Europe Could Be Supporting Russia’s War via ‘Seven Sons’ Partnerships

Executive Summary:

• Research collaboration between European and Chinese universities could be indirectly supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine.
• Over 20 agreements, partnerships, or newly published research articles have been announced between “Seven Sons of National Defense” universities and European entities between December 2024 and January 2025. These followed delegations from the universities to France, Austria, and Spain.
• The “Seven Sons” universities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have a history of military collaboration, intellectual property theft, and, crucially, growing ties with Russia. They also have been implicated in talent recruitment programs that incentivize foreign experts to collaborate with PRC institutions, sometimes unknowingly contributing to military research.
• Unchecked research collaboration with the “Seven Sons” universities presents a real security threat. To date, the balance in Europe between scientific openness and national security tips toward the former. The longer the PRC continues to exploit this approach, the more that very openness will be put at risk.

In 2024, France and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) commemorated 60 years of diplomatic relations. The two countries marked the occasion with both political fanfare and growing collaboration in science and technology research. PRC state media has framed these partnerships as evidence of the resilience of Sino-French ties, emphasizing ongoing and future joint ventures (CGTN, 2024; MFA, January 25, 2024; December 14, 2024). However, among these collaborations are exchanges with the “Seven Sons of National Defense” (国防七子)—a group of universities affiliated with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT; 工业和信息化部) known for their deep integration with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the country’s military–industrial complex (ASPI, November 25, 2019; China Brief, June 7, 2024). [1] These seven universities are on the U.S. government’s entity list, which details foreign individuals, companies, and organizations deemed national security concerns (eCFR, accessed February 10). [2]

PRC state media often present collaborations in the familiar language of “win-win cooperation” (合作共赢), portraying them as benign academic exchanges. For instance, a recent article in the People’s Daily, the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), featured a French robotics professor at Nanjing University of Science and Technology promoting Franco-Chinese technological cooperation (Xinhua Net, August 21, 2024; People’s Daily, January 8). However, beneath this narrative lies a significant security risk for European institutions. “Seven Sons” universities have a history of military collaboration, intellectual property theft, and, crucially, growing ties with Russia, as exemplified by President Vladimir Putin’s visit to the Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT; 哈尔滨工业大学) last May (HIT, May 18, 2024).

One implication often overlooked by European governments, universities, and even private technology firms engaged in partnerships with Chinese institutions is that many of these same Chinese universities are simultaneously working with Russian entities on dual-use technologies (Acta Astronautica, accessed February 10). As such, European research partnerships could be indirectly supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine and harming Europe’s own security as a result.

‘Seven Sons’ Research Enhances PLA Capabilities

The PRC’s military-linked universities are actively engaged in research on a wide range of dual-use technologies. A focus on critical areas such as artificial intelligence (AI) and nanotechnology, which are poised to shape power projection capabilities in the coming years, is expected for such institutions. The “Seven Sons’” partnerships overseas provide concrete evidence of how they pursue these technologies. The collaborations outlined below align closely with key technologies targeted by the PLA as identified by the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) December 2024 report, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. These include AI; quantum information; brain science; biotechnology; clinical medicine; deep space, deep sea, and deep earth technology; and integrated circuits. The report also notes that the PRC is invested in photonics, nanoelectronics, network communications, robotics, and new energy systems (DoD, December 2024, p. 24).

Through the country’s military-civil fusion (军民融合) development strategy, Seven Sons universities are deeply involved in supporting military modernization within the PRC. Historically, the PRC has leveraged international academic exchanges to gain access to critical technologies that support PLA modernization efforts (U.S. Senate, 2019). Investigations have linked these institutions to economic espionage targeting Western research institutions and companies (Justia, accessed February 10). The blurred lines between civilian and military research in the PRC mean that academic breakthroughs can directly enhance PLA capabilities. It is for this reason that, in 2020, the Trump administration issued Proclamation 10043, which prohibited PRC students affiliated with the “Seven Sons” and other military-linked universities from obtaining visas to study in the United States (Federal Register, accessed February 10).

The universities also have been implicated in talent recruitment programs, such as the Thousand Talents Plan (千人计划), which incentivizes foreign experts to collaborate with PRC institutions, sometimes unknowingly contributing to military research (ASPI, August 20, 2020; China Brief, June 6, 2024). Other organizations, such as the Chinese Scholarship Council (国家留学基金委员会), recruits overseas students and scholars affiliated with weapons science and aeronautics to return to the PRC to continue their research (China Brief, October 8, 2019; DoD, December 2024, p.29, p.155). The “Seven Sons’” deepening ties with European institutions therefore raise concerns regarding the security of intellectual property and the military applications of their research.

