How al-Sharaa’s New Syrian Regime Masks Its Islamism Behind Bureaucracy

Executive Summary:

• Former jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa and a coalition of militant groups led by his Committee for the Liberation of the Levant (HTS) successfully overthrew the brutal al-Assad regime in Syria on December 8, 2024, leaving the fate of the country uncertain.
• While al-Sharaa has strategically presented himself as a moderate, his background and organization’s actions point to a continued attachment to Salafist Islamism.
• A crucial part of HTS’s strategy as a wartime regime was outsourcing governance to local technocrats, helping them bolster their reputation internationally as well as decrease domestic dissent.
• In spite of al-Sharaa’s self-styled moderation, HTS’s past repression of discontent, a recent sectarian massacre, and the total, if indirect power offered to al-Sharaa by the new provisional constitution suggest that the new Syrian regime is more likely to be a repressive Islamist regime than a moderate, tolerant one.

Following the surprising fall of the al-Assad regime in Syria to a coalition of militant groups on December 8, 2024, observers have been following developments in Syria closely, unsure of how the new post-al-Assad regime will govern (Al Jazeera, December 8, 2024). Many in the West are hopeful that the new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa (frequently referred to by his nom de guerre, Abu Muḥammad al-Jawlāni; see Militant Leadership Monitor, May 31, 2013), will lead the war-torn country down a moderate, pro-Western, liberal path. While the country’s direction is as of yet unknown, the best possible predictor of where Syria is headed can be drawn from an analysis of the current transitional government, which is the immediate descendent of two closely tied organizations: Hay’at Taḥrīr al-Shām (“Committee for the Liberation of the Levant”; HTS), the Salafi jihadist group led by al-Sharaa (see Terrorism Monitor, April 28, 2023); and the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), a civil administration created by HTS to govern the territory under their control in 2017.

Few have heard of the SSG, which has avoided the limelight of its military counterpart in international coverage. Nevertheless, the group has grown from being responsible for the lives of Syrians under HTS’s de facto control in Idlib Governorate into becoming the country’s internationally recognized government.

Only several months into its rule, unfortunately, the new Syrian regime is showing signs of extremism. This includes the recent massacre of around 1,500 Alawites, who are associated with the brutal al-Assad regime, as well as a reversion to some hardline Islamic policies, such as training the civil police in sharī’ah law (Times of Israel, March 10; SharqToday, January 24). Likewise, the recently signed provisional constitution officially limits al-Sharaa’s power while effectively granting him nearly unlimited indirect control over the country’s nascent institutions (BBC Arabic, March 16). These developments track with what can be seen if one examines the development of the SSG’s relationship with HTS since 2017, where the occasional moderate, Western tendencies on display appear to be based on the interests of al-Sharaa rather than any sort of heartfelt ideological transformation.

Why HTS Succeeded Where Others Failed

HTS’s creation of the SSG as a quasi-independent governing body under the rule of a jihadist regime is unusual, as other jihadist groups generally opt to govern directly. Important parallels can be drawn between HTS and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen (The Washington Institute, July 2024). Both arose as al-Qaeda affiliates exploiting the power vacuum left by ongoing civil wars to establish their power bases for the purposes of furthering their wider agenda. Each attempted to provide services to their respective citizenries in order to bolster their legitimacy as well as support from locals and others outside the region. In turn, the provision of services to the local pollution was seen as a means to an end, aiding in the recruitment of fighters as well as the acquiring of resources and additional international support.

Critically, HTS succeeded where AQAP failed. This happened in part because AQAP opted to prioritize the direct implementation of its particular vision of Islamic governance, enforced using strict religious police. AQAP’s efforts backfired, instead straining the group’s limited resources, weakening them militarily, and alienating them from the existing population, who ultimately came to view their brand of al-Qaeda-style Salafism as a foreign imposition.

Delegated Rule Through the SSG

By contrast, the SSG was created by HTS to govern in a hands-off manner, replacing existing local councils that operated under the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA; Qasioun News, December 12, 2017). This allowed HTS to delegate the administration of “apolitical issues” like infrastructure repair, education, and the provision of healthcare to local civil society leaders, while HTS itself focused on military affairs (Al Jazeera, September 6, 2024).

