Iran and Russia Pursue Multipolar World Order

Executive Summary:

• Iran and Russia signed a new comprehensive strategic agreement on January 17, serving as a comprehensive framework to build closer ties and cooperate in what the two states refer to as a just and multipolar world order.
• The treaty highlights expanding trade routes, reducing reliance on the U.S. dollar, and enhancing military collaboration without formal alliance commitments, including via Iran’s continued supply of drones and potential ballistic missile transfers.
•  Moscow and Tehran maintain a pragmatic partnership despite tensions over Russia’s support for Azerbaijan’s plans for the Zangezur corridor. The two states are avoiding rigid alliances to preserve flexibility in their geopolitical maneuvering.

On January 17, the leaders of Iran and Russia signed a new comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in Moscow, replacing a previous pact from 2001  that has been renewed several times (Al Jazeera, January 17). Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and deteriorating Russia-West relations have transformed Moscow-Tehran ties. Historically, Russia was cautious about sharing sensitive technology with Iran to avoid Western backlash. Russia’s war against Ukraine, however, has pushed Moscow to further pivot toward Asia, with Iran playing a key role in this realignment. Even if the war against Ukraine ends, Russia’s alignment with Iran is likely to continue. As both states face Western sanctions, Moscow increasingly views Tehran as a vital partner, especially for access to the Indian Ocean and East Africa (see EDM, January 11, 2024). Iran, anticipating maximum pressure from Washington, is also keen to expand military and political cooperation with Russia (The White House, February 4).

The official details of the new agreement essentially cover all areas of cooperation, including culture, politics, infrastructure development, and even sanitation (IranGov, January 17). Russia and Iran argue that the two will continue promoting a just and multipolar world. This means cooperation within and expansion of such platforms as BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (see EDM, November 4, 2024). [1] Another area of cooperation is the development of a new payment system to facilitate the reduction of dependence on the U.S. dollar (see EDM, January 11, 2024). There are also intentions to expand the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which runs from Russian ports to Iran and its southern seashore and aims to link Russia with the Middle East, India, and even Africa’s eastern coasts (see EDM, June 7, 2023).

Unsurprisingly, military and strategic ties are prevalent throughout the treaty, including strengthening bilateral cooperation. This likely refers to the continued supply of Iranian drones and potentially other technologies such as short-range ballistic missiles to Russia (see EDM, March 6, June 20, 2023, September 18, 2024).

The document mentions the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, and how Russia and Iran will strive to “facilitate bolstering of peace and security” in these areas (IranGov, January 17). In both regions, Moscow and Tehran have traditionally shared a specific approach based on the concept of “regionalism,” which seeks to limit the presence of non-regional actors such as the United States and the European Union. Tehran and Moscow likewise support the 3+3 initiative which includes Russia, Iran, Türkiye, and the three South Caucasus states (despite Georgia so far declining participation due to Russia’s continuous occupation of 20 percent of its territory) (see EDM, March 12).

Beyond these points, the treaty also reveals the limits of the Russo-Iranian partnership. Despite expanding cooperation, Moscow and Tehran have not included stipulations on forming a formal alliance, nor pledges on mutual defense in case one of the countries is attacked by a third party. Conversely, for example, the treaty between Russia and North Korea signed in 2024 does have a special mutual defense clause, effectively elevating Moscow-Pyongyang relations to an alliance (Al Jazeera, November 12, 2024). This difference highlights Tehran and Moscow’s need to maintain flexibility in their partnership in such a way that evades formal alliance. Moreover, beyond the lack of a specific mutual defense clause, a series of issues remain contentious and limit the level of cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. Tensions persist, particularly over delays in arms trade as Iran still awaits delivery of Russian Su-35 fighter jets, possibly due to Moscow’s balancing act with Middle Eastern powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Al-Monitor, January 27).

Additionally, there are differences over Russia’s support for Azerbaijan’s ambition to establish the so-called Zangezur corridor, which would run from Azerbaijan proper to its exclave of Nakhchivan and to Türkiye, all via Armenia’s southernmost province of Syunik. Russia is eager to restore Soviet transportation routes, increasing its influence in the region (see EDM, January 25, 2021). While Iran’s calculus is simple, the corridor would deprive Armenia of its physical border with the Islamic Republic (Azatutyun, February 6). Iran would face an uncomfortable reality of Russian and especially Turkish influence along its northern border. The differences have often sparked diplomatic spats between Moscow and Tehran and continue to be problematic (see EDM, September 12, 2024).

A wider Middle Eastern angle to Russo-Iranian relations is also underway. Iran has often chastised Russia for the latter’s support of the United Arab Emirates’s claim over the islands in the Persian Gulf. These islands are currently under Tehran’s control, but are contested by Abu Dhabi as under occupation by Iran (Iranintl, December 21, 2023; ARN News Center, September 24, 2023). Moreover, Russia is unlikely to support Iran in any direct conflict with Israel, instead limiting military support to avoid jeopardizing its broader regional interests (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, December 30, 2024; Izvestiya, March 6).

The treaty serves as a comprehensive framework for the two powers to build closer ties and cooperate in ushering what they often refer to as a just and multipolar world order (see EDM, November 10, 2022, October 21, 2024; Tehran Times, August 11, 2024). Bound by shared opposition to the West, Tehran and Moscow appear to have found a balance between expanding cooperation while maintaining strategic flexibility. In short, their relationship remains transactional, with both sides wary of each other’s long-term ambitions from the South Caucasus to the Middle East. The January agreement ultimately demonstrates the awareness that Moscow and Iran maintain in both evading binding commitments that could restrict their maneuverability while seeking to project a unified position toward multipolarity.

Note:

[1] A loose political-economic grouping initially consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and South Africa, which has now expanded to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates.