Comparing and Contrasting Western Peace Frameworks for Russia-Ukraine War

Executive Summary:

• Two framework plans on how to end Russia’s war against Ukraine have been submitted by the United States and collectively by France, Germany, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. The quadripartite plan marks the first entry of Western European governments into these negotiations.
• While both plans address various aspects of war termination, the territorial aspects loom larger at this stage. The two plans differ markedly from one another in terms of the status of Crimea, among other territorial and non-territorial issues.
• Russia’s objectives in Ukraine transcend the territories currently at stake. If and when it pockets these territorial concessions, Russia will proceed to the political and security-related stages in its efforts to subjugate the remainder of Ukraine.

Western governments have issued competing proposals on how to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The first was the U.S. proposal tabled for Ukrainian consideration on April 17, followed by a joint proposal on April 23 by France, Germany, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. The joint proposal marked the Europeans’ first entry into these negotiations. Both reported texts have been published in full without changes by the Reuters news agency (Reuters, April 25 [United States], [France, Germany, Ukraine, and United Kingdom]).

The five governments involved have not confirmed, denied, or otherwise commented on these documents. Both proposals are labeled as “frameworks,” which leaves room for more detailed formulation. Their nature is the usual one of unsigned nonpapers, and their classification level is relatively low (the U.S. document “verbally transmitted,” the quadripartite document “official-sensitive”). International and Ukrainian media treat them as authentic expressions of those governments’ current policies, while Russia, the main addressee of these proposals, has only responded obliquely thus far.

Both documents address a wide range of war termination aspects, including military security, economics, and reconstruction. The territorial aspects, however, loom larger than other aspects at this stage, given Russia’s military occupation of Ukrainian territories and its grip on the initiative on the ground.

Crimea

Under Washington’s proposal, “[the United States] provides de jure recognition of Russian control of Crimea.” The European and Ukrainian joint proposal, however, omits Crimea altogether, stipulating instead that “territorial issues will be discussed and resolved after a full and unconditional ceasefire.”

Kyiv, the European Union collectively, and other Western states are adamant in refusing to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea de jure. The United States had shared this position following the 2014 annexation. In 2018, during the first Donald Trump Administration, the U.S. Department of State issued the Crimea Declaration that stated:

“Russia, through its 2014 invasion of Ukraine and its attempted annexation of Crimea, sought to undermine a bedrock international principle shared by democratic states: that no country can change the borders of another by force” (U.S. State Department, July 25, 2018).

The department has given a press statement titled “Crimea is Ukraine” annually through 2024 (U.S. State Department, March 14, 2018, February 27, 2019, February 26, 2020, February 25, 2021, September 28, 2022, February 26, 2023, September 11, 2024).  

In the U.S. proposal, Ukraine is not required to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea. It is only required to accept the United States’ recognition of Crimea’s de jure. Ukraine would simply consent to the U.S. recognition in the framework of Kyiv-Moscow negotiations. Ukrainian observers interpret this procedure as intended to remove a major legal obstacle to international ratification or acceptance of the whole settlement package. This wider goal is unattainable as long as Russia’s annexation of Crimea lacks international recognition, but becomes attainable if Ukraine passively consents to legalizing Crimea’s transfer to Russia (Yevropeiska Pravda, April 25).

Four Mainland Ukrainian Provinces

Russian forces currently occupy the entirety of Ukraine’s Luhansk province and some 70 percent of each of the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts. Under Washington’s proposal, “the [United States] provides de facto recognition of Russian control of Luhansk” and “provides de facto recognition of Russian-controlled parts of Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Kherson” (sic). Again, the United States would initiate the recognition on its own behalf, although it is not a party to the conflict, and apparently without requiring Ukraine, let alone Western allies, to follow suit.

Additionally, Washington stipulates that “Ukraine regains territory in the Kharkiv oblast [province].” Russian forces occupy a northeastern portion of that province and are creeping forward. The Russian military-civil administration (occupation authority) has returned there and is advancing in step with the ground troops.

The Ukrainian-U.K.-French-German proposal makes clear that any “territorial negotiations start from the basis of the line of control” (frontline turning into ceasefire line). It postpones negotiations on all territorial issues, however, until a “full and unconditional ceasefire” is achieved (see above). This precaution would avoid negotiating under Russian fire.

Local Territorial Adjustments

The U.S. and quadripartite proposals harmonize in demanding local territorial adjustments in Ukraine’s favor.  First, that “Ukraine enjoys unhindered passage on the Dnieper River and control of the Kinburn Spit.” This means lifting the blockade of the Dnieper Estuary and two Ukrainian Black Sea ports, Mykolaiv and Kherson, by Russian forces from the Kinburn Spit (see EDM, March 28).

Secondly, they call for Ukraine to regain territorial control of the Russian-seized Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (largest in Europe by installed power generation capacity) and the Kakhovka Hydropower Dam. The Trump administration has already proposed to take over the operation of the Zaporizhzhia plant in bilateral negotiations with Russia (see EDM, March 21).

International Outlook

In terms of international law, no country in the world or international organization interprets Russia’s war against Ukraine as a territorial dispute. Not only are Russia’s annexations since the beginning of the full-scale invasion recognized legally by none, but the existence of a territorial dispute between them is also unrecognized, as long as Ukraine’s territorial integrity and borders are legally recognized by all except Russia itself.

Prior to its all-out war on Ukraine, the Kremlin did not demand official recognition of its post-1991 territorial seizures. Russia was content all along with de facto acceptance—in lieu of de jure recognition—of its capture in one form or another of Transnistria from Moldova (1992), of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia (2008), of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces from Ukraine (2014, 2015), and of major parts of four Ukrainian mainland provinces (see above) in 2022. From 2024 onward, however, Moscow seeks de jure recognition by Ukraine and potentially by others. The U.S. proposal regarding Crimea is the first known concession in this regard, along with the accustomed de facto acceptance of other territorial changes (Yevropeiska Pravda, April 29).

Although territorial aspects of war termination loom front and center now, Russia’s objectives far transcend the territories currently at stake. The Kremlin openly declares its goals regarding a post-war rump Ukraine as changing its internal political order and leaving it permanently vulnerable militarily vis-à-vis Russia. If and when it pockets the territorial concessions, Russia probably will proceed to the follow-up stages in its efforts to subjugate the remainder of Ukraine.