Pakistan’s Prison Break Expert: A Profile of Adnan Rashid and His Group Ansar al-Aseer

Pakistan’s Prison Break Expert: A Profile of Adnan Rashid and His Group Ansar al-Aseer

Few people in the Pakistani jihadist scene have managed to ascend in the jihadist ranks as quickly as Adnan Rashid. A former professional airman who served in the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), Rashid gained fame among jihadists for his planning and execution of prison-breaks. These operations resulted in the release of Taliban militants, boosting the morale of violent Islamist insurgents. Forming Ansar al-Aseer is one major step he has taken to continue to carry out these jailbreaks.

An ethnic Pashtun, Rashid was born in 1980 in Chota Lahore, a subdivision of the impoverished Swabi district of Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa province. With few employment opportunities available in the Swabi district, Rashid joined the PAF in 1997. He later joined jihadist circles while attending study groups organized at mosques on Air Force bases by the proselytizing movement Tablighi Jamaat. [1]

He first entered the public eye for his involvement in assassination attempts on then Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf in 2003. Rashid worked with the sectarian Islamist militants of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Amjad Farooqi group) in the attack carried out in December of that year. Rashid coordinated and placed the suicide bombers near General Musharraf’s motorcade in Rawalpindi. General Musharraf survived the December 2003 twin VBIED (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) suicide attacks, but 16 people lost their lives. Rashid was arrested in 2004 after one of the most concerted investigations in the country’s history, involving almost all of Pakistan’s police and intelligence agencies. He was tried and convicted by a military tribunal and sentenced to death (Dawn [Karachi], April 19, 2012). Rashid reentered the spotlight after the Bannu Jail Break incident. The lightly-guarded prison was attacked by more than 150 Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) militants commanded by then amir Hakimullah Mahsud in April 2012. Rashid, along with 400 Taliban fighters, managed to escape.

Eight years of imprisonment had not changed Adnan Rashid. He immediately renewed his ties with jihadist groups, especially the TTP, which had not yet been established when Rashid attempted to assassinate Musharraf in 2003 (the TTP was formed in August 2007). Apart from joining the TTP, Rashid planned and executed the July 2013 prison break at Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber-Pakhtunkhawa province, involving some 100 Islamist militants attacking the prison (Channel 4, July 30, 2013). The jailbreak resulted in the escape of 275 militant prisoners. The battle between the attackers and prison guards also resulted in the deaths of five militants and four prison guards (Dawn [Karachi], July 30, 2013; The News [Islamabad], August 2, 2013). Rashid’s most recent endeavor was the June 8 attack on Karachi International Airport, for which the TTP proudly claimed responsibility (The News [Islamabad], June 11).

After his escape from Bannu District Prison, Rashid also established Ansar al-Aseer (Supporters of the Prisoners) through cooperation with TTP. Ansar al-Aseer’s purpose is to free from Pakistani prisons militant Islamist prisoners associated with the TTP, al-Qaeda and Punjab-based Islamist terrorist groups working in tandem with the two organizations. Ansar al-Aseer’s Dera Ismail Khan prison break operation led to the reinvigoration of jihadist activities in Pakistan as more than 100 convicts were back in the business. Two consecutive prison breaks shifted the dynamics of the Islamist insurgency in Pakistan and strengthened jihadist resolve across Pakistan. Through his leadership, Adnan Rashid gained more respect and support from the jihadist community and his prison break adventures put Pakistani security agencies on edge.

Rashid clearly stated his agenda in a February 2013 statement:

Rashid’s jihadist contacts appear to have grown in prison. He is now closely linked to Islamist militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Emirat-e-Kaukav and the TTP, all of which are linked to al-Qaeda Central and based in Pakistani tribal areas. The establishment of Ansar al-Aseer is, in a way, a joint venture to serve a greater jihadist purpose. Rashid’s first-hand knowledge of the dilapidated state of Pakistan’s prisons is now an asset for all jihadist organizations operating in Pakistan.

The establishment of Ansar al-Aseer is believed to be an attempt by al-Qaeda-linked groups in Pakistan to maximize their efforts to further weaken the already feeble government presence. The freeing of Islamist militants is also disheartening for law enforcement agencies, whose officers arrest the culprits after lengthy investigations. Another endeavor may have been to utilize Rashid’s former PAF background to launch a new wave of fidayeen attacks on air force bases; air force and naval bases are favorite targets of Pakistani Islamist militants. In recent years, al-Qaeda and TTP-linked Islamist terrorists have been able to attack Minhas Air Force Base (three attacks: 2007, 2008 and 2012) 40 kilometers north of Islamabad, Mehran Air Base in Karachi (2011), Samungli Air Force Base in Quetta (2014) and Air Force Base Khalid, also in Quetta (2014). After each attack the TTP and its associated wings claimed responsibility.

The jihadists in Pakistan doubly benefit from terrorist attacks on naval and air force installations. First, by destroying critically important military equipment (primarily aircraft, including reconnaissance planes, helicopters and fighter jets) during these attacks, they reduce the capabilities of the Pakistani defense forces. Secondly, such terrorist attacks at strategically significant and highly sensitive installations have paved the way for conspiracy theories across Pakistani society. The most common theories regarding the terrorist attacks on air force bases is that the United States, India or, at times, Israel are behind such attacks to undermine the capabilities of the Pakistani military. These rumors exist despite the fact that the TTP and IMU’s media outlets (Umar Media and Jundullah Studio) openly proclaim their responsibility for such attacks.

In fact, Ansar al-Aseer serves a bigger purpose and the larger interests of all jihadi groups in Pakistan. The appearance of the group on Pakistan’s jihadist map has suddenly changed the whole picture. Bolstering the security of prisons has now become a significant issue in government circles. From Karachi to Peshawar, all four provincial governments are now investing more and beefing up their prison security. Pakistani law enforcement has foiled at least one prison escape attempt recently; TTP prisoners had dug a tunnel at the Central Prison in Karachi (Dawn [Karachi], October 13). Adnan Rashid is suspected to have plotted the attack, which was undone when intelligence agencies tipped off security forces.

The security of urban area prisons may have improved after security was tightened, but rural districts and their far-flung prisons could still become target of Ansar al-Aseer. A few more prison breaks could rejuvenate the jihadists, who are currently on the back foot after the launch of the Zarb-e-Azb military operation in North Waziristan in May.

The Adnan Rashid-led Ansar al-Aseer may plan future prison breaks to free Islamist terrorists from Pakistani prisons. Currently, Rashid and his group are busy fighting the Pakistani military in North Waziristan and there were rumors of his arrest, which proved inaccurate. Despite the enhanced security measures taken by all four provincial governments and the federal government to improve the security of prisons, the system is still concerned about possible future attacks by Rashid and his band of followers. The threat emanating from Ansar al-Aseer is not as severe as the threat of TTP attacks on Pakistani cities and military installations, but the success of Rashid’s agenda could cause far more difficulties for security officials in Pakistan.

Farhan Zahid writes on counter-terrorism, al-Qaeda, Pakistani al-Qaeda-linked groups, Islamist violent non-state actors in Pakistan, militant landscapes in Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban.

Note

1. Discussions with a journalist who interviewed Rashid in prison.