While beholden to HTS, the SSG was in many ways independent and left to its own devices when dealing with matters that did not directly concern HTS or its leaders (Middle East Political Science, November 2020). While HTS made efforts to appear more moderate, especially by distancing itself from al-Qaeda, it never officially disavowed its own Salafi bent of Islam. Conversely, the SSG ditched Salafi doctrines in Islamic governance, instead implementing shari’ah law in line with the local, more tolerant Shāfi’i madhhab (Islamic legal school of thought) (OrientXXI, December 24, 2024). This stood in particularly stark contrast with HTS’s Syrian contemporary Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), famous for implementing uncompromising and draconian measures in line with its vision of an Islamic regime. Notably, the SSG attempted to impose a strict religious “morality police” upon the local population several times but was forced to reform and moderate these initiatives due to a combination of public pressure and a desire to be seen as palatable internationally (SyriaTV, April 18, 2024).

It appears that the SSG, as the civil arm of HTS, understood it needed to maintain a form of accountability to those it ruled if it wished to hold onto any semblance of legitimacy. HTS considered this to be a key part of its efforts to attract positive international publicity and position itself as the rightful ruler of Syria after al-Assad. As such, the comparative moderation of the SSG should be understood not as the seed of a nascent liberalizing regime, but instead as a calculated political decision intended to ensure relative popularity in HTS-controlled territory while also attracting positive publicity from international observers.

It would be a mistake to assume that HTS’s governing strategy was itself democratic. The group actively engaged in suppressing public dissent, clamping down on peaceful protests against its rule in early 2024 with an iron fist (Syrian Dialogue Center, March 8, 2024). Interestingly, this was accomplished through mass arrests enacted through the intelligence (mukhābarāt) agency of the SSG. HTS’s commandeering of al-Assad-era detention centers and its harsh treatment of detainees earned it significant notoriety (Facebook/فايز شناني, March 3). While these were seen as HTS policies, they were directly implemented through the SSG by the head of the civil intelligence services, Anas Khattab (Al Modon, December 26, 2024).

The prison policy showcases the extent to which the SSG was subservient in its goals to HTS. Just as HTS used parts of the SSG to implement its goals of civilian control and security, the group also used force to bolster the SSG. When the latter implemented an olive oil tax that was met by protests, HTS’s forces cracked down on the protestors with violence and arrests (Syria TV, December 17, 2024). The HTS-controlled city of Idlib has been wracked by protests several times since 2017 over economic difficulties and alleged mismanagement, but this was consistently met with suppression (Al Modon, April 11, 2019).

Technocracy and Bureaucracy

Unusual for what might have otherwise been considered an Islamist regime, the specific policies and structure of the SSG led to it frequently being described as a technocracy (Al Jazeera, September 6, 2024). The SSG delegated governance tasks to the local educated elite, either directly through its own ministries or through existing civil society organizations that cooperated with the SSG. This allowed the group to both improve local administration and co-opt the educated class responsible for participating in civil society. Given that these groups could have formed the core of local opposition to HTS, the SSG’s openness to local elites is likely to have helped stabilize HTS’s rule over Idlib.

The SSG’s internal structure appears to have been intentionally designed to mimic the administrative structure of the past al-Assad government. This includes the number, purpose, and type of ministries, in addition to dozens of constituent committees covering most any issue. Collectively, they form an unusually extensive bureaucracy for an unrecognized body that administered less than a tenth of the country. The Syrian cabinet arrangement shared by both the al-Assad and al-Sharaa regimes features a high degree of bureaucratic decentralization, with just about any issue one could imagine being assigned its own committee within one of several competing ministries (as opposed to one central apparatus under a single minister). For example, there are separate ministries for Education and Higher Education; similarly, the ministries for Agriculture, Development, and Economy and Resources are each independent and co-equal (Levant24, July 11, 2023). While this arrangement was not invented by HTS and is shared with other Arab governments including Iraq and Egypt, the SSG’s adoption of it while still far from power is highly unusual.

The group’s adoption of a complex administrative apparatus may have had less obvious benefits. By integrating Syria’s scholars, professionals, and local elites into its power structure, the SSG assists in ingratiating them with their new HTS rulers. The creation of a vast, decentralized, bureaucratic system that places a large number of actors on a relatively equal level offers a stage for Syrian elites to advance themselves socially and participate in politics. This has several advantages, from legitimizing HTS and the SSG to theoretically improving governance. One can imagine that disaffected elites complaining about the falling quality of healthcare in Idlib might be offered a role in the local Hospital Directorate, thereby offering them a route to fix the issue—while also getting the potential malcontents to “buy in” to the new regime. In theory, even if these committees are unnecessarily duplicative and/or fail in their appointed administrative task, they may still serve as a useful heat sink for potential elite discontent.