Europeans’ exposure to the kinds of risks these partnerships entail is not unique. American institutions are also deeply enmeshed in research collaborations with “Seven Sons” universities, as are other developed democracies such as Australia and South Korea (U.S. Senate, January 30; Data Abyss, accessed February 10). European institutions pride themselves on maintaining open academic exchange and fostering innovation independent of geopolitics. However, the risks posed by deepening ties with Chinese defense-linked universities remain poorly understood, with some prominent voices in academia even calling for closer ties with the PRC (The Times, December 25, 2024). Analyzing these latest partnerships provides insight into the research priorities of these universities for the coming year. Given their close ties to the Chinese military and government, the collaborations also offer an indirect glimpse into the strategic focus of these state entities. Additionally, the partnerships reveal that the PRC targets not only European universities, but also technology companies and international agencies. Yet European entities continue to expand these partnerships, despite the security risks they entail.

European Universities’ Strengthening Ties to ‘Seven Sons’ Universities

In the past two months, institutions across Europe—not just in France—have established or strengthened links with at least one of the “Seven Sons.” According to press releases from PRC universities, over 20 agreements, partnerships, or newly published research articles have been announced between these institutions and European (including Russian) entities between December 2024 and January 2025 (see below). While European policymakers focus on expanding export controls and countering Beijing’s influence operations, the issue of research collaboration with PLA-linked universities has received comparatively little attention (BBC, December 17, 2024; Reuters, January 16).

Recent academic exchanges highlight the scope of the PRC’s influence efforts. For example, in the week of December 9–16, 2024, Beihang University’s president led a delegation to France and Austria that secured new agreements with leading institutions based in those countries. The delegation met with representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, and even Nobel Laureate in Physics Albert Fert. Organized under the Beihang-Europe Cooperation Committee (北航中欧合作委员会), founded in 2023, these meetings culminated in new cooperation agreements in high-tech strategic sectors with both civilian and military applications. Among the key engagements were (Beihang University, December 16, 2024):

• A meeting with Olivier Chansou, president of the École Nationale de l’Aviation Civile (ENAC), focusing on expanding the Zhongfa Aviation Institute of Beihang University (北京航空航天大学) (ENAC, accessed February 10; Zfai, accessed February 10). According to a Beihang press release, the engineering school, which actively recruits international students and faculty, has been designated an “Excellent Case of Sino-Foreign Cooperation in Education” (中外合作办学优秀案例) in Zhejiang Province (Beihang University, December 25, 2024). Given the PRC’s ambitions in aerospace, particularly through the state-backed Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC, 中国商飞), and longstanding concerns over intellectual property theft related to the company’s C919 single-aisle aircraft, such collaborations merit closer scrutiny from the French government and France’s airline powerhouse Airbus (China Brief, May 10, 2024; USTR, May 14, 2024, p.34; Euronews, January 3).
• A renewed memorandum of cooperation with Austria’s International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), emphasizing AI, big data, and complex systems research (IIASA, accessed February 10).
• A strategic cooperation agreement with Dassault Systèmes, a leading software firm, to develop a digital research and education platform, with planned joint research in AI, the metaverse, integrated circuits, and more (3DS, accessed February 10).
• A memorandum of understanding with leading engineering and research institution ESPCI Paris, facilitating joint research in chemistry, energy, and materials science (ESPCI, accessed February 10).
• A scholarship agreement with French mathematics foundation Fondation Mathématique Jacques Hadamard to support Beihang undergraduates pursuing master’s degrees in France (Fondation Hadamard, accessed February 10).
• A collaboration with engineering institute INSA Toulouse focusing on joint research projects and meetings (INSA Toulouse, accessed February 10).

Beihang’s December engagements extended beyond France and Austria. That same month, a delegation from its School of Integrated Circuits visited Spain’s Catalonia Institute of Nanoscience and Nanotechnology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona to discuss joint research on two-dimensional materials, which are critical to military applications in sensors, imaging, and electronics (Beihang University, December 12, 2024; Defense Science Journal, accessed February 10). Meanwhile, a representative of Northwest Polytechnical University (NPU), Party Committee Executive Vice-Secretary Cheng Jiwei (程基伟), also met with the Autonomous University of Barcelona as well as with other Spanish universities as part of the China-Europe University Presidents Dialogue (中欧大学校长对话会) (NPU, December 9, 2024). As part of the trip, NPU signed an agreement with the University of Salamanca to collaborate on aeronautical engineering and environmental science projects (University of Salamanca, December 12, 2024).

