Battling Nihilism: The PRC’s Quest for Autonomy

Executive Summary:

• The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) frames historical nihilism an existential threat, as it could lead to ideological alienation, public distrust, and ultimately, institutional collapse resembling the experience of the Soviet Union.
• Since 2022, the CCP has shifted its focus to cultural nihilism, perceived as an even greater threat capable of severing the spiritual identity of the People’s Republic of China and leading to wholesale Westernization.
• Methods to counter cultural nihilism include deliberate intellectual separation through the promotion of “Chinese-style modernization” and the formation of “independent knowledge systems.”

On January 10, the Study Times (学习时报), the Central Party School’s theoretical paper, warned that “historical nihilism” (历史虚无主义) had become more “subtle and covert” (迂回隐性) in the era of artificial intelligence. AI models, trained on what the Party-state considers unreliable information, repackage and disseminate nihilistic narratives through deepfakes, falsified historical texts, fabricated imagery, bot armies, and recommendation algorithms tailored to individual preferences. The threat, the article notes, is that audiences might gradually reinterpret history and reach false conclusions (Study Times, January 10).

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) stance against historical nihilism is well-documented. Shortly after taking office, Xi Jinping declared that the “comprehensive negation” (全面否定) of Soviet history and the “denial of Lenin and Stalin” (否定列宁，否定斯大林) amounted to historical nihilism, which “paralyzed minds” (思想搞乱) and “rendered Party organizations at all levels ineffective” (各级党组织几乎没任何作用了) (Qiushi, March 31, 2019). As recently as February 2022, a documentary linked historical nihilism directly to the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Youku, February 22, 2022). For Xi, the correct view of history is not primarily an academic issue, but a political issue (Qiushi, March 31, 2019). This perspective informed Document No. 9—officially titled Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere (关于当前意识形态领域情况的通报)—which, alongside critiques of universal values, Western governance styles, and neoliberalism, identified historical nihilism as a threat aimed at undermining the CCP’s historical legitimacy and long-term rule (ChinaFile, November 8, 2013). Taken together, Xi’s speech and the Central Committee’s document underscore the long-term importance of combatting historical nihilism as part of a system of Western values. More importantly, they frame it as an existential threat that could precipitate the CCP’s collapse if left unchecked.

Stages of Collapse

The Party believes that historical nihilism could induce systemic collapse in three stages. First, individual cases of historical nihilism would emerge. Second, historical nihilism would proliferate in mainstream society. Finally, it would spread until a critical mass of people rejects the system completely, leading to its downfall. As a result of these fears, the Party is hypervigilant, keen to preemptively halt the advance of this ideological rot.

Perhaps the most prominent incident of historical nihilism in the Xi era has been a controversy surrounding the wartime story of the “Five Heroes of Langya Mountain” (狼牙山五壮士). CCP lore valorizes these men as having heroically resisted Japanese forces until they exhausted their ammunition and jumped from the mountain to avoid surrender. In 2013, however, some people—including the executive editor and editor of the liberal journal Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黄春秋)—began to cast doubt on the story, arguing that the so-called “heroes” were betrayed to the Japanese by villagers whom they had repeatedly bullied (Control, 2017). The controversy resulted in defamation lawsuits against both men and against relatives of the soldiers and two other scholars who had spoken out. After losing these lawsuits, the journalists lost their editorial positions. More recently, in mid-2024, the artist Gao Zhen (高兟) was detained for “slandering the reputation of [China’s] heroes and martyrs” (侵害英雄烈士名誉), with authorities confiscating several of his artworks (New York Times, September 2, 2024).