HTS’s utilization of the SSG as a technocratic instrument of governance will play in its favor as it assumes the mantle of the transitional government. More than a decade of civil war has left the country with a severe brain drain. At least a third of Syria’s experts and academics have fled abroad since the start of the war (Syria TV, September 9, 2021). Asaad al-Shaibani, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, will almost certainly fight to attract talented members of the Syrian diaspora back to their homeland—a crucial step in rebuilding Syria’s war-wracked economy. To this end, the transitional government largely composed of the former SSG no doubt wishes to demonstrate that émigré doctors, engineers, and lawyers returning to Syria will be protected, respected, and even promoted into office under the new administration.

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Role

While it is important to view both HTS and the SSG as unique organizations with their own power structures and interests, Ahmed al-Sharaa’s role as the paramount leader must be emphasized. The “al-Jawlāni organization,” used here to refer to the frequently rebranded group led by al-Sharaa that would eventually evolve into HTS, is entirely the brainchild of al-Sharaa (Enab Baladi, April 22, 2024). Al-Sharaa is generally viewed as a clever and far-sighted tactician, whose background has offered him a keen sense of the impact local and international opinion has on his movement’s success. The victorious HTS and all its past forms were developed through a process of metamorphosis—informed and guided by al-Sharaa’s understanding of the world and his own ambitions. The establishment of the SSG in 2017 is no exception.

This is best demonstrated by al-Sharaa’s many political pivots (Azure, February 7). The current transitional government is the fourth iteration of the armed organization led by al-Sharaa (known unanimously in HTS’s earlier incarnations as al-Jawlāni). Each pivot was an intentional response to the changing circumstances in the Syrian Civil War.

The “al-Jawlāni organization,” then known as the Al-Nusra Front, began in 2012 as a radical jihadist group seeking to exploit the anarchy of al-Assad’s downfall to establish a global caliphate (National Counterterrorism Center, accessed March 16). Following a short period affiliated with Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and a longer period as an al-Qaeda affiliate, the group narrowed the scope of its jihadist mission to just Syria’s borders. This was likely a decision made in response to Western intervention against Islamic State. Later, the group would repeatedly claim that it had distanced itself from al-Qaeda, a designated terrorist organization. In 2017, al-Sharaa renamed the group to HTS in an attempt to portray his forces as the legitimate armed resistance group fighting al-Assad’s regime. Between the rebranding, visible efforts at cracking down on the most ardent jihadists in Idlib and within the group, and the formation of the SSG, al-Sharaa convinced enough of the international community of his good intentions to start enjoying the benefits of international support (PBS, January 6, 2021).

Al-Sharaa’s establishment of the SSG succeeded in giving his rule an air of legitimacy by demonstrating its ability to govern. To this end, al-Sharaa invited Riad al-Asaad, leader of the secular, U.S.-backed Free Syrian Army, to attend the formation of HTS in 2017, where he served as deputy prime minister for military affairs for a year (Syrian Memory, accessed March 16). The SSG provided a key arena for competing interests during the war, keeping civilians docile (through repression and/or the provision of services), though this balancing act could only do so much to keep HTS’s extremist wing in line. Al-Sharaa has failed at keeping radicals within his coalition in line in the past. Hardliners who went on to form the al-Qaeda-affiliated group Ḥurrās al-Dīn split off from the al-Jawlāni organization in July 2016, following al-Sharaa’s formal disaffiliation from al-Qaeda (BBC Arabic, December 2, 2018).

With HTS and the SSG now evolving into the transitional government, observers should expect al-Sharaa and his regime to govern with similar motives—and an equally heavy focus on optics. The government is likely to be pulled in a number of different directions, balancing between its own interests, pressure from more aggressive jihadist elements within HTS, and international prodding for a more secular, democratic, and tolerant government.

