Moscow and Tehran Working to Block U.S. Involvement in Zangezur Corridor

Executive Summary:

• Azerbaijan and Armenia are considering an agreement featuring U.S. management of transit through Armenia via the Zangezur Corridor to link Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave.
• Russia and Iran are staunchly opposed to the proposal because they fear that U.S. involvement in the route would threaten their control of north–south trade through the South Caucasus.
• Moscow and Tehran are determined to torpedo any agreement of U.S. involvement, meaning that the closer peace appears to be, the more likely a new and broader conflict will become.

Baku and Yerevan are edging toward a peace agreement with progress on the issue of transit between Azerbaijan proper and the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan. Azerbaijan hopes to gain access to the Nakhchivan exclave through what Baku calls the Zangezur Corridor, a 43-kilometer-long (around 26-mile-long) strip of land running through Armenia’s Syunik Oblast. Progress in peace talks is possible in part because of the U.S. proposal to manage or rent the route for a century, an idea that has garnered some support in Azerbaijan and Armenia (Voenno-Politicheskaya Analitika, July 22; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 24). Moscow and Tehran, the two other governments heavily invested in this region, remain adamantly opposed to U.S. involvement in the transit corridor (Window on Eurasia, September 24, 2024, July 19; Voenno-Politicheskaya Analitika; Russkiy Vestnik, July 23; Vzglyad, July 24).

Iran and Russia fear that U.S. involvement will make it more difficult to use Armenia as a transit route for north–south trade. Both countries view U.S. patronage of the Zanzegur Corridor as a threat to their influence in the region and their security (Eurasia Today, September 19, 2024; Bugin Info, July 21). Moscow and Tehran are concerned that U.S. management of the Zangezur Corridor would enable the United States and Türkiye to expand their influence in the Caspian basin (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 22; Svobodnaya Pressa, July 24). Russia and Iran have been working, separately and together, to torpedo any such agreement, something that lies behind the cooling of relations between both countries and with Armenia and Azerbaijan (see EDM, July 7; Ritm Evrazii, July 25). The closer a peace deal appears, the more likely a new and broader conflict will break out in the region, an outcome that history suggests is all too likely.

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s delineation of the South Caucasus left large numbers of Armenians in Azerbaijan, primarily in Nagorno-Karabakh, and split Azerbaijan into Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan exclave, with Armenian territory in between (Window on Eurasia, May 21, 2021). This arrangement ensured continued tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijanis while blocking a major channel of Turkish influence and leaving open a land bridge for Russia to Iran that Moscow could count on Armenia to support. When Soviet power weakened in the late 1980s, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh sought to join Armenia or at least form their own republic. This movement triggered a conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan that lasted until Azerbaijan retook most of the territory Armenians had occupied within its borders in 2023, leading to the departure of the overwhelming majority of ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan (International Court of Justice, November 12, 2024). [1]

After Azerbaijan retook control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, many hoped that transit routes would reopen. Moscow, Yerevan, and Baku all declared they would work to reopen transit routes, including Zangezur, but diplomatic progress has proven difficult (see EDM, February 24, 26, July 23). Iran has consistently opposed any change in borders, something it fears would occur following the opening of a Zangezur corridor through what is now Armenian territory. Tehran has pushed instead for the development of transit between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhchivan on the Iranian side of the Aras River, something few Azerbaijanis found acceptable (Window on Eurasia, November 19, 2023; see EDM, January 10, 2024). Despite its earlier promises, Moscow did little to nothing to promote the reopening of the Zangezur route, content to continue to press for the development of north–south trade while allowing Armenian–Azerbaijani tensions to fester, giving Russia the opportunity to play its traditional divide-and-rule tactics (see EDM, February 22, 2021; Window on Eurasia, January 15, 2024).

Three changes in the last several years have led to progress in talks between Baku and Yerevan. First, the governments of both Armenia and Azerbaijan have become disenchanted with Moscow and stopped relying on Russia as a mediator, instead trying to reach an agreement on their own (see EDM, July 17, 23; Voenno Politicheskaya Analitika, July 23). Second, Türkiye has expanded its influence in the region, improving its relations with Armenia while continuing to expand its influence in Azerbaijan and the Turkic countries of Central Asia (see EDM, May 6, July 25, 30, 2024, January 22, February 19, March 20). Third, the United States has floated the idea that an American company might manage transit across Nakchivan or even rent the entire Syunik/Nakhichivan region for a century (Voenno-Politicheskaya Analitika, July 22).

The U.S. proposal has garnered some support in Yerevan and Baku, sparking alarm in Moscow and Tehran. Russia and Iran have denounced any such move as a threat to their influence in the region and to their national security. Their comments have further strained relations between Moscow and Tehran, on the one hand, and Baku and Yerevan, on the other, making progress in peace talks more difficult. Crucially, however, Moscow and Tehran retain significant leverage in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, should they choose to utilize the economic, political, and military tools at their disposal. Military interference from Iran and Russia is a growing possibility as Armenia and Azerbaijan move out of Moscow’s orbit while Moscow and Tehran simultaneously expand military cooperation. Factors, including Russia’s military base in Armenia at Gyumri and its economic leverage through transit routes and trade, mean it still holds significant power in the region (see EDM, March 16, 2023; Kavkazskiy Uzel, July 14).   

While many observers believe an agreement between Baku and Yerevan is imminent, Moscow and Tehran may utilize the numerous resources at their disposal to halt progress. The maintenance of their control of north–south trade routes through Armenian territory is just as important to Iran and Russia as the reopening of a route to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan is to Baku. One Russian commentator has even speculated that the Zangezur Corridor may play a similar role to the Danzig Corridor in contributing to the outbreak of World War II (Voenno Politiicheskaya Analitika, September 27, 2023). Russia and Iran, two countries that may be weaker than they were previously, are now working together on an increasing number of issues, especially as a peace accord in the region garners more interest.

Note:

[1] In the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, this author proposed what became known as the “Goble Plan,” which would have allowed the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to join independent Armenia in exchange for Armenia yielding the Zangezur Corridor to Azerbaijan (Goble, Paul. “Coping with the Karabakh Crisis,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Vol 16, No. 2 (1992): Pages 19-28). The idea attracted some support in Azerbaijan and Türkiye, but was rejected by Armenian nationalists who feared being surrounded by Turkic groups, as well as by the Russian and Iranian governments, which saw the arrangement as a threat to their power in the region (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 9, 2000). The question of the status of the Zangezur Corridor accordingly remained the rock on which many peace negotiations foundered.