Kremlin Attacks Unwittingly Generate Non-Russian Nationalism

Executive Summary:

• Moscow’s attacks on non-Russian nationalism are unintentionally having the opposite effect than the Kremlin intends by causing those attacked to dig in to defend themselves and prompting others to do the same lest they become victims.
• While some attacks on non-Russian communities are having the intended result, at least for the time being, far more attacks than usually assumed are having this counter-intuitive effect, prompting Moscow, for now, to adopt ever harsher measures against non-Russian nationalism generally.
• As repression continues to hurt a broader swath of society, the Kremlin’s problems will only grow worse, prompting some to push for a change in course in the future, a possibility many non-Russians are counting on.

Moscow’s increasing attacks on non-Russian nationalism are unintentionally having the opposite effect on immigrant communities and indigenous nations. Instead of causing non-Russian nationalist groups to cease their activism, the Kremlin crackdown is prompting a growing number of groups to double down on their commitment to their causes through new strategies to achieve the same goals (Telegram/@Govorit_NeMoskva, April 19; Indigenous Russia, April 21). Even though some regime tactics are working, the failure of other measures meant to suppress non-Russian nationalism has prompted the Kremlin to adopt ever harsher measures. If Kremlin repression of ethnic minorities increases to the point that it negatively affects society as a whole—as was the case under Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and is increasingly likely under Russian President Vladimir Putin—the threat non-Russian nationalism creates for Moscow will grow (Window on Eurasia, April 25).

At present, those advocating a more moderate approach do not appear to have a significant audience with key Kremlin decision-makers (Telegram/@v_v_ivanov_z, April 9; Natsionalniy Aktsent, April 10; Versia, May 12). Putin and those around him who were shaped by what happened at the end of Soviet times remain convinced that increased repression is effective at quelling non-Russian nationalism, even though similar tactics had the opposite effect at the end of that period. They believe that non-Russian groups would see a more liberal approach as a victory, causing them to expand their demands from decentralization to outright independence. The problem is that continued repression only postpones rather than resolves these problems. Whatever “victories” Putin claims now may become defeats for the Kremlin in the long term, especially given how negatively non-Russians are likely to remember Putin’s oppression.

Friction between Moscow and non-Russian groups has attracted relatively little attention because the share of the non-Russian population is smaller now than it was at the end of Soviet times and because Putin’s repression of non-Russian nationalism has been more consistent and more “successful” than Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s. In 1991, roughly half of the Soviet population was non-Russian, while now, the share of non-Russians in the Russian Federation is between a quarter and a third, depending on how migrants are counted. Gorbachev instituted periods of liberalization followed by repression, creating a different and more explosive cycle between the regime and non-Russian groups compared to Putin’s more consistently repressive policies. Still, the conflict between non-Russians and the center can be observed across the Russian Federation, as well as on many issues affecting the non-Russian population, three of which are particularly instructive. First, anti-immigrant attitudes are leading to attacks on ethnic enclaves, sparking fear of attacks on the Russian republics (see EDM, April 10). Second, Moscow is imposing restrictions on non-Russian languages, prompting efforts to preserve smaller languages online through the Internet (Idel Realii, June 30, 2024; Anti-imperial Block of Nations, April 14). Finally, there is growing resistance among non-Russians to the Russian Community organization and its vigilante-style attacks on ethnic minorities (see EDM, May 27). 

The emergence of ethnic enclaves and Moscow’s efforts to disband them is the clearest example of how the Kremlin’s anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies consolidate non-Russian nationalism. Moscow’s anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies have accelerated the formation of ethnic enclaves as immigrants seek to protect themselves from attacks and abuse. The formation of ethnic enclaves, in turn, frightens Russians and the Russian state as seedbeds of extremism and anti-Moscow activism (see EDM, April 10, October 22, 2024; Window on Eurasia, April 3). This fear leads to calls to eliminate ethnic enclaves altogether by enacting laws to prevent their formation, but any such laws would give the state the whip hand in deciding where people can live. This power would affect not just migrants but also indigenous non-Russians and even Russians, demonstrating how anti-migrant actions can easily become anti-minority ones. The latter may then organize, assuming that their repression is next (Telegram/@matveevkomment, May 27; Natsionalniy Aktsent, May 29).

Putin’s attacks on non-Russian language instruction in schools have also had unintended consequences. Some non-Russian groups are developing new ways to ensure that their languages survive, and even nations whose languages have been doing well have decided they must take action to ensure their language’s survival (Window on Eurasia, March 21, 2023; Idel Realii, June 30, 2024; Window on Eurasia, July 4, 2024; Anti-imperial Block of Nations, April 14). Putin’s use of the Russian Community organization as a vigilante group against non-Russians is generating opposition and resistance among groups who have been attacked and among those who fear attacks in the future (see EDM, October 15, 2024; Window on Eurasia, April 15; see EDM, May 27; Window on Eurasia, June 3).

Non-Russian groups that have not yet faced attacks from the Kremlin or the Russian Community are worried enough that they are becoming more nationalist, speaking out, and forming broader coalitions to resist (EPL, September 17, 2024; Region.Expert, September 18, 2024). While the Russian opposition remains fragmented, non-Russian national movements are increasingly collaborating to improve their chances of resisting Kremlin repression. These efforts have begun to bear fruit over the last few months, resulting in a variety of joint declarations and providing Ukraine with a centralized approach to support non-Russians as a whole (Cvobodniy Idel Ural, April 11, 2022; Window on Eurasia, August 1, 2024).  

For the time being, Moscow remains dominant and can arrest or force the exile of non-Russian leaders at will. The most active non-Russian nationalist leaders are either behind bars or living and working abroad (see EDM, April 15). It is a mistake, however, to ignore the tectonic shifts taking place among non-Russians inside the Russian Federation as a result of Moscow’s oppressive policies. The Kremlin is breeding its own nemesis in the form of movements larger, more ready to cooperate, and better supported from abroad. Moscow’s oppression is spurring not just independence movements, but groups that want to see an empire that is aggressively attacking its neighbors become a democratic and federal state existing in peace with other states (Window on Eurasia, April 25).  While Putin is in power, non-Russian groups will almost certainly remain on the defensive. They will remain and be increasingly affected by his policies. These groups’ involvement with each other and with broader causes, such as environmentalism, means that they will likely continue to be radicalized and play a role in Russia’s future (Idel Realii, May 29).