Moscow Pressures Soldiers to Stay Enlisted to Sustain War Economy

Executive Summary:

• The Russian economy is stagnating as a result of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine, making signing a contract with the Ministry of Defense one of the only ways to make money.
• Between March and April, the number of Russians willing to join the military almost doubled, and the Ministry of Defense is forcing current military personnel to sign a new contract or extend the one they already have.
• Russian soldiers may become mercenaries in other conflicts should Russia’s war against Ukraine end given the lack of good job prospects domestically.

The Russian economy has continued to deteriorate as Moscow’s war against Ukraine continues (see Strategic Snapshot, May 8). While war-related industries show slight growth, the growth in the private sector is stagnating. Industries including the production of food products and beverages, wood processing, furniture, petroleum products, metallurgy, and motor vehicle manufacturing are shrinking. Stagnation and decline are spreading to investments and consumer demand (Re-Russia, April 11).

Russian income statistics are skewed by the war. Overall, incomes are growing, but growth is seen only for individuals involved in the war or military production. Since 2022, 22 percent of the Russian population have seen their incomes increase by one and a half times or more. Another 40 percent saw a moderate increase in real income of between 3 and 25 percent. Approximately a quarter of households, however, saw their incomes decrease, and 20 percent suffered a decrease of more than 10 percent (Re-Russia, April 9). Even Kremlin-linked Telegram channels acknowledge that 71 percent of Russians live in poverty or on the edge of the subsistence minimum, and there is a prevailing sense of stagnating incomes (Telegram/@russicaRU, April 19). The gap between the military and private sectors will continue to widen as the economy slows.

Reports about the sharp growth of those willing to sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense are logical given the deterioration of Russia’s private sector. Independent journalists reveal that the recruitment rate of new contract soldiers in the first week of April was the highest since the beginning of the year (Verstka, April 11). From April 1 to 10, 993 Russians signed contracts with the Ministry of Defense to join the military. In comparison, 449 Russians signed contracts in the first ten days of March, 503 in the first 10 days of February, and 341 in the first 10 days of January. Every day, more than a hundred people leave Moscow for the war, and internet search queries show increased interest in contract military service (Verstka, April 11). Recruiters for the Ministry of Defense admit that, although this growth is influenced by propaganda about the successes of the Russian Army on the battlefield and a desire for revenge for relatives and friends who have fallen at the front, money is still the most common motivation for signing a contract. They admit that “due to the current structure of the country’s economy, it turns out that with every passing day there are fewer and fewer options for solving financial issues” (Verstka, April 11).

The Russian army command is taking steps to prevent soldiers from returning home from the front should there be a demobilization and drafted soldiers are no longer legally required to serve (Verstka, February 12). The Russian military coerces mobilized and conscript soldiers to sign contracts by all means, including threats, deception, and promises (E1.ru, August 3, 2023; see EDM, August 7, October 10, 2024). The same pressure is exerted on contract soldiers whose contracts have formally expired. These soldiers are forced to sign new contracts, preferably for longer periods (Istories.media, April 9).

The number of Russian contract soldiers increases every day. Should Russia’s war against Ukraine end, it is unclear what will be done with contract soldiers. Some Russian military analysts are making new war plans, calling, for example, for a greater Russian military presence in the Arctic (Topwar.ru, April 14). The Russian military also maintains its African presence (see EDM, November 14, 2024, March 6, April 17). Last year, following the formal liquidation of the Wagner private military company, its mercenaries began reporting directly to the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), and the Russian “Africa Corps” continued its activities (see EDM, March 3, 12, 2024; VoA–Russian Service, August 23, 2024). The Kremlin and its affiliated structures provide military support to friendly regimes abroad, bolstering their power. In exchange, Russia gets access to natural resources, often bypassing official procedures and local laws (The Moscow Times, November 10, 2024). Russian military presence in Africa became especially evident last summer after Tuareg rebels ambushed a column of former Wagner mercenaries in Mali (BBC–Russian Service, July 28, 2024; see EDM, July 31, 2024).

Once they leave the army, former Russian soldiers often want to continue their “military careers” privately. Some become mercenaries in the pay of other countries. Just as the Russian Ministry of Defense has recruited thousands of soldiers from the Middle East and other regions to fight in its war against Ukraine, other states, separatist groups, and terrorist organizations have sought Russian mercenaries with combat experience for their armies (BBC–Russian Service, March 31, 2022; 9tv.co.il, October 13, 2023; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 24, 2024). In October 2023, one Wagner fighter told EAN News that he received offers to fight in Gaza on the Palestinian side, as well as regular offers to fight for money in Libya, Syria, and the Central African Republic (EAN News; 9tv.co.il, October 13, 2023). Left without work, soldiers from Russia’s war against Ukraine may begin to accept such offers (Carnegie Politika, October 25, 2023; Deutsche Welle–Russian Service, October 27, 2023).

Once Russia’s war against Ukraine ends, Russia will lose the support the military-industrial complex provides to the Russian economy, and many Russians will lose the income they have received from serving in the military (see Strategic Snapshot, March 13). Soldiers from Russia’s war against Ukraine finding work in other militarized outlets would suit the Kremlin. Mercenary service creates an outlet for the “utilization” of former soldiers, and veterans of Russia’s war against Ukraine would continue to destabilize the existing world order in new roles.