Kursk Incursion Draws Delayed Response From Beijing

Executive Summary:

• Official media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has finally begun to comment on the Ukrainian operation in Russia’s Kursk oblast, which began on August 6. It gives Ukraine low odds of success, emphasizes Russia’s strength and successes elsewhere in the conflict, and has started amplifying Russian propaganda about US involvement and potential Ukrainian attacks on the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant.
• For the two weeks after Ukrainian forces invaded Russia’s Kursk Oblast on August 6, PRC state media either ignored the developments or provided minimal reporting, mostly recycling statements from Russian officials and media.
• The PRC’s muted coverage follows a pattern of delayed responses to surprising events and volatile situations, also seen at the outbreak of the war and during Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023. This can be taken as evidence that authoritarian systems are not necessarily capable of responding quickly to developments, especially when decision making is highly centralized.

On August 6, Ukrainian forces invaded Kursk Oblast inside the borders of the Russian Federation (Institute for the Study of War [ISW], August 6). This marked the first time that Ukraine has launched an offensive campaign into Russian territory. The operation was at first a closely guarded secret, leading to uncertainty about the nature and scale of the incursion, as well as about its objectives. Over two weeks later, a clearer picture has emerged. While the operation is still ongoing, by August 20, Ukrainian troops had advanced 17–22 miles into Kursk and taken control of hundreds of square miles of Russian territory. Over 120,000 civilians have been evacuated from the Kursk region, though bridges and transport links have been destroyed, severing supply lines for Russian combatants. So far, the operation has been fairly successful, with large numbers of Russian combat units surrendering to the advancing Ukrainian forces (Comment is Freed, August 21). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has now stated that the operation aims to create a “buffer zone” within Russia, with the hopes of using this as part of any future negotiations (People’s Daily Online, August 19). For its part, Russia is yet to formulate a clear response. State media continues to downplay the invasion, and despite Putin’s rhetoric about responding “decisively,” its forces are apparently continuing to focus on the main battlegrounds in Eastern Ukraine. This might slowly be changing however, as senior officials begin to articulate a stance. For instance, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev wrote on Telegram this week, “There will be NO MORE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THE COMPLETE DEFEAT OF THE ENEMY!” (Tass, August 21; Telegram/Medvedev, August 21).

Against this backdrop, People’s Republic of China (PRC) Premier Li Qiang (李强) paid a visit to Moscow for the 29th regular meeting of PRC and Russian heads of government. There, he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin (Xinhua, August 22). The joint communique published after the meeting made no mention of Ukraine and the current developments in the conflict along the border. In fact, it did not touch on any topics related to the military (People’s Daily, August 22). This is not necessarily unexpected—the same was true of the communique that followed the previous such meeting, held last December (FMPRC, December 12, 2023). Nevertheless, it is indicative of the PRC’s standard approach to dealing with unwanted surprises. In official communications, the PRC government has practically ignored the development or, when forced to acknowledge it, has played it down. This approach is symptomatic of structural weaknesses and belies the theory of “authoritarian advantage” that argues authoritarian states can respond to events more rapidly due to a centralized decision-making process, an absence of political opposition, and greater flexibility in policy implementation.

Circumspect on the Incursion, Amplifying Russian Propaganda

A survey of key state media outlets in the PRC reveals a dearth of coverage of Ukraine’s incursion into Russian territory. In the People’s Daily, the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), “Kursk Oblast (库尔斯克州)” is yet to be mentioned in any article since the operation first came to light. The website of the PRC foreign ministry, “fmprc.gov.cn,” contains just one mention so far, in a question-and-answer session with a ministry spokesperson. The spokesperson notes that the PRC side is “aware of the situation” and then reiterates its “consistent and clear (一贯的、明确的)” position on the Ukrainian issue, calling on the parties to observe three principles for de-escalation (FMPRC, August 12). (These are no expansion of the battlefield, no escalation of fighting and no fanning of the flames by any party.) The website for the PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is slightly more informative, containing five pieces about the situation in Kursk. However, these consist mostly of brief reports from Xinhua’s Moscow bureau, Russian State media TASS, and statements from the Russian government and officials.

People’s Daily Online (人民网), along with Xinhua, the official state news agency, has done more to update PRC citizens about the conflict. People’s Daily Online has published 18 articles on Kursk since August 8. Yet these, too, all remain limited in scope. The early pieces largely focus on Russia’s perspective, again relying heavily on Russian statements and coverage (though this could be partly due to the lack of Ukrainian acknowledgment of the operation until a statement by Zelenskyy on August 13) (People’s Daily Online, August 14). The pieces remain restrained, and editorials or commentary are markedly absent.

