Belarus Cultivates Family-Style Relations with the People’s Republic of China

Executive Summary:

• Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka visited Chinese President Xi Jinping for a “family-like” meeting to reinforce bilateral ties between the two countries.
• The visit reflects Minsk’s strategy amid sustained Western sanctions to diversify from over-reliance on Russia without alienating Moscow.
• Belarus will eventually face a decision point regarding its position on European security that will test the limits of its pragmatic foreign policy, particularly given the importance of continued direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine to achieve a lasting peace.

On June 2–4, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to meet with President Xi Jinping and other top officials and business representatives. This marked Lukashenka’s fifteenth visit to the PRC to discuss “issues of international cooperation” (President of the Republic of Belarus, June 2, 4). The visit is part of Belarus’ broader foreign policy diversification to deepen the strategic partnership with the PRC while balancing its relationship with Moscow amid sanctions and geopolitical isolation from the West (see EDM, December 10, 2019, March 16, 2023, July 15, 2024). The PRC classifies the relationship as an “all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership” (全天候全面战略伙伴关系), which entails close relations that are expected to remain stable in the long term (see China Brief, September 20, 2024; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, April).

Lukashenka and Xi met at the Zhongnanhai residence, the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and State Council, where Xi reiterated that the PRC and Belarus are “true friends and good partners” and that PRC-Belarus relations are “strategic and long-term” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, June 4). Lukashenka also met with a number of business representatives and other PRC officials to discuss economic cooperation in technological modernization and mechanical engineering (President of the Republic of Belarus, June 3). 

During the meeting, Lukashenka told Xi that “the eyes of many countries, like Belarus, are turned to you—to Beijing” in light of “unprecedented pressure on us from the West” (President of the Republic of Belarus, June 4). He claimed that “many nations are convinced” that “China has endured, it will endure, and it will not allow the world order to be broken” (President of the Republic of Belarus, June 4). Lukashenka clearly refers to hardening relations with the West, specifically Europe and the United States. Western sanctions against Belarus are in response to a government crackdown on protests against Lukashenka’s sham 2020 presidential election, ongoing human rights violations, and Minsk’s support for Russia’s full-scale invasion (see EDM, June 4, 2024; U.S. Congress, May 5; U.S. Department of State, accessed June 10). During the meeting, Xi called on both Belarus and the PRC to “jointly oppose hegemonic, domineering and bullying acts, and uphold international fairness and justice” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, June 4). 

Both Lukashenka and Xi described the visit as a “family” meeting (President of the Republic of Belarus, June 4). Xi said in private to Lukashenka, “My friend, you and I have a special relationship, so today we will have a family dinner,” according to Belarusian First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Snopkov (BelTA, June 8). Snopkov told Belarusian state media later that Xi’s daughter, Xi Mingze, joined the leaders for dinner as a further example of the meeting’s family-like setting. Xi reportedly explained to Lukashenka, “For the first time in history, my daughter will be present at a dinner with a foreign leader” (BelTA, June 8).

Since Lukashenka’s visit, the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus and the Chinese Academy of Sciences signed two separate agreements on cooperation and an action plan for the period until 2030. The agreements align with Belarus and the PRC’s ongoing efforts to develop a roadmap for cooperation until 2030 (BelTA, April 17, 2024). The purpose of the agreements is to create joint centers and laboratories, conduct joint research, scientific, and technical programs, and organize educational and training programs for students (National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, June 5). They outline priority cooperation areas such as microelectronics and instrument-making, mechanical engineering, space technologies, optical and laser technologies, information technology, and artificial intelligence. 

Economic cooperation is at the core of the PRC-Belarus relationship, as the PRC is Belarus’s second-largest trading partner (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, January 1). In August 2024, the two countries signed a free trade agreement, which Lukashenka approved on February 6 this year (Belarus Today, August 22, 2024; BelTA, January 10; Official Website of the Republic of Belarus, March 11; Pravo.by, [1] [2], accessed June 9). Between March 2024 and March 2025, Belarus’ imports from the PRC increased from $464 million to $528 million (an increase of 13 percent) (Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed June 9). While exports from Belarus to the PRC are largely chemicals, rapeseed oil, and wood products, Belarus mostly imports cars, video displays, and combustion engines from the PRC (Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed June 9).

Minsk’s closer relationship with the PRC reflects broader perceptions in Belarus about the country’s foreign policy direction. In a recent national opinion poll, 34 percent of Belarusians believed that cooperation with the PRC should take precedence in the country’s foreign policy, while 47 percent of respondents named relations with Moscow as the top foreign policy priority (see EDM, April 24). In line with these perceptions, multilateral, Beijing-led forums including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS (a loose political-economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, the PRC, and South Africa) offer Belarus new venues for international collaboration without alienating Moscow (Conversations with the President, February 25). Belarus joined the SCO in 2024 as the first European member and continues to seek full membership in BRICS (President of the Republic of Belarus, July 4, 2024; see EDM, October 30, 2024). Xi’s invitation to Lukashenka to attend the SCO summit in August and the PRC’s annual commemoration of the end of the Second World War in September suggest that Beijing is open to accommodating Minsk’s efforts (President of the Republic of Belarus, June 4).

Beyond economic and diplomatic cooperation, Lukashenka’s discourse on his direct relationship with Xi reflects a level of friendship otherwise reserved for his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. During the meeting at Zhongnanhai, Lukashenka referred to Xi as “my old [long-time] but very reliable friend” (BelTA, June 7). At the ceremonial opening of Minsk’s new National Football (soccer) Stadium, a few days later, Lukashenka proposed to erect a monument to Xi. Lukashenka’s proposition nods to his Chinese counterpart’s personal love of soccer (see China Brief, July 15, 2018; China Daily, October 10, 2023). During the speech, Lukashenka said the stadium is “entirely a gift from the Chinese people” and that it would be fitting to “erect a monument to my friend Xi Jinping here [b]ecause it is only thanks to him that the Chinese built this stadium at their own expense” (President of the Republic of Belarus, June 7). The new stadium was constructed by Beijing Urban Construction Group and, according to Lukashenka, is a “symbol of the strong Belarusian-Chinese friendship” (President of the Republic of Belarus, Belarus Today, June 7). It is the largest stadium in Belarus with a seating capacity of over 33,000 and is complete with a sculpture of Belarusian and Chinese football players (BelTA, June 7). 

Lukashenka’s family-style diplomacy with the PRC will eventually face pressure due to a changing security environment in Europe. Once neighboring Ukraine and Russia reach a genuine peace agreement, Minsk will be forced to decide whether its engagement with its European neighbors and the West will be confrontational or productive. Right now, Lukashenka should be considering mechanisms to position Belarus as a valuable contributor to European security before completely losing all relevance once a genuine peace is achieved between Kyiv and Moscow. When that time comes, Belarus’ pragmatic foreign policy will either enhance its relevance to European security or serve to further isolate the country from meaningful international engagement.