In addition to formal partnerships like these, there are numerous announcements of visiting lecturers and honorary scholars—many likely recruited through the PRC’s talent programs—along with joint research publications and participation in international events (China Brief, August 5, 2010; NUAA, November 30, 2024; BIT, December 6, 2024; HIT, December 30, 2024; HEU, January 27). Collaborations span a wide range of fields from materials science to AI to energy. [3] Many of these areas of foundational research have direct applications that could contribute to military technologies, giving researchers from “Seven Sons” institutions early access to critical breakthroughs.

Europe’s Indirect Support for Russia’s War

In parallel with collaborations in Western Europe, PRC universities are strengthening their research ties with Russian institutions (Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 4, 2024). In late 2024, Andrey B. Prokofev, vice president of Russia’s Samara University and faculty member of the Department of Aircraft Engine Theory, met with the leadership of both Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (NUAA) and NPU (Samara University, accessed February 10). At NUAA, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to advancing international research collaboration, signing agreements to establish joint laboratories and dual-degree programs (NUAA, November 28, 2024). At NPU, Prokofev discussed talent cultivation and scientific research, culminating in an agreement to create a Sino-Russian joint research laboratory (NPU, December 2, 2024). Around the same time, Mikhail Gordin, president of Bauman Moscow State Technical University, visited Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT). The two delegations discussed strengthening cooperation in areas such as underwater robotics, lunar rover development, satellite platforms, and solar panels. They pledged to establish joint laboratories and enhance student and faculty exchanges (BIT, December 24, 2024).

The “Seven Sons” universities’ collaboration with Russian institutions adds another layer of complexity to European engagement with the PRC. As Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine enters its fourth year, the strengthening of Sino-Russian research ties suggests the possibility of indirect European contributions to Russian military capabilities. Sino-Russian cooperation extends to critical sectors such as aircraft engines and aerospace propulsion—fields with direct military applications, as demonstrated by partnerships between Samara University and NUAA or NPU. Given the heavy sanctions Western governments have imposed on Russia’s defense sector, PRC assistance to help sustain Russia’s technological development could undermine European objectives.

Conclusion

European policymakers and academic institutions exhibit a persistent lack of urgency regarding the implications of such collaborations. Unlike the United States, which has taken some proactive measures to restrict academic exchanges with PLA-affiliated institutions, Europe’s approach remains largely permissive (House CCP Select Committee, May 9, 2024). Emphasis on open research and innovation and the assumption that scientific progress exists in a geopolitical vacuum exposes it to strategic vulnerabilities. This is increasingly untenable in a world where technology is a cornerstone of great power competition.

Unchecked research collaboration with the “Seven Sons” universities presents a real security threat. To date, the balance in Europe between scientific openness and national security tips toward the former. The longer PRC continues to exploit this approach, the more that very openness will be put at risk.

Notes

[1] The universities of the Seven Sons of National Defence include:

• Beihang University in Haidian, Beijing
• Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) in Haidian, Beijing
• Harbin Engineering University (HEU) in Harbin, Heilongjiang
• Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT) in Harbin, Heilongjiang
• Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (NUAA) in Nanjing, Jiangsu
• Nanjing University of Science and Technology (NUST) in Nanjing, Jiangsu
• Northwestern Polytechnical University (NPU) in Xi’an, Shaanxi

[2] Academic research collaboration between “Seven Sons” universities and Western institutions is a widespread problem. According to recent testimony delivered by Dr. Jeffrey Stoff to the U.S. government Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “There were 17,630 unique articles published between 2019 and January 2025 involving a coauthor from one of these ‘seven sons’ defense universities and a coauthor affiliated with a U.S. institution” (U.S. Senate, January 30, p.11). Stoff highlights one case in which a former UCLA professor, who worked on DoD and NSF-funded research, “partnered with and had talent program appointments at the Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) and other PRC research institutions heavily involved in defense R&D.” He notes that no action was taken, and that the professor “now leads a massive AI research effort” in the PRC (p.27).

[3] A fuller—though non-exhaustive—list also includes chemistry, nanotechnology, carbon neutrality, big data, complex systems, the metaverse, simulation, digital healthcare, integrated circuits, and two-dimensional materials.