Moscow Conducts Fascistization of Russian Higher Education (Part One)

Executive Summary:

• Russia is reforming its higher education system to instill an ultra-patriotic ideology through new required courses, such as “Fundamentals of Russia’s Statehood,” designed by the presidential administration with the goal of cultivating a “patriotic intelligentsia.”
• Structural changes include replacing the bachelor’s/master’s model with a new system of basic and specialized education and a development app to gauge students’ acceptance of “traditional values,” forcing ideology on students as a measure of success.
• The state promotes Cossack universities, which combine patriotic indoctrination with paramilitary training, as a model for broader education, reflecting a long-term strategy to raise a generation prepared for conflict.

Moscow is making changes to the Russian higher education system that lend support to the claim that modern Russia is “fascist” (The Conversation, March 30, 2022; The Globalist, July 5, 2022). The 2023 introduction of ultra-patriotic lessons at the primary and secondary school levels, known as “Conversations About Important Things,” is well-known and has attracted considerable attention.  Education reforms, however, are also taking place at the tertiary level (see EDM, September 9, 2024, February 4, September 24; Conversations About Important Things, accessed September 12). In 2023, the Russian Ministry of Education had already proposed a new course for freshmen students at universities called the “Fundamentals of Russia’s Statehood,” apparently designed by the presidential administration with the hope of cultivating a “patriotic intelligentsia” (Meduza, May 25, 2023). Russia appears to have two primary objectives in mind with such moves. First, Moscow aims to mold pliant “patriots,” the future elites who will govern the country in the years to come. Second, it seeks to recruit those in the prime of youth to the military. Both goals track with Putin’s September 18 statement when speaking with leaders of the State Duma parliamentary groups that “we must search for, find, and nominate people who have no fear in serving the Motherland and have gone to risk their life and health” (President of Russia, September 18).

New changes are being continually implemented in the education system as Russia begins its new academic year. The most notable was announced by Russian Minister for Science and Higher Education Valery Falkov, who claimed that Russia was transitioning to a “new model,” symbolizing its divergence from global standards. The new model rejects the traditional division between bachelor’s and master’s degrees and introduces two new levels: basic and specialized.  Basic will last from four to six years, depending on specialism and direction. Specialized education, effectively a master’s degree taken after basic training, will last from one to three years. Doctoral education will continue as currently implemented. These changes, developed through a pilot project, were implemented at more regional universities this year and are expected to be applied to all universities by 2027 (Gazeta.ru, June 15). At the same time, the ideological purpose of university education is demonstrated by the promise of a development app to gauge students’ acceptance of “traditional values,” thereby forcing ideology on students and measuring the success of their indoctrination (Vedomosti, September 30).

Another initiative is the establishment of a higher learning center at the Russian State Humanitarian University, named after Ivan Ilyin (Kommersant, April 16, 2024). Ilyin was a white Russian expelled from Bolshevik Russia in 1920 who said complementary things about Hitler and who is reputed to be one of Putin’s ideological influences (Meduza, April 26, 2024). Naturally, the director of the institute is Aleksandr Dugin, one of the leading ideologues of the “Russian World” and an attendant of a recent international fascist conference in St. Petersburg (BBC Russian Service, August 27, 2022; Important Stories, September 23). Naming the institute for Ilyin prompted some resistance from students who feared it was rehabilitating a Nazi apologist. Vyacheslav Volodin, Chairman of the State Duma, however, dismissed such claims, saying that the center’s focus was on thinking about the future of a united, strong, and sovereign Russia (TASS, April 20, 2024). The defense of an academic institution from within the administration emphasizes the degree to which this is a state-directed move.

Dugin is at the center of a proposal to remake the discipline of political science in Russian universities. Describing the current teaching of the subject as “America-centric” and dismissing it as a “mechanism for embedding the principles of destructive neoliberal ideology in students’ minds.” Dugin instead proposes turning political science into a means for propaganda and installing “patriotism” in students. Key features of his new approach include revisiting Count Uvarov’s trinity of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality” and asserting Moscow’s claims to be the Third Rome—a direct descendant of the Byzantine (Roman) Empire. The 1990s should be viewed in an “unequivocally negative” light, and the role of Putin in creating an assertive Russia should be applauded. Russia’s personalist dictatorship, ritually endorsed by a plebiscite masquerading as democracy, should be presented as the best form of government for the country, and the state should be discussed in divine terms (Meduza, February 25). It is unclear whether this new course will remain confined to the Ilyin Institute or apply to all Russian students more broadly.

The state is actively training future soldiers from those who are already patriots, such as the Cossacks. There are now 26 universities in the “league of Cossack universities,” and the Ataman of the All-Russian Cossack Society (VsKO), Vitaly Kuznetsov, is keen on being associated with them (VsKO, accessed September 12). Given the remit of his office to work with youth, this is not surprising (see EDM, August 10, 2022, November 8, 2023, February 8, 27, 2024). For example, on September 1, the “Day of Knowledge,” marking the start of Russia’s academic year, Kuznetsov attended events at the Razumovsky First Cossack University in Moscow with members of the presidential administration. Members of the Synodal Committee for Connections with Cossacks were also in attendance. Metropolitan Kirill said, “For this unique educational institution, the First Cossack University, this day is filled with a special meaning because here the traditions of serving the Fatherland are organically intertwined with the power of modern science” (VsKO, September 1). In many ways, the Cossacks seem to present a model for how Dugin envisions university education working throughout Russia.

The Cossacks symbolize and synthesize some of the changes occurring in Russian higher education, as reflected in the evolving forms of knowledge generated about this group. This year, university libraries were stocked with a new textbook, “The History of the Cossacks of Russia,” in a move that will also unfold at lower levels of education in the new year (Kazachestvo.ru, July 22). This follows the opening of the central museum of the Russian Cossacks in Moscow, an example of state promotion of particular narratives (see EDM, May 29). Aside from indoctrination, young people also learn paramilitary skills and pretend war simulations in Cossack education, both dimensions of raising a war-fighting generation of which Dugin would be proud. Changes in Russian higher education appear poised to shape the post-war landscape, underscoring the Kremlin’s perception of a prolonged struggle.