PLA Insights from Ukraine’s Asymmetric USV Operations

Executive Summary:

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) closely studies the Russia–Ukraine conflict, viewing Ukraine’s innovative use of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) as a transformative model for future naval warfare and asymmetric operations.
• Chinese analysts emphasize the cost-effectiveness, mass-producibility, modular flexibility, and stealth of USVs, framing them as key tools for achieving an asymmetric maritime advantage, which aligns with China’s focus on cost-efficient deterrence and military-civil fusion.
• Experts advocate combining USVs with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and manned fleets under unified command systems. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) envisions AI-driven “super-brain” decision-making to manage complex, multi-domain operations.
• While recognizing USVs’ potential, PLA experts warn of vulnerabilities to similar swarm tactics targeting China’s coasts and islands. Proposed countermeasures include early warning, physical barriers, electronic and kinetic defenses, and future adoption of directed-energy weapons for anti-USV operations.

In September, Zhuhai Yunzhou Intelligence Technology (珠海云洲智能科技) launched a new type of dual-mode naval platform. “Blue Whale” (蓝鲸号), an unmanned surface vehicle (USV), is capable of operating both on the surface and underwater, where it can remain submerged for over a month. It represents an advance in the country’s innovation capabilities, as well as signalling a growing demand for unmanned systems (Zhuhai City Innovation Bureau, September 12). [1] This demand is shaped by a focus within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on maritime warfare, especially in preparation for a Taiwan contingency, as evidenced by numerous naval trainings and drills in recent years. The influence of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is also a clear influence on decisions for PLA equipment procurement.

Since February 2022, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has closely followed developments both on and off the battlefield in Russia and Ukraine (China Brief, March 28, July 18). One area that has attracted attention from Chinese military analysts is Naval combat in the Black Sea. Academics have estimated that roughly half of Ukraine’s USV attacks by the end of 2024 achieved significant military results, sabotaging Russian warships and logistical infrastructure. [2] Analysis by military experts, scholars, and practitioners from leading PRC defense institutes over the past three years shows that the PRC is moving decisively toward embracing USVs, but that technological hurdles remain and not all scenarios necessarily favor their deployment.

USVs are Cheap, Scalable, Flexible, and Undetectable

PRC observers highlight four major characteristics of USVs. First, despite their relatively low cost, USVs can be very effective operationally. In March 2024, Ukrainian forces successfully sank Russian patrol warship Sergei Kotov using a group of Magura V5 USVs (Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, March 5, 2024). While the destroyed ship reportedly cost around $65 million, each Magura V5 costs less than $300,000. [3] Some PLA analysts have described this as a textbook example of “countering the large and superior with the small and frugal” (以小博大，以廉制优). The logic can be found in PLA discussions of the characteristics of contemporary drone warfare more generally (China Brief, March 28). [4]

Second, USVs are easy to mass-produce. Their production does not require highly specialized technologies or materials. Some PRC analysts reference American reports suggesting that Ukrainian USV models could be assembled in a garage using basic tools (Global Times, November 28, 2023). Experts from China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC; 中国船舶集团), a major naval contractor for the PLA Navy (PLAN), emphasize that USVs can be mass-produced by civilian facilities during crises, and that civilian vessels can be conveniently converted into military-use USVs. [5] This capability would benefit the PRC in particular, given it is the world’s largest shipbuilder and has the world’s largest navy by vessel count (U.S. Department of Defense, December 18, 2024). In addition, the PRC’s military-civil fusion (军民融合) development strategy and ongoing institutional efforts to strengthen national defense mobilization provide Beijing with significant advantages in potentially flooding maritime battlefields with domestically produced USVs (State Council, December 4, 2017).

