Caspian Sea Dying with Catastrophic Consequences Looming Ahead

Executive Summary:

• Global warming, increased human use, and declines in the flow of water from rivers that feed the Caspian Sea are threatening its viability.
• Food production from the sea is declining, and the Caspian’s ports and sea lanes are silting up, limiting north–south and east–west trade and advantaging countries that use small vessels over Russia, which relies on large ships.
• The Caspian littoral countries, as well as others further afield such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), are worried, but they are unlikely to unite to find a solution. Instead, the countries surrounding the sea are splitting into blocs, preparing for the possibility of needing to use force to defend their interests in the Caspian.

The world watched for decades as the Aral Sea died in the middle of Central Asia, a victim of global warming, increased human use, and declines in the flow of water from the rivers that fed it. Many assumed that its disappearance was impossible. Following on the heels of that disaster, experts are warning that the Caspian Sea, a much larger and more important body of water, may face a similar fate with more fateful consequences (Aktsenti, September 10). The Caspian Sea’s water level is declining annually in some places by as much as 70 centimeters (roughly three feet), its shorelines are receding by many kilometers, especially in the north, and some coastal cities and ports have become landlocked. Food production from the sea, which those living along its shores depend on, has declined, and the ports and shipping lanes used for trade are silting up. Silted trade lanes are limiting north–south and east–west trade, shifting the geopolitical balance in the Caspian Sea away from Russia. Russia historically dominated the sea with its large ships of the Caspian Flotilla, but now other countries’ smaller ships can better navigate the sea’s ever-shallower waters. Countries such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Iran are also newly advantaged through a dredging capacity that Moscow lacks (see EDM, March 18, June 24; Fond Strategicheskoy Kulturi, July 9; Kaspiyskiy Vestnik, July 26; Kommersant, August 20; Kaspiyskiy Vestnik, September 8).

The Caspian littoral countries and other players further afield, such as the PRC, Türkiye, and the European Union, are concerned about the sea. They are unlikely, however, to take the necessary steps to slow, let alone stop, the Caspian’s shrinkage. The Caspian’s stakeholders would have to agree on a course of action, change their behavior, and spend enormous sums. The chances of this are even slimmer than the change was from the states affected by the death of the Aral (Versia; Svobodnaya Pressa, August 4). The falling water levels on the Caspian are exacerbating tensions among the countries with interests in the Caspian, intensifying their division into blocs and making conflict more likely and a comprehensive agreement less so (see EDM, November 16, 2023; Window on Eurasia, July 26; see EDM, August 24; Spik.kz, September 18).

As was the case regarding the demise of the Aral, Russian experts and officials initially denied that the Caspian was threatened and dismissed those who claimed otherwise as alarmists. They eventually acknowledged, however, that declining water levels in the Caspian pose a threat to Russia’s interests (Caspian News, August 29, 2024). Declining water levels in the Caspian threaten Russia in three ways. First, its ability to move ships around—including from the Caspian Flotilla to support Putin’s war against Ukraine—has declined. Second, the declining water levels have stilted its plans to develop a north–south trade corridor to Iran and the Indian Ocean. Third, Russia’s support of the PRC in seeking expanded east–west trade across the Caspian, circumventing the region’s highway and railway networks, neither of which can carry the amount of cargo a route through the Caspian could (Window on Eurasia, July 23, 2023, April 27, August 29, September 21, 2024, March 13). With Putin now on the side of those the Kremlin earlier dismissed as fearmongers, Russian commentators and officials have begun sounding the alarm (APA, June 19). Moscow has not yet achieved significant agreement with the other littoral states on how to address the deterioration of the Caspian. Russian fixes have been temporary, such as bringing in PRC or Iranian dredge operators to clear silt from its ports. The lack of long-term solutions may breed larger problems for Moscow in the future, which would have to shift its focus back to railroads for trade (Window on Eurasia, July 11, September 10).

While Moscow has dithered, the four other littoral states—Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan—have become increasingly insistent that Moscow take their interests into account. All four have increased the size of their naval forces on the Caspian, forces that are built around smaller ships that are less affected by increasingly shallow waters compared to the larger vessels of Russia’s Caspian Flotilla. Except in the case of Iran, Moscow has responded with anger rather than a desire to cooperate (Versia; Svobodnaya Pressa, August 4; Window on Eurasia, August 8). As a result, these states are now dividing up into three increasingly distinct and hostile blocs (Window on Eurasia, July 26).  

Andrey Matveyev, a prominent Kazakhstan commentator, argues that the littoral countries are turning what had been known as “a Russian lake” into “a sea of discord,” jeopardizing the stability of the region (The Times of Central Asia, July 24). In his view, three blocs are emerging, which are expanding their navies and holding more joint exercises. The first bloc consists of Russia, Iran, and the non-littoral PRC. These three states have been conducting joint exercises since 2019 and want to prevent any other country from challenging their positions on the Caspian (Eurasia Today, July 25). They are now, however, being confronted by two other blocs which, although under the radar screens of most, are increasingly prepared to compete for resources on the Caspian. Moscow’s war against Ukraine diverts its attention and resources from the Caspian, and the smaller and less suitable Caspian Flotilla means that Russian dominance in the sea is waning.

According to Matveyev, the second bloc consists of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and members of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which is led by Türkiye (The Times of Central Asia, July 24). The OTS views the Caspian as a bridge to Central Asia and wants to ensure that that path remains open. The third bloc is the Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan partnership. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have the largest Caspian navies in terms of vessel numbers and are most concerned about Russia’s failure to address the shrinking sea. Matveyev acknowledges that his Caspian “blocs” have overlap and may change, but insists that the trend toward the formalization of these coalitions is ongoing as the countries deal with declining water levels on the Caspian and Russia’s general unwillingness to release more water from the Volga into the Caspian. There have been some limited exceptions to this pattern. Moscow and Astana have agreed to dredge a portion of the northern Caspian Sea so that the two countries can more easily reach petroleum platforms that ships cannot access due to the water’s shallow depth (Kaspiyskiy Vestnik, September 24). The five littoral countries have moreover agreed that they need to address falling water levels now, before they become irreversible. Disagreements remain, however, on what should be done and who should do it (Spik.kz, September 18).

The looming demise of the Caspian carries an important lesson for all governments with interests in the Caspian Sea’s littoral regions. Even something as seemingly mundane as declining water levels can transform geopolitics, and thus must be understood by the region’s stakeholders.