Tracking the sparse official coverage as it has developed nevertheless drives home the pro-Russian slant of PRC media, despite Beijing’s frequent protestations to the contrary (see China Brief, May 24). For instance, casualty figures are always those provided by the Russian side (People’s Daily Online, August 9; August 12; August 21; August 23). These likely overinflate the damage Russia has inflicted while minimizing Ukraine’s impact. For instance, one article claims Ukraine has lost 4,700 men in Kursk since August 6, while another puts Russian fatalities at a mere 31 (PD Online, August 21; August 23). Other journalistic strategies also reveal this implicit stance. One such strategy is to ensure that articles conclude either by quoting TASS or Russian officials, especially in articles constructed by stacking alternating quotes from Ukrainian and Russian sources. Another strategy is to selectively quote Western sources without context, pulling quotes that highlight Russian progress or Ukrainian weakness. For instance, one Xinhua piece quotes the Economist as saying that “losses are mounting” for the Ukrainian army in Kursk. It also quotes the New York Times for an article in which a Ukrainian soldier criticized the operation for reducing ammunition allocations to the Eastern front (Xinhua, August 22). This same article combines the two strategies, concluding with a quote from international relations scholar John Mearsheimer, a favored Western voice in both the PRC and Russia for arguing that the West is to blame for the current conflict. Writing for the Quincy Institute, Mearsheimer is quoted as saying that the attack in Kursk was a “huge strategic mistake” that will “hasten [Ukraine’s] defeat.”

Here we can see that the restraint of the previous fortnight’s coverage has started to shift. The Xinhua article cited above constitutes perhaps the first piece of commentary from an official outlet. It gives a substantial airing to Zelenskyy’s statements and surveys the state of play on the ground with a degree of accuracy. Nevertheless, it frames the Kursk operation as a failure for Ukraine. It argues that Ukraine’s strategy is to “besiege Wei to save Zhao (围魏救赵).” In other words, it hopes to create a diversion to afford it some breathing space elsewhere. Nevertheless, the diagnosis is that Russia has not reacted as Ukraine had hoped, instead increasing pressure on Ukraine in the East. Toward the end, it argues that the operation “has neither improved the situation on the front line nor affected the prospects for peace talks (既没有改善前线局势，又影响了和谈的前景),” stating that “the gains do not outweigh the losses incurred (得不偿失).”

PRC media is now also endorsing Russian propaganda and conspiracy theories more explicitly. This continues the ongoing alignment of the two countries’ discourse systems, something that was also reaffirmed in Premier Li’s communique as an area in which the two sides should deepen mutual coordination (see China Brief, April 12). On Wednesday, August 21, state outlet China News Service (中国新闻社) showed a screenshot of an article from the outlet RT, “exposing” the presence of personnel from a US private military contractor in Kursk. It also amplified Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s claim that the United States orchestrated the attack (China News, August 21).

The presence of a nuclear power plant in Kursk has also led to further—unsubstantiated—claims of dangerous play from Ukrainian forces. PRC state broadcaster CCTV has amplified a statement from Russia’s foreign ministry that Ukraine is “trying to use ‘suicide drones’ to attack Kursk nuclear power plant,” which it characterizes as an “act of terrorism” (CCTV, August 23; Reuters, August 23). While there had been earlier talk that Ukrainian forces might reach the power plant, this is now unlikely. A statement from the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who is set to visit the plant next week, will likely provide more clarity. The statement will probably debunk Russian claims, just as the IAEA did in November 2022 following inspections at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (PD Online, August 23; EDM, November 22, 2022).

A Pattern of Biding Time Suggests Systemic Weakness

There are two possible interpretations of the PRC’s official silence during the first two weeks of the invasion. One is pragmatism. The invasion is a risky and developing situation that might come to nothing, in which case, there would be no need for the PRC to amplify news that boosts morale for Ukraine and its supporters at Russia’s expense. The benefit of this pragmatism (in Beijing’s view) is that taking the time to reach a decision makes it less likely that it will need to change course further down the line. Another interpretation—not necessarily mutually exclusive with the first—is that the PRC system is not capable of responding quickly to contentious and volatile situations. Beijing’s response to the Kursk invasion is only the latest data point in a pattern of muted coverage from the Party-state communications apparatus in the wake of similar events. Back in early 2022, when Russia initially invaded, the PRC did not immediately give its comprehensive strategic partner the same level of backing that it would come to (China Brief; March 25, 2022; May 24). Then, when Yevgeny Prigozhin led a mutiny against Putin in the summer of 2023, official media was again slow to respond (X.com/Wen-Ti Sung, June 25, 2023).

One problem with this approach is that political leadership is apparently absent at crucial junctures. Then, once decisions are taken and trajectories take their course, a sunk cost effect takes hold that makes pivoting to a different agenda increasingly difficult—in part because it requires an implicit acknowledgment that the previous policy was a mistake. The most notable example of this was the refusal to change course on the “Zero-Covid” policies until late 2022, causing enormous economic and social harm (China Economic Review, February 2024). This problem is exacerbated by the trend toward further centralization under Xi Jinping. The likelihood that Xi must sign off on each big decision leads to a lack of efficiency and flexibility in the system, as those lower down demur on decisions, waiting for top-down approval for fear of repercussions. There is a further possibility that the system has responded even more slowly to the Kursk incursion, as the Party leadership was in Beidaihe for the first two weeks of August and not in Beijing.

Conclusion

The Kursk invasion constitutes a real possibility that the narrative of the war will turn, energizing Ukraine and its supporters. Depending on how it plays out in the next few crucial weeks, it could come to be seen as a significant moment in the conflict. The unwillingness of the PRC to acknowledge the invasion at first does as much to reaffirm Beijing’s commitment to Moscow as Premier Li Qiang’s visit did this week. The same is true for its later stance downplaying its likelihood of success, suggesting US involvement, and implying nuclear brinkmanship. Taking a step back, this moment also provides useful insight into some of the operations of Beijing’s authoritarian regime, including some of its weaknesses.