situation in the Western track of Georgian foreign policy has opened room for deeper engagement with the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Türkiye. It is no coincidence that six of Kobakhidze’s eight visits since his re-election have been to countries in the mentioned regions and the United Arab Emirates (Government of Georgia, accessed April 17).

A wide range of geopolitical and geoeconomic factors dictate why Azerbaijan was the first destination for Georgian leaders in the new era of the country’s foreign policy. Above all, both states agree that the countries of the region should resolve the problems of the South Caucasus, and the intervention of external actors is not permissible. This principle defines the overall direction and parameters of their foreign policy. In Baku, Kavelashvili stated, “No third country or organization can determine better than we can what is in the best interest of our peoples” (President of Azerbaijan, April 16).

Aliyev has expressed strong support for the Georgian government and criticized the perceived interventionist stance of the European Union in Georgia’s domestic politics. At an international forum on April 9 in Baku, Aliyev said:

The attitude towards Georgia’s internal process in the European Commission is absolutely unacceptable. This is the behavior of colonialists. They try to look at the will of the Georgian people through the principles of a colonial past … The people of Georgia know that we are with them, and the government of Georgia knows. The internal issues of Georgia must be resolved by the Georgian people, not by bureaucrats from Brussels (President of Azerbaijan, April 9).

The non-intervention into each other’s domestic affairs has been a key principle in Azerbaijan-Georgia relations since the mid-1990s, and its importance has further increased for them recently amid tensions with the European Union.

The two countries are also aligned in the region’s key geoeconomic issues. Many significant regional energy and connectivity projects pass through the territories of the two South Caucasian countries. At a press conference with Kavelashvili, Aliyev stated, “Today, any discussion of Europe’s energy security would be incomplete without acknowledging the vital roles of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Currently, Azerbaijan exports natural gas to 12 countries, including Georgia, and these exports are carried out via Georgia” (President of Azerbaijan, April 16).

Similar patterns can also be observed in the Middle Corridor, a transportation route connecting Europe with Asia across the Caspian Sea (see EDM, April 19, 2022, April 20, 2023, October 28, 2024). The railroads and ports built by Georgia and Azerbaijan, and mostly on their own expenses, as in the case of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, provide a valuable infrastructure for transportation along the Middle Corridor (see EDM, May 19, 2014, October 16, 2017). Many in the region were surprised when Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission’s President, did not mention Georgia as a transit country along the Middle Corridor during her speech at the first EU-Central Asia summit in April. Georgia was clearly missing from the speech as von der Leyen was discussing the importance of opening Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Türkiye for improving connectivity between Europe and Central Asia via the Middle Corridor (European Commission, April 4).

The Azerbaijani president harshly criticized this omission, along with the alleged instrumentalization of the transport issues to affect the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. He questioned why the European Commission President ignored all the investments Georgia and Azerbaijan have made in the establishment of railways and seaports, which are critical for the Middle Corridor, while raising an issue (i.e., the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Türkiye border talks) that is “none of their business” (President of Azerbaijan, April 9). The Georgian political elite appreciated Aliyev’s remarks as important support to the Georgian people in “the most difficult times” (1tv.ge, April 9; Caliber.az, April 10).

In parallel with alignment on the most fateful regional issues, Baku and Tbilisi are also focused on establishing a trilateral cooperation format in the South Caucasus, together with Armenia. This proposal, raised by the Azerbaijani and Georgian leaders several times over the past two years, has received lukewarm support from Armenia (see EDM, April 13, 2023). The fact that the three countries came together at the level of deputy foreign ministers in a trilateral format for political consultations in Tbilisi, a day after Kavelashvili’s visit to Baku, however, demonstrates some positive dynamics toward this end (Apa.az, April 17). According to the official press release of the meeting from Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the talks were held in “the positive and constructive atmosphere,” and this was characterized “as an initial phase designed to build trust and pave the way for the eventual advance of the dialogue to a higher level” (Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 17).

The recent diplomatic engagements between Azerbaijan and Georgia underscore the deepening strategic partnership between the two neighbors at a time of shifting regional and international dynamics. Shared positions on fundamental geopolitical and geoeconomic issues—ranging from opposition to external interference in South Caucasus affairs to collaboration on vital energy and transport corridors—form the bedrock of this growing alliance. As Tbilisi reorients aspects of its foreign policy, choosing Baku as the first destination for the new Georgian leadership symbolizes continuity and a renewed commitment to regional solidarity. The evolving trilateral dialogue with Armenia, though still nascent, further illustrates the potential of the three countries to overcome their political differences and build a more autonomous and cooperative South Caucasus.