Third, USVs’ modular design allows components to be reconfigured or easily replaced, offering tactical flexibility. In the early phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine’s USVs were used primarily for suicide attacks. While some PLA experts praised this as a creative innovation, others criticized its lack of versatility. [6] Over time, however, Ukraine has diversified USV functions using what some scholars characterize as a “platform + payload” (平台+载荷) model, pairing vessels with mission-specific payloads for surveillance, anti-air strikes, and electronic jamming. Researchers within the PLAN have asserted that USVs are evolving into a new class of weapon system, integrating “reconnaissance, strike, assessment, and disruption” (集‘侦、打、评、扰’于一体). [7]

Fourth, USVs are difficult to detect and intercept. They are therefore ideal for high-speed penetration operations (高速突防). The Magura V5’s semi-submersible design yields an exceptionally small radar cross-section (a measure of detectability). Its radar cross-section is 0.01 m², comparable to that of a small bird, making it extremely challenging to be detected by conventional surveillance systems (Global Security, September 4, 2019). [8] Made from composite materials, it is challenging to distinguish from sea clutter on radar. USVs’ agility also complicates interception, particularly in swarm attacks. [9]

These characteristics have led both Chinese and American defense experts to regard USVs as providing an asymmetric advantage (Phoenix, September 21, 2023; Academy of People’s Armed Police, March 3, 2024; CSSN, April 15, 2024). Many credit USVs with enabling Ukraine to regain control over the western Black Sea, despite the near destruction of its conventional navy in the early stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion. [10]

Asymmetric warfare has long been a central topic among Chinese military theorists. A PLA-affiliated publication, shared on the website of the PRC Ministry of National Defense (MND), has discussed the U.S. military’s historic difficulties countering asymmetric strategies (PRC MND, March 27, 2018). PRC naval strategists see asymmetric warfare, especially through emerging deep-sea and unmanned technologies, as a potential means for the PLA to secure dominance over key maritime areas when facing superior adversaries (PRC MND, February 14, 2023; PLA Daily, July 23, 2024). Recognizing the asymmetric nature of Ukraine’s USV employment, some PLA experts explicitly call for developing “multi-level, multi-domain, and multi-capability unmanned platforms” (多层级、多领域、多能力的无人装备平台) to leverage the PLAN’s asymmetric strengths in future conflicts as performed by the Ukrainian forces. [11]

Concerns Over USV Limitations

A second lesson can be drawn about USVs from Ukraine’s Black Sea operations—that of their limitations. Analysts note that all successful Ukrainian USV attacks were conducted as nighttime surprise operations, suggesting that their effectiveness could be highly conditional. If a surprise attack fails, USVs may become less effective and vulnerable in high-intensity, contested environments. [12]

The small size that gives USVs high maneuverability also limits their fuel capacity and seakeeping performance in open waters (Global Times, November 28, 2023). In the PRC’s case, this means USV deployment would be suitable mainly in nearshore regions. For expeditionary operations, USVs would have to rely on larger manned carrier vessels, increasing detection risks. Current USV swarms are not fully automated and still depend on remote control via microwave communication. If the control link is jammed or disrupted, USVs may lose functionality or become uncontrollable. [13]

USVs to Integrate Into Systems Warfare Approach

PRC experts are exploring ways to maximize the asymmetric potential of USVs while mitigating their limitations. Many advocate for integrating USVs into operations that coordinate manned and unmanned systems. Analysts frequently cite Ukraine’s coordinated use of USVs with drones, missiles, and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) as examples of “cross-domain coordination” (跨域协同) for integrated offensive operations. A defense journal under China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC; 中国航天科工集团), a major state-owned missiles manufacturer, argues that coordinated operations between manned fleets, unmanned fleets, and drones (有人舰队+无人舰队+无人机协同作战) will become the defining operational concept for future naval and aerial battles. [14] A paper published by the Chinese Academy of Engineering (中国工程院), an institution under the State Council, similarly advocates enhancing coordination among cross-domain unmanned platforms of all kinds to exploit asymmetric advantages.