These high-profile cases signal the limits of the CCP’s tolerance for alternative viewpoints that could undermine its legitimacy. There are more subtle vectors for historical nihilism, however, that the Party sees as much more dangerous. These include online personalities and public intellectuals who often unintentionally promote historical nihilism, sometimes using humor or mockery (Red Flag, April 29, 2016). One instance discussed in party literature concerns a Beijing history teacher with over 13 million Weibo followers who mocked the Great Leap Forward—a policy-induced famine that led to the deaths of tens of millions—as making an “outstanding contribution to birth control” (为计划生育作出了突出贡献) (Red Flag, January 9, 2017). Another redoubt for historical nihilism is in people’s desire for novelty and emotional engagement. Its message is packaged as memes, online fiction, jokes, homophones, nicknames, abbreviations, online slang, and “fictionalized history” (虚构历史) (Red Flag, September 20, 2016; People’s Tribune, October 20, 2023; People’s Tribune, February 26, 2024). Here, historical nihilism thrives by maintaining an “underdog” (弱者) image and succeeds through “marginal resistance to mainstream” (边缘反抗主流) narratives—in other words, by embedding in everyday online interactions and popular entertainment (Qiushi, January 4, 2013). For the party-state, this is the real threat historical nihilism poses.

As historical nihilism proliferates across mainstream society, it creates confusion. The process begins with small discussions that gradually expand and gain wider acceptance (Red Flag, January 22, 2017). Young people and young Party members are particularly vulnerable because their perspectives have not yet fully solidified (Study Times, October 26, 2015). A June 2015 survey among university students revealed that only 38 percent accurately understood historical nihilism as “using the negation of history to achieve the negation of reality” (通过对历史的否定达到对现实的否定), while 34 percent saw it merely as “another historical perspective” (是对历史的另一种认识). [1] For the CCP, these findings demonstrate an increasing lack of historical understanding. The dangers this entails are exacerbated by an additional external dimension. The PRC faces a “relentless encroachment of Western influences” (西风美雨的不断侵蚀), which it cannot fully control (Study Times, March 17, 2023). [2] Domestic and foreign narratives thus converge into ideological forces capable of negatively influencing social development (Red Flag, January 22, 2017).

In the Party’s view, if these forces are not dealt with, systemic collapse is the probable outcome. This view is not speculative. A 2015 article argued that the spread of historical nihilism in the PRC was “eerily similar to what happened in the Soviet Union” (和当年的苏联简直是如出一辙), rendering the threat of collapse palpable (Red Flag, June 8, 2015). Over time, historical nihilism could trigger “a degradation of public opinion, ideological alienation, and political catastrophe” (舆论变质、思想异化和政治灾难) (Red Flag, September 20, 2016) leading the PRC “toward the peril of a history-less and faithless collapse” (到一个没有历史和信仰崩塌的危险境地) (Qiushi, January 4, 2013). One article abstractly characterizes this as the “Tacitus trap” (塔西佗陷阱), a situation in which the government or the Party loses credibility and becomes distrusted regardless of its actions (Red Flag, April 7, 2017). Nihilism’s logic dictates that slight deviations in thought lead to significant errors in action, distort perceptions, mislead the public, and weaken the Party’s creativity, cohesion, and effectiveness, and “even jeopardize the revolutionary cause” (甚至断送革命前途) (Study Times, August 27, 2021). What begins as isolated criticism of the Party’s leadership or an ideological concept gradually expands into wholesale rejection of the socialist system (Red Flag, January 9, 2017). Thus, the “debate over history” (历史之争) is ultimately framed as a “life and death struggle” (生死之战) for the CCP (Red Flag, October 24, 2016).

Resolving Nihilism via Crackdowns and the History Resolution

During Xi’s first term, the Party’s existential angst was exacerbated by the prevalence of other forms of nihilism it identified and sought to combat. One such form was the recurring threat of “legal nihilism” (法律虚无主义). Initially epitomized by the Mao era’s anti-rightist campaign and Cultural Revolution, legal nihilism later referred to the replacement of law by slogans and Party directives during the period of reform and opening. Under President Xi Jinping, this term resurfaced through external critiques. Notably, Russia was described as suffering from legal nihilism, thereby reinforcing the PRC’s domestic arguments for legal reforms and a strengthened legislative system (EDM, January 30, 2008; Study Times, February 24, 2014). “Value nihilism” (价值虚无主义) also gained prominence amid perceived moral decline characterized by the loss of ideals and beliefs and broad skepticism or mockery of higher values. [3]