Concerning Developments

Early optimism has given way to fears that the tolerant “al-Sharaa” may have been the jihadist “al-Jawlāni” in sheep’s clothing all along. Skirmishes between government-linked forces wearing jihadist attire and Alawite militias believed to be led by an al-Assad-loyal general spiraled horribly out of control in the first weeks of March. Government-linked forces engaged in large-scale sectarian massacres of mostly Alawites—up to 1,500 civilians are believed to have been killed—alongside other brutal acts of collective punishment concentrated in Syria’s coastal region (Alhurra, March 12; Facebook/Yahya Abouzakaria, March 10).

Western supporters of al-Sharaa might have expected him to immediately crack down on the group affiliated with the new government that carried out the massacres. Instead, al-Sharaa’s first message focused heavily on warning against further Alawite resistance, saying that Sunni retribution against the Alawites was unavoidable, given the seething resentment during the Alawite-dominated years of the al-Assad regime (YouTube/العربي ـ أخبار, March 7). Still, al-Sharaa did call for peace during the incident and eventually promised to hold the perpetrators accountable—according to the recommendation of a new committee that is to be formed for the purposes of investigating the incident (Al Jazeera, March 9). This tragedy no doubt diminished optimism that al-Sharaa’s leadership would lead to a moderate, tolerant regime rather than a sectarian, jihadist one. It also amounted to an admission that there are elements of the new armed forces that Damascus is not in full control of.

Others with high hopes for a moderate, liberal future for Syria have pointed to the ongoing process of reestablishing constitutional rule in the country. In short, over the past two months, a seven-person constitutional committee released an interim constitution that enshrines key reforms like the separation of powers, judicial independence, women’s rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press, which was approved by al-Sharaa (Al Jazeera, March 13). The document is to serve as the basis for the new regime for four to five years, a period during which a new legislature—of which one-third is to be appointed directly by al-Sharaa, with the rest appointed by a committee al-Sharaa selects—will debate and adopt a permanent constitution. Following this period, free elections are to be held according to the new, permanent constitution. Al-Sharaa was also granted the power to appoint judges to the constitutional court.

In short, while the facade of separation of powers exists, in all likelihood the system will be fully under the indirect control of al-Sharaa. The Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the country’s northeast—who had only recently signed an agreement subsuming their civil and military apparatuses into the new government—have already declared their “complete rejection of the constitutional declaration” (Rudaw, March 14). The fact that the provisional constitution offers al-Sharaa effective personal control over the government and future constitution only amplified fears of a return to jihadism, especially when the constitutional committee announced that “sharī’ah [Islamic law] will be the primary source of legislation” (Swiss Broadcasting Company, March 13). The centrality of sharī’ah had always been a key theme of HTS rhetoric, but this had been significantly less emphasized in recent years, as the group portrayed itself as forward-thinking and sought international support.

Conclusion

Assuming his actions do not reignite the country’s civil war, al-Sharaa’s new control over the system has all but guaranteed that Syria will be molded in his image. The question remains: what image will that be, the tolerant “al-Sharaa” or the jihadist “al-Jawlāni?” Ultimately, this comes down to how strictly he intends to implement sharī’ah law, limited by how much he is able to get away with before he loses Western support.

The broader trajectory of the SSG as the civil arm of HTS suggests that al-Sharaa and his organization’s evolutions represented calculated political decisions rather than a change of heart. The ostensibly independent SSG, even as a government in waiting, was always subservient to al-Sharaa’s long- and short-term objectives. Likewise, the SSG could fairly be described as technocratic and meritocratic, but not democratic in the Western, participatory sense.

While al-Sharaa could decide to use all of his newfound direct and indirect powers to attempt to erect a moderate, liberal democracy in Syria, this would go against his stated beliefs and the history of both his militant organization and the civil government it has propped up since 2017. Conversely, observers must be keenly aware of the fact that the image-savvy al-Sharaa will almost certainly attempt to portray himself to the West as a moderate reformist, regardless of the policies he intends to implement at home. Al-Sharaa may be able to bring stability, but this is likely to come with some level of constitutional Islamization and political repression, up to and including further sectarian violence. Through the SSG, al-Sharaa has demonstrated his ability to provide the citizens under his rule with basic services, but it remains to be seen if he will do so without enshrining his own extremist and/or authoritarian rule. It is often forgotten today that Bashar al-Assad too once promised to reform the state—before cracking down on the nascent Damascus Spring—settling on economic reforms and policies that maintained the support of the country’s elites in lieu of real political reform. Al-Jawlāni may have brought down al-Assad, but it is yet to be seen whether al-Sharaa will choose a new and better path for Syria.