Some scholars embed discussion of future naval conflict within the broader theoretical frame of system of systems warfare (The Jamestown Foundation, January 2017). This line of thinking views conflicts as consisting not of battles between weapons or platforms, but of battles between systems. [15] To build an effective system requires achieving deep cross-domain integration. Effective situational awareness and information management are essential. Command systems must process overwhelming amounts of real-time, multi-domain data. PRC naval researchers predict that the development of “‘super-brain’-enabled decision-making” (‘超脑化’辅助决策) will become inevitable, indicating that future command decisions will rely heavily on advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems with computational and perceptual capabilities and, eventually, cognitive intelligence. [16]

Benefits and Costs to Proposed USV Countermeasures

For the user, the potential benefits of USVs are many. In the hands of an adversary, however, they constitute a decisive threat. This is something PRC experts identify as a growing concern. The PRC’s extensive coastline exposes it to possible USV swarm attacks. Numerous strategic assets, including ports, shipbuilding facilities, and offshore energy infrastructure, are vulnerable. Coordinated USV and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assaults could pose additional risks to the PRC’s economically vital coastal regions. As the PRC consolidates its expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea with military and scientific facilities, these too are exposed to potential swarm attacks (The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, accessed October 30). Analysts have pointed out that small islands inherently favor attackers and are difficult to defend. This was the case for the Black Sea’s Snake Island, for example, in the early stages of the Russian invasion. [17]

Chinese military experts have proposed four anti-USV countermeasures. The first is “early warning detection” (预警探测). USVs are currently difficult to detect via radar. Detection consequently often relies on physical observation by naval officers. Some experts propose developing automatic detection technologies for small maritime targets. Others have suggested learning from Russia’s remote radio-technical monitoring system (远程无线电技术监测系统), which identifies USVs indirectly by tracing their remote-control signals (WeChat/沃德舆情观察, September 2, 2024). [18]

The second measure is creating a “physical blockade” (物理拦阻) by deploying barriers around maritime infrastructure to block an USV’s approach. Following Ukraine’s attack on the port city of Sevastopol, Russian forces implemented such barriers effectively. The downside of this approach is a reduction in operational efficiency for friendly vessels, which also are impeded by the barriers. And for the PRC, the country’s vast coastline and numerous offshore assets make large-scale physical blockades costly and impractical. [19]

The final two measures rely on electronic countermeasures and fires. Referred to as “soft kill” (软杀伤) and “hard kill” (硬杀伤), they entail disrupting USV operations through jamming and directly destroying USVs with kinetic weapons. Although cost-effective in principle, this method faces technical challenges. Most current shipboard jammers are designed for low-angle, sea-skimming threats and perform poorly against high-elevation satellite communications. Conventional electronic warfare systems also suffer from modular segmentation, frequency gaps, and coordination issues, reducing their effectiveness. “Hard kill” measures are often described as a “last-resort anti-USV measure” (反无人艇的保底手段), as conventional anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons are seen as too expensive for use against low-cost USV swarms. Close-in weapon systems (CIWS), automated, short-range defense systems that use rapid-fire guns or missiles to intercept incoming threats, offer a more economic option but have limited ammunition and deplete quickly, leaving ships vulnerable to subsequent drone or missile attacks. [20]

Dating back to 2018, PRC had already unveiled the missile-armed USV Watcher II (瞭望者Ⅱ), its first such platform and, after Israel’s “Sea Knight,” the world’s second USV to successfully test-fire a missile. It can perform precision strikes against small- and medium-sized maritime targets around islands and coastal waters and support amphibious forces attacking near-shore moving targets (Times of Israel, March 8, 2017; PRC MND, November 10, 2018). Recent PRC military parades have showcased systems that claim to be high-energy laser (HEL) and high-power microwave (HPM) weapons (CCTV, September 13; China Brief, October 1). According to state media, these technologies, featuring high engagement speed and low cost per shot, are expected to become the PLA’s primary tools against UAV and USV threats. PRC analysts are also showing interest in micro-USVs (微型无人艇) for potential anti-USV applications. This interest stems from Russia’s development of lightweight attritable USVs such as the Marlin (China Military Online, May 6).

Conclusion

The ongoing evolution of naval warfare, exemplified by Ukraine’s deployment of USVs in the Black Sea, presents both opportunities and challenges for the PRC. For Chinese military planners, Ukraine’s experience offers valuable lessons in both the potential and the limitations of unmanned maritime systems. It also provides insight into the future dynamics of asymmetric naval conflict, and hints at the PRC’s direction of future technological development.

