Italy’s Approach to Georgia Stirs Controversy

Executive Summary:

• Italy’s increased bilateral engagement with the Georgian Dream government sharply contrasts with broader EU skepticism toward Tbilisi’s democratic backsliding.
• Rome’s approach is shaped by historical, cordial ties with Russia and its proxies; energy interests; and a sovereigntist outlook that downplays regime type in foreign policy.
• Tbilisi Mayor Kakhaber Kaladze’s deep connections to Italy—rooted in his soccer career and political links to Forza Italia—help explain the warm ties between Georgia and Italy.

The inauguration of Georgia’s new consulate in Milan on June 10 reignited controversy over Italy’s increasingly accommodating stance toward the ruling Georgian Dream party (1tv.ge, June 10). The move underscores Rome’s divergence from the EU consensus on Tbilisi’s democratic backsliding (see EDM, October 17, 2024, May 7, June 4). Kakhaber “Kakha” Kaladze, currently mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream general secretary, attended the ceremony together with Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze and Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili. Kaladze rose to popularity as a soccer player for AC Milan as well as the Georgian national soccer team, and he maintains close connections to Italy.

In Milan, Kaladze met with Mayor Giuseppe “Beppe” Sala and Lombardy Governor Attilio Fontana (Interpressnews, June 9). Fontana is a member of the League (Lega), the party led by current Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure and Transport Matteo Salvini. Sala, instead, has been the mayor of Italy’s “economic capital” since 2016. He was elected as a center-left independent, backed by both political parties (e.g., the Democratic Party) and several local civic lists (liste civiche). A former business executive turned politician who steered Milan through Expo 2015’s legacy, Sala primarily focuses on sustainable urban development, cultural events, human rights, and inclusion. During their meeting, Kaladze said he still considered Milan his “hometown” and vowed “to use every available resource” to strengthen Italian-Georgian relations.  

Kaladze’s comments and the meeting itself sparked controversy. Nona Mikhelidze, a Georgian scholar based in Italy and senior fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali, criticized Sala for meeting with Kaladze. Other observers also highlighted the blatant contradiction in Sala engaging with a government accused of violating the very human rights he claims to safeguard (Milano Today, June 12; La Valigia Blu, June 17). Despite his institutional role, Sala should not be considered aligned with Rome’s current government.  Even if elected independently, Sala represents the center-left coalition, which comprises those parties now in the opposition in the Italian Parliament. His approach, however, is consistent with the broader stance Italy has taken toward Georgia in recent months.

A couple of weeks before the consulate’s opening, another Italian-Georgian diplomatic exchange raised similar concerns. On May 28, Italian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Edmondo Cirielli, met with his Georgian counterpart, George Zurabashvili, and stressed “the need for a frank and constructive dialogue” between Georgia, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, May 28).

This meeting, too, drew criticism in Italy and across Europe. Rasa Juknevičienė, a Lithuanian member of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament, denounced the engagement as “deplorable” and called it “a mistake that some EU countries have a different approach toward Georgia” (Ansa, June 4). Juknevičienė compiled the European Commission’s 2023 and 2024 reports on Georgia, which were later used to support recommendations for suspending the country’s accession to the European Union (European Parliament, June 12). 

Italy has been drifting from the broader EU consensus on how to handle the Georgian Dream government for some time. In January, Massimiliano D’Antuono, the Italian ambassador to Georgia, met with Foreign Minister Botchorishvili to discuss Georgian-EU relations and possible areas for future cooperation (Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 31). Although it was an ambassador, not a government minister, who attended the meeting, it still drew criticism from parts of the Italian public that see the current situation in Georgia as a product of Russian interference and Kremlin imperialism. Italy is not entirely alone in maintaining a dialogue with Tbilisi. Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia have taken similar positions (see EDM, June 16). Rome’s stance, nevertheless, notably diverges from that of major EU powers such as France, Germany, and Poland.

Italy’s approach seems to be influenced by both structural and situational factors, including the current government’s worldview and political relationships. Structurally, Italy has long pursued friendly relations with Russia and pro-Russian actors across Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. This stance even shaped Rome’s approach to Ukraine prior to the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion (see EDM, March 16, May 11, 2015, February 6, 2020, June 30, 2021, December 6, 2022). 

Russia’s invasion was expected to cause a fundamental and definitive shift in Rome’s policy. This, however, has turned out less substantial than initially assumed. Italy still formally supports Ukraine’s resistance. Yet, some cracks have emerged. For example, earlier this year, Italian Minister of the Environment and Energy Security Gilberto Pichetto Fratin announced that Italy would resume buying Russian gas once peace is achieved in Ukraine (Il Fatto Quotidiano, February 22). This approach is not limited to the ruling coalition alone. On June 23, former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, now leader of the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) opposition party, submitted a parliamentary motion advocating for “not excluding a possible collaboration with Russia on gas” (HuffPost Italy, June 23).

Deputy Foreign Minister Cirielli is a key architect of Italy’s policy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia. His perspective, however, seems to be slightly dissonant with Rome’s foreign policy approach. On May 14, he organized the seminar “Italy and Central Asia,” hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in collaboration with Vision and Global Trends, an Italian think tank that promotes ideas of multipolarity and Eurasianism and opposes the “Anglo-Saxon presence” in the Eurasian heartland. The center is led by Tiberio Graziani, a geopolitical analyst known for his criticism of NATO and ties to Russian, pro-Kremlin ideologue Aleksander Dugin (La Repubblica, August 21, 2022; Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, May 14; Vision and Global Trends, May 15). Vision and Global Trends is the only group with which Cirielli collaborated on this event, suggesting that he shares the organization’s views. As such, cordial relations with the Georgian Dream government are part of this slightly divergent approach toward Russian proxies in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and elsewhere.

Other regional players also play a role here. The Georgian Dream government has visibly strengthened ties with Azerbaijan (Anadolu Agency, January 21). For Italy, which signed a strategic partnership with Baku in 2020, this bilateral relationship is central to its engagement in the Caucasus. It has become the primary lens through which Rome views its wider engagement in the region (see EDM, March 3, 2020).

The Italian government, moreover, places limited emphasis on the internal politics of its international partners. This stance, informed by the primacy of national sovereignty, rejects interference in domestic affairs—an expectation Italy wants reciprocated. Such a pragmatic, realist approach has shaped Rome’s diplomacy with numerous countries and must be considered when analyzing official policy toward Georgia.

Finally, personal ties matter. Kaladze lived in Italy for years, where he became politically connected, notably as a close associate of the late Silvio Berlusconi (L’Ultimo Uomo, November 5, 2024). He even credited Berlusconi with helping “end” (in reality, “freeze”) Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia (RTI, September 1, 2008). Kaladze’s intimate familiarity with Italian politics—and especially with Forza Italia, now led by Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani—has likely contributed to Italy’s more accommodating approach to the Georgia Dream government.