Kremlin Playing Memory Politics to Recruit Cossacks into BARS Units

Executive Summary:

• The Kremlin is using memory politics through state media, museums, and official narratives to glorify Cossack military tradition, attempting to merge “service” and “ancestral” conceptions of Cossack history to justify modern expansionism and legitimize the occupation of Ukrainian territory.
• The Kremlin is investing in a selective version of Cossack history to recruit volunteers into BARS (Boeviki Armii Reserv Strany, Боевой Армейский Резерв Страны) reserve units, portraying all of Cossack history as one of border defense and expansion.
• Out of the 19,000 Cossacks in the military, approximately 6,500 serve in BARS battalions—well-trained volunteer reserve units with private military company-like traits—making them a central force in Russia’s “stealth mobilization” efforts.

The Kremlin is employing Cossack memory politics and historical narratives and investing in Cossack organizations to facilitate its current expansionism amid its war against Ukraine. On June 24, the Central Museum of the Russian Cossacks opened in Moscow. In the museum, “the history of all the Cossack troops of the Russian Imperial Army [is] told” (MK.RU, May 15). The museum is located on Bolshoy Levshinsky Lane and is part of the State Historical Museum complex. It features exhibits dedicated to the wars in which the Cossacks participated, as well as their everyday life. The museum opened on the symbolic date of June 24, the day of the 1945 parade across Red Square after the defeat of Nazi Germany (MK.RU, May 15; President of Russia, June 24). Opening the museum on a day relevant to the dominant historical “justification” for Russia’s war against Ukraine weaves the Cossacks into this narrative at a foundational level. The Central Museum of the Russian Cossacks features exhibitions on the role of the Cossacks in the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine, linking their present participation to past victories (VsKO, May 28).

The Kremlin is playing memory politics, seeking to unite the “ancestral” and “service” branches of Cossack history to portray expanding Russian borders as fundamental to Cossack identity (see EDM, September 30, 2024; Russia Post, May 9). The Kremlin is attempting to historicize the contemporary service movement, promoting present-day military service through a reductive historical ideal of the Cossack as a border guard, despite this representing just one subset of Cossack history. The official Cossack website, which is strongly influenced by the Kremlin, recently published an article extolling how “most of the pages of Russian history can be filled with examples of Cossack valor” (VsKO, May 28). The article claims that Cossacks have always “provided reliable protection on the far borders of the state, from the Dnieper to the Amur” (VsKO, May 28). While admitting that there were “free communities of the Terek, Yaik, and Siberian Cossacks that arose without action on the part of the state,” the article melds the historical identity of these Cossacks with the “service Cossacks, called city Cossacks” that arose in the 15th century as employees of the state who protected cities and border regions (VsKO, May 28). The article makes a central argument linking a narrow view of Cossack history with present-day military service, claiming:

Since the 16th century, the Cossacks have guarded the borders of Russia and to this day continue to valiantly and selflessly defend the Motherland … The role of the Cossacks in the history of the Russian state has undergone significant changes over the centuries, but the essence has remained unchanged (VsKO, May 28).

The article also focuses on how Cossack groups contributed to the historic expansion of Russia, claiming that as “the borders of the kingdom expanded, the more actively the Cossack migrated” (VsKO, May 28). The Kremlin is using a one-dimensional view of Cossack history to legitimate its land grab in eastern Ukraine, portraying Russia’s war as simply a continuation of history.

The Kremlin is investing in Cossack organizations and historical narratives to facilitate “stealth mobilization” through volunteer BARS (Boeviki Armii Reserv Strany, Боевой Армейский Резерв Страны) reserve units (see EDM, October 10, 2023, May 29, July 2). On May 27, one of the founders of the Cossack BARS-16 battalion, Ruslan Tsvetkov, and his deputy, Oleg Orukhov, took part in the program “Our Time” on Channel One. They spoke about the combat training and performance of Cossacks in the BARS reserve forces, a program established in 2021 to replace the previous, relatively untrained, Russian army reserve force with an active reserve force composed of volunteers who undergo regular training (Institute for the Study of War, March 5, 2022; 1tv.ru, May 27). The two BARS-16 leaders valorized Cossack BARS participation in the “defense” of Krasny Liman against Ukraine and emphasized the so-called “patriotism” of their volunteers (VsKO, May 28).

Many Cossacks serve in BARS units. According to one article, “more than 46,000 Cossacks have taken part in the Special Military Operation. At the moment, more than 19,000 are defending the Fatherland, of which 6,500 are part of 27 volunteer Cossack units” (VsKO, May 28). It is unclear, however, exactly how to classify those “volunteer” units, most of which operate under the umbrella of the BARS organization. BARS groups were officially established by a presidential decree in the summer of 2015. The military did not seriously implement them until 2021, however (Idel Realii, August 11, 2022). While there is no official website for the organization, an unofficial one describes them as “a mobilizational reserve, a group of citizens … who are kept in the most prepared state. These are civilians who have voluntarily entered into an agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense” (BARS2021, accessed June 6).   

There is some debate over how to classify BARS units. Russian military review outlet Militaryarms.ru states that “it is not known for sure whether BARS is a fully-fledged [private military company (PMC)]” (Militaryarms.ru, April 23, 2023). For example, all PMC members can be referred to as “BARS-ists,” and while “there is no reliable information” about whether criminals can join BARS (as they did for Wagner), there are members “who have previously been held accountable or are on the wanted list” (Kniga Voyni, accessed June 6). Applicants should be between 18 and 60, in good physical condition, and must not have relatives in Ukraine (Militaryarms.ru, April 23, 2023; Kniga Voyni, accessed June 6). Exact levels of remuneration are unclear, but they are rumored to be between 25,000 and 75,000 rubles (approximately $320 to $960) a month for enrollment in BARS, and up to 360,000 rubles (approximately $4,600) a month if deployed to Ukraine. The BARS structure is similar to military command as “command positions are distributed not according to age and military rank, but according to the individual qualities of a person” (Kniga Voyni, accessed June 6). On balance, the BARS units share many of the distinguishing features of PMCs, and some BARS members were involved with Wagner and the Union of Donbass Volunteers. Whatever the classification, they are the primary vehicle by which Cossacks reach the front lines, with a total of 18 Cossack BARS battalions (VsKO, October 3, 2023; see EDM, January 16, 2024).

The appearance on Channel One and the involvement of the Kremlin in Cossack memory politics highlight how Moscow uses the militaristic archetype of the Cossack to drive army recruitment and legitimize Russian President Vladimir Putin’s land grab in Ukraine. If the Kremlin’s Cossack-centered propaganda and memory politics are successful, their participation in the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine through BARS units is likely to increase.