In the PRC defense start-ups and state-owned companies already have made notable USV breakthroughs; and are moving toward deployment and integration into war planning. These advances underscore Beijing’s growing ambition and the need for others to move quickly to avoid a widening gap.

Notes

[1] Not to be confused with the BlueWhale, a UUV manufactured by the Israeli defense firm ELTA Systems.

[2] Zhang, Jiakui (张家奎), Li Xiaodong (李晓东), Zhou Heyu (周河宇), and Wu Xiaotao (吴小涛). “俄乌冲突中无人艇作战运用的分析研究 [Analysis of the Operational Use of Unmanned Surface Vessels in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict].” 数字海洋与水下攻防 [Digital Ocean and Underwater Offense & Defense] (December 2024).

[3] Wertheim, Eric. “Ukraine’s Magura Naval Drones: Black Sea Equalizers.” [Proceedings, United States Naval Institute] (September 2025).

[4] Tan, Fuguo (谭福国), Chen Weiyi (陈维义), Zou Qiang (邹强), and Zhou Yong (周勇). “俄乌冲突中无人艇攻防及其启示 [Offense and Defense of Unmanned Surface Vessels in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict and Its Implications].” 数字海洋与水下攻防 [Digital Ocean and Underwater Offense & Defense] (August 2025).

[5] Zhang, Jiakui (张家奎), Li Xiaodong (李晓东), Zhou Heyu (周河宇), and Wu Xiaotao (吴小涛). “俄乌冲突中无人艇作战运用的分析研究 [Analysis of the Operational Use of Unmanned Surface Vessels in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict].” 数字海洋与水下攻防 [Digital Ocean and Underwater Offense & Defense] (December 2024).

[6] Xie, Xing (谢兴), Cai Xuan (蔡玄), Chen Hu (陈虎), You Zhuo (游卓), and Liang Wu (梁武). “俄乌海战对我国海军建设的启示 [Lessons from the Russia–Ukraine Naval Warfare for the Development of China’s Navy].” 数字海洋与水下攻防 [Digital Ocean and Underwater Offense & Defense] (December 2023);

Zhang, Jiakui (张家奎), Li Xiaodong (李晓东), Zhou Heyu (周河宇), and Wu Xiaotao (吴小涛). “俄乌冲突中无人艇作战运用的分析研究 [Analysis of the Operational Use of Unmanned Surface Vessels in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict].” 数字海洋与水下攻防 [Digital Ocean and Underwater Offense & Defense] (December 2024).

[7] Tan, Fuguo (谭福国), Chen Weiyi (陈维义), Zou Qiang (邹强), and Zhou Yong (周勇). “俄乌冲突中无人艇攻防及其启示 [Offense and Defense of Unmanned Surface Vessels in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict and Its Implications].” 数字海洋与水下攻防 [Digital Ocean and Underwater Offense & Defense] (August 2025).

[8] Mu, Guanjie (穆冠杰) and Lu Ying (鲁赢). “海战场反无人艇集群作战能力需求及典型战法设计 [Requirements for Counter-USV Swarm Combat Capabilities and Typical Tactics Design in Naval Battlefields].” In 第十二届中国指挥控制大会论文集 [Proceedings of the 12th China Command and Control Conference], edited by 中国指挥与控制学会 [China Command and Control Society], May 2024.

[9] Hu, Zhihuan (胡智焕), Xie Wei (谢威), Liu Ruonan (刘若楠), and Zhang Weidong (张卫东). “俄乌冲突中无人艇海上作战模式的新突破 [A New Breakthrough in Unmanned Surface Vessel Maritime Combat Modes in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict].” 海洋工程装备与技术 [Marine Engineering Equipment & Technology] (March 2024);

Wei, Yuejiang (魏岳江). “从珠海航展看无人艇作战成建制发展态势 [Observations on the Formation-Based Development Trend of Unmanned Surface Vessel Operations from the Zhuhai Airshow].” 生命与灾害 [Life and Disaster] (December 2024).