An even more significant variant was “political nihilism” (政治虚无主义), introduced in late 2016 by then-secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Wang Qishan (王岐山), Xi’s anti-corruption czar. It described a condition of “depoliticization” (去政治化) and “de-ideologization” (去意识形态化) whereby individuals become overly transactional, lacking political discernment and the ability to distinguish right from wrong (People’s Daily, November 8, 2016; Red Flag, April 7, 2017). Political nihilism broadly applied to Party members and cadres who prioritized fengshui (风水) or made arbitrary decisions without research or public consultation. It was also identified as the root cause behind the downfall of prominent Party leaders Zhou Yongkang (周永康), Bo Xilai (薄熙来), Guo Boxiong (郭伯雄), Xu Caihou (徐才厚), Sun Zhengcai (孙政才), and Ling Jihua (令计划) (Red Flag, April 20, 2018). The importance of these different types of nihilism, however, paled in comparison to historical nihilism.

The insidious nature of historical nihilism’s spread demanded constant vigilance and structural solutions. The Party adopted a dual strategy for countering it. Coercive measures such as censorship and crackdowns were paired with proactive legislative and educational initiatives. As articulated in a 2013 article in the Party’s theory journal Qiushi, addressing historical nihilism required “not only deconstruction but also construction” (不仅要破，而且还要立) (Qiushi, January 4, 2013; China Brief, February 7, 2014). As a result, by 2019, historical nihilism no longer appeared among the PRC’s most influential “social thoughts” (社会思潮), despite ranking second in 2018 and regularly appearing in the top ten during Xi’s first term. [4] This decline resulted largely from intense Party crackdowns. In 2021, the Party established a historical nihilism hotline, enabling internet users to report violations of historical orthodoxy. It also launched a campaign against numerous accounts spreading nihilist content, including prominent platforms such as “History Forum” (历史论坛) and “History Link” (历史连连看) (Cybersecurity Administration of China, April 9, 2021). Online platforms removed over two million pieces of content deemed illegal or non-compliant (State Council Information Office, May 8, 2021). Legal measures complemented these crackdowns. Slander against heroes and martyrs became punishable in 2018 and was criminalized in 2021. Extensive party history education campaigns supplemented these actions (Asian Survey, June 28, 2023).

The apotheosis of this activity was the 2021 History Resolution, which the CCP Central Committee presented as an explicit antidote to historical nihilism (Xinhua, November 16, 2021; Study Times, January 21, 2022). This allowed the Party in early 2022 to declare confidently that historical nihilism had been “discredited and effectively curbed” (声名狼藉，得到坚决遏制), emphasizing that the phenomenon had experienced an overall decline in influence and largely subsided (Red Flag, May 10, 2022; People’s Tribune, October 20, 2023).

Cultural Nihilism: An Existential Threat to Chinese Modernization

No sooner had victory been declared than a new form of nihilism, “cultural nihilism” (文化虚无主义), emerged to take its place as the primary ideological concern. Initially framed as a “hallucinogenic potion” (迷魂汤) and “toxic fumes” (毒气弹) intended to destabilize the country’s cultural foundations and promote wholesale Westernization, after 2021, cultural nihilism was increasingly viewed as even more threatening than historical nihilism had been (Red Flag, May 7, 2018). This shift was facilitated theoretically by the 2021 History Resolution, which redefined Xi Jinping Thought as encompassing the “best of the Chinese culture and ethos in our times,” describing it as the “Marxism of contemporary China and of the 21st century” (Xinhua, November 16, 2021).

The Party’s fusion of its socialist ideologies with traditional Chinese culture elevated the stakes significantly. Cultural nihilism posed an existential threat surpassing even Party collapse. As one article argued, it involved endorsing Western narratives that attributed Chinese civilization’s origins to the West, thereby denying its originality (People’s Tribune, January 30, 2024). This, in turn, could cause spiritual disorientation, erode people’s sense of belonging, and sever China’s “spiritual lifeline” (割断精神命脉) (Study Times, March 17, 2023). Ultimately, the spread of cultural nihilism threatened the CCP’s political survival—not directly, but by destroying the very fabric of Chinese civilization.

