Moscow Church, Facing Ban in Ukraine, on Defensive Across Former Soviet Space

Executive Summary:

• The Russian Orthodox Church of Ukraine faces a ban from Kyiv for its refusal to break completely with Moscow, because of the numerous continuing examples of its support and aid to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
• Similar moves against the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) and its branches are occurring across the former Soviet space, undermining both the Russian church and Putin’s “Russian world.”
• That, in turn, is undermining the ROC MP within the Russian Federation, where the Church’s retreat abroad is simultaneously reducing its influence in the Kremlin and prompting the church itself to take actions elsewhere to show its usefulness.   

On August 20, the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, passed a law banning all religious organizations in Ukraine subordinate to religious structures headquartered in countries engaged in aggression against Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada, August 20). Many Ukrainians have demanded this measure be taken since the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) was granted autocephaly in 2019 and especially since Russian President Vladimir Putin began his expanded war against Ukraine in 2022 (see EDM, December 8, 2022, February 13, April 10). The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) styled itself part of the Moscow Patriarchate until recently. While it is not the only denomination that falls under this category, it is the primary target of Kyiv’s actions by virtue of its size, its competition with the autocephalous OCU, and the support it continues to provide for Putin’s war. Moscow has denounced this law as a threat to religious freedom in Ukraine, a position that has attracted some support from religious and human rights leaders in the West. The Kremlin has even begun to insist that Kyiv’s recent actions are turning the war in Ukraine into a religious war (Window on Eurasia, August 24). Kyiv believes—and the evidence suggests—that what it is doing is an entirely reasonable defense of its national security. Ukraine is likely to press ahead, especially because other former Soviet republics have been moving in a similar direction and because of the follow-on impact of its actions in Russia itself.

The new law, in fact, does not impose an immediate ban but instead gives the Moscow church in Ukraine ten months to demonstrate that it has completely separated itself from Moscow, not only in name but in fact. Kyiv will only ban the UOC and the other denominations, including the Old Believers, if they have not done so by spring 2025. This will trigger not only property disputes but a variety of reactions from clergy and laity now part of the UOC. Ukrainian political and religious leaders clearly hope that most of the UOC’s laity and at least some of its clergy will join the autocephalous OCU either on an individual or collective basis. Some, however, may go underground, join the Eastern-Rite Catholic Churches (referred to occasionally as Uniates) who are Orthodox in practice but subordinate to Rome, or even seek continued recognition by and support from Orthodox churches beyond the borders of Ukraine, including Moscow (T.me/BuninCo, reposted at Echofm.online, August 20; MK.ru, August 29). Consequently, the new law should not be read as a final resolution of religious conflicts within Ukraine but rather as another move on the complicated chessboard of church life there.

The stakes resulting from this looming ban are enormous, not only in Ukraine but elsewhere in the former Soviet space—perhaps especially in the Russian Federation itself. In Ukraine, the Moscow church—although it has been declining in size over the last decade—is still the most numerous in terms of bishoprics and parishes, although not in terms of attendance. OCU churches, in most cases, now attract far more attendees than the Moscow church. The autocephalous OCU is almost certain to become the predominant national church in Ukraine if the Moscow UOC is marginalized by a ban (or even the threat of one), a development that will further strengthen Ukrainian national identity in the face of Russian aggression. The predictions of some Russian commentators that a ban will set off a religious war are thus almost certainly exaggerated, although Moscow propagandists can be counted on to predict this in hopes of mobilizing Western support against Kyiv on this issue (T.me/Agdchan; BusinessOnline, August 21).

The impact of Ukraine’s new law does not stop at its borders. Ukraine’s actions in the past and present are encouraging governments and religious leaders across the former Soviet space to challenge the pretensions of the Moscow church and to rein it in or even ban it outright. The three formerly occupied Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have moved the furthest in this direction and have been denounced by Moscow for what the Russian government says is a replication of Ukraine’s moves (see EDM, February 13; Rubaltic.ru, August 28). Moscow analysts suggest that Moldova and Belarus are following in their wake, albeit at different speeds (see EDM, August 12, 2021; Rubaltic.ru, August 19). Both the Russian government and the Moscow church are worried that the smaller Orthodox communities in the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia may be about to do the same (Window on Eurasia, March 10, July 6).  

The greatest impact of what Ukraine has done, however, may well be in Russia itself. The new law may affect not only the relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) and the Kremlin but also the actions of the ROC MP among Russians inside Russia and elsewhere in the world. The loss of unity implied by the ROC MP losing its position in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet space continually pushes it toward becoming little more than a national church of the Russian Federation. In this way, the ROC MP is far less useful to the Kremlin not only in maintaining its influence in all those countries and more generally in the Orthodox world but in insisting on the validity of Putin’s “Russian world.” Unsurprisingly, that development has reduced the influence the ROC MP has in government circles. 

It has also had two other effects on the Moscow church itself. On the one hand, Ukraine’s actions have prompted the Moscow Patriarchate to be even more outspoken in its defense of the Kremlin and its war as well as more active in promoting Kremlin actions elsewhere, such as in Africa, where the ROC MP continues to make inroads (see EDM, February 3, 2022; Window on Eurasia, September 1). On the other hand, it has exacerbated fissiparous trends within the ROC MP inside Russia that some argue could lead to its splitting apart. This might lead to a renewal of Orthodox religious life beyond the control of the Moscow Patriarchate and promote regionalist political challenges to Moscow as well (Window on Eurasia, January 14, April 29; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 20).

Consequently, what may seem to some to be a narrowly religious dispute in Ukraine may very well play a far larger role in the social and political fate of Russia, the post-Soviet space, and hence the world than Western analysts and policymakers understand.