[10] Li, Xiaozu (李效祖), Chi Qingxi (池庆玺), Jiang Peng (姜鹏), and Han Mengmeng (韩孟孟). “俄乌冲突中非对称海陆对抗特点研究及思考 [Study and Reflections on the Characteristics of Asymmetric Sea-Land Confrontation in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict].” 战术导弹技术 [Tactical Missile Technology], no. 6 (2023): 128–133.

[11] Xie, Xing (谢兴), Cai Xuan (蔡玄), Chen Hu (陈虎), You Zhuo (游卓), and Liang Wu (梁武). “俄乌海战对我国海军建设的启示 [Lessons from the Russia–Ukraine Naval Warfare for the Development of China’s Navy].” 数字海洋与水下攻防 [Digital Ocean and Underwater Offense & Defense] (December 2023).

[12] Tan, Fuguo (谭福国), Chen Weiyi (陈维义), Zou Qiang (邹强), and Zhou Yong (周勇). “俄乌冲突中无人艇攻防及其启示 [Offense and Defense of Unmanned Surface Vessels in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict and Its Implications].” 数字海洋与水下攻防 [Digital Ocean and Underwater Offense & Defense] (August 2025);

Zhang, Jiakui (张家奎), Li Xiaodong (李晓东), Zhou Heyu (周河宇), and Wu Xiaotao (吴小涛). “俄乌冲突中无人艇作战运用的分析研究 [Analysis of the Operational Use of Unmanned Surface Vessels in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict].” 数字海洋与水下攻防 [Digital Ocean and Underwater Offense & Defense] (December 2024).

[13] Ibid.

[14] Hu, Zhihuan (胡智焕), Xie Wei (谢威), Liu Ruonan (刘若楠), and Zhang Weidong (张卫东). “俄乌冲突中无人艇海上作战模式的新突破 [A New Breakthrough in Unmanned Surface Vessel Maritime Combat Modes in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict].” 海洋工程装备与技术 [Marine Engineering Equipment & Technology] (March 2024);

Wei, Yuejiang (魏岳江). “从珠海航展看无人艇作战成建制发展态势 [Observations on the Formation-Based Development Trend of Unmanned Surface Vessel Operations from the Zhuhai Airshow].” 生命与灾害 [Life and Disaster] (December 2024).

[15] Jiang, Bitao (江碧涛), Wen Guanghui (温广辉), Zhou Jialing (周佳玲), and Zheng Dezhi (郑德智). “智能无人集群系统跨域协同技术研究现状与展望 [Research Status and Prospects of Cross-Domain Coordination Technology for Intelligent Unmanned Swarm Systems].” 中国工程科学 [Engineering Sciences of China] (2024).

[16] Ding, Zhenguo (丁振国), Huang Peirong (黄培荣), and Jiang Haitao (姜海涛). “聚焦海战需求的指挥信息系统发展研究 [Research on the Development of Command Information Systems Focused on Naval Warfare Requirements].” 舰船电子工程 [Ship Electronic Engineering] (February 2025).

[17] Xie, Xing (谢兴), Cai Xuan (蔡玄), Chen Hu (陈虎), You Zhuo (游卓), and Liang Wu (梁武). “俄乌海战对我国海军建设的启示 [Lessons from the Russia–Ukraine Naval Warfare for the Development of China’s Navy].” 数字海洋与水下攻防 [Digital Ocean and Underwater Offense & Defense] (December 2023).

[18] Wang, Haifeng (王海峰). “复杂多变海杂波背景下的海面小目标检测方法 [The Sea Surface Small Target Detection Method Under the Complex and Changeable Sea Clutter Background].” Master’s thesis, 南京信息工程大学 [Nanjing University of Information Science & Technology], Nanjing, 2023.

[19] Tan, Fuguo (谭福国), Chen Weiyi (陈维义), Zou Qiang (邹强), and Zhou Yong (周勇). “俄乌冲突中无人艇攻防及其启示 [Offense and Defense of Unmanned Surface Vessels in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict and Its Implications].” 数字海洋与水下攻防 [Digital Ocean and Underwater Offense & Defense] (August 2025);

Zhang, Jiakui (张家奎), Li Xiaodong (李晓