The CCP’s strategy to avert cultural collapse focuses not merely on resistance but more fundamentally on establishing, preserving, and promoting the PRC’s agency against external influences. This involves cultivating “cultural subjectivity” (文化主体性理论), defined as developing an independent cultural system characterized by autonomy and self-reliance. Cultural subjectivity is central to forming self-identity and maintaining a clear distinction between Chinese values and those of external actors (Research on the Discipline of Marxist Theory, June 19, 2024). Practically, countering cultural nihilism means “not becoming a spiritual, cultural, or ideological colony of the West” (不能在思想、文化、精神上成为西方的殖民地) and firmly establishing the “spiritual identity of the modern civilization of the Chinese nation” (树立中华民族现代文明的精神标识) (Study Times, September 4, 2023). Central to this strategy is fostering cultural confidence, described as the “most foundational, widespread, and profound form of confidence” (更基础、更广泛、更深厚的自信). Such confidence is seen as a necessary condition for achieving national rejuvenation (Red Flag, November 26, 2021).

This perspective motivated the formulation of Xi Jinping Cultural Thought in the fall of 2023. Reflecting what commentator Deng Luwen (邓聿文) calls an expression of “cultural authoritarianism” (文化专制主义) (Voice of America, October 23, 2023), it was meant to reinforce the PRC’s distinctiveness from Western nations and serve as an antidote not only to cultural nihilism but also to other forms of nihilism. The Party reframed historical nihilism as originating from a cultural rupture experienced by non-Western countries in which traditions are viewed as obstacles to modernization, leading to a denial of their historical value and interest in their continuity (Study Times, June 3, 2024). The CCP’s response to the threats of nihilism, therefore, has been an assertion of China’s cultural identity as an existential foundation, positioning it as the ultimate safeguard against both domestic and foreign threats of nihilism.

Conclusion

Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has led a broad-based campaign for preserving the CCP’s agency amid competing discourses and values both internally and externally. The heart of this has been the struggle against nihilism in its various forms. One practical consequence is the rise of “Chinese-style modernization” (中国式现代化), which is explicitly differentiated from Western models (China Brief, May 10, 2024). Equally significant are efforts to develop “independent knowledge systems” (自主知识体系) and “independent theoretical systems” (独立理论体系) tailored specifically to the condition of Chinese-style modernization (Study Times, September 4, 2023; Red Flag, September 23, 2023).

These initiatives reflect a deliberate effort to distinguish Chinese theoretical concepts and categories from their Western counterparts across academic fields such as international relations, political science, history, and archaeology, effectively resulting in intellectual decoupling and derisking. Evident in DeepSeek’s regurgitating of Beijing talking points, this effort reflects, from the CCP’s perspective, a long-term solution to the problem of nihilism conveyed through what it sees as implicit biases in knowledge production (Politico, February 4). The goal of training AI on culturally, historically, and politically aligned content is not merely to mitigate perceived risks but to actively consolidate a politically acceptable epistemic order. This fundamentally strengthens the PRC’s autonomy, but risks complicating future academic exchanges and, eventually, political dialogue by eroding shared frameworks of understanding, potentially fostering misunderstanding and mistrust.

Notes

[1] 程馨莹 [Cheng Xinying], 历史虚无主义对当代大学生的影响研究 [A Study on the Impact of Historical Nihilism on Contemporary University Students], 中国社会科学出版社 [Beijing: China Social Sciences Press), 2016, p. 118.

[2] The specific Chinese phrase translates literally to “Western winds and American rains.”

[3] 丁辉 [Ding Hui] and 陈奕锟 [Chen Yigun], eds., 历史虚无主义研究与批判 [Research and Critique of Historical Nihilism], 格致出版社 [Shanghai: Gezhi Publishing House & Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2019], p. 7.

[4] For a complete table, see People’s Tribune, “2020国内社会思潮” [Domestic Social Thoughts in 2020], 2021/01.2.