NATO States Undertake Security Commitments to Kyiv Under Ukraine Compact (Part One)

Executive Summary:

• Twenty-three North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)member states have undertaken bilateral security commitments to Ukraine. The ten-year agreements operate under the umbrella of a Ukraine Compact, outside NATO’s framework, and postpone Ukraine’s NATO membership in deference to Russia.
• The assistance offers are potentially massive in volume but lack the certainty and reliability of treaty-based security guarantees. The declarative compact falls short of institutionalizing an alliance, but the sum total of bilateral agreements could amount to a coalition of the willing for Ukraine without prejudicing Kyiv’s membership prospects.
• Russia will undoubtedly aim to roll back these Western commitments to Ukraine. The Kremlin almost certainly will demand their abrogation as part of any political settlement between Ukraine and Russia or any negotiations on European security if Russia wins the war.  

From January through July of this year, amid Russia’s war of state annihilation, Ukraine has concluded bilateral agreements on security cooperation with 23 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Designed by NATO member states with a common pattern, these agreements will nevertheless operate outside of the alliance framework. This half-hearted solution allows for postponing Ukraine’s NATO membership to yet another remote horizon in deference to Russia. The security agreements, nevertheless, implicitly recognize NATO’s own vital stake in Ukraine’s state survival. They entail major benefits for Ukraine as the recipient of assistance and for NATO via its member states as donors in the interest of their common security.  

NATO partner Japan and the European Union have also concluded bilateral security agreements with Ukraine, bringing the total to 25. Several additional agreements are in the offing. The United States-Ukraine security agreement is the flagship among these bilateral agreements (President.gov.ua, June 13). They all envisage large-scale military assistance and national security-related economic support to Ukraine for a ten-year period, effective immediately.

All these documents, however, are nonbinding agreements, as distinct from binding treaties. The agreements stipulate “commitments” (in some cases, “intentions”), as distinct from guarantees, to provide Ukraine with security and related assistance. The assistance offers are potentially massive in volume but do not entail the certainty and reliability of treaty-based security guarantees. 

The network of bilateral agreements was officially introduced during NATO’s 75th anniversary summit in Washington on July 11. The alliance did not provide an institutional framework but only a festive context for publicizing this initiative (see EDM, July 17, 18). On that occasion, all 25 signatories to the bilateral agreements, as well as Ukraine, endorsed “The Ukraine Compact,” a joint declarative document. The compact proclaims a shared political commitment “to support Ukraine as it defends itself now and to deter aggression against Ukraine in the future, as part of its bridge toward NATO membership. … We affirm that the security of Ukraine is integral to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond and that we intend to support Ukraine until it prevails against Russia’s aggression” (Whitehouse.gov, July 11). 

The launch event was held on the sidelines of NATO’s summit,not as officially part of the event. The Ukraine Compact and the bilateral agreements are not included among NATO documents. The compact itself—“endorsed,” distinct from being signed—is a political statement of principle without specific obligations. Symbolically crowning that network of bilateral agreements, the compact does not envisage any consultation or coordination mechanisms among signatory countries. Those mechanisms remain purely bilateral between each signatory country and Kyiv under the separate agreements.

Such precautions underscore, first, that the Ukraine Compact and bilateral agreements remain clearly outside of NATO’s framework; second, that the joint document does not provide a basis for joint actions by the parties to bilateral agreements with Ukraine; and third, that the agreements themselves or their sum total are not being institutionalized and do not constitute an alliance, but potentially a coalition of the willing, to defend Ukraine. 

Kyiv and supportive NATO member states insist that the bilateral agreements and the multilateral compact are not to be construed as replacements of NATO membership for Ukraine, nor as consolation prizes for postponing that membership indefinitely. Rather, the parties present them as a transitional solution. With this in mind, non-binding and non-institutionalized arrangements for Ukraine can be viewed as a two-sided coin. On the one hand, they fall short of guaranteeing Kyiv’s security by treaty, and their practical implementation remains less than certain, subject to a range of future contingencies. On the other hand, such inadequacies are a constant reminder that there is no substitute for NATO membership, thus energizing efforts to advance Ukraine’s accession to the alliance. 

The Ukraine Compact and, in particular, the bilateral security agreements under its umbrella envisage neither the stationing of NATO forces in Ukraine nor joint exercises on Ukrainian territory, let alone intervention by NATO members’ joint or national forces in any crisis situation. This dispensation is considerably weaker overall compared to the original conception—the 2022 Kyiv Security Compact—which inspired the 2024 Ukraine Compact (see EDM, December 16, 2022, May 16, 20). 

On the forward-leaning side, the bilateral security commitments to Ukraine are non-transactional in the sense that they do not require Ukraine to choose neutrality or nonalignment in exchange. Their entry into effect is not conditioned on an eventual compromise settlement between Ukraine and Russia. Additionally, as a transformative element in European security, these commitments exclude Russia for the first time from security arrangements or conflict-resolution frameworks concerning Ukraine (see Part Two). 

Moscow will undoubtedly aim to roll back these Western commitments to Ukraine. The Kremlin will demand their abrogation as part of any political settlement between Ukraine and Russia or any negotiations on European security. Specifically, Russia will demand to be included again with veto rights among the powers guaranteeing Ukraine’s security, will condition any putative guarantees on Ukraine’s permanent neutrality or nonalignment, and will threaten in word and deed to continue the war of annihilation against Ukraine until Kyiv and Western powers satisfy those Russian demands. The NATO states’ security commitments to Ukraine are therefore at risk of being negated by the same NATO members’ failure—Washington’s first and foremost—to arm Ukraine properly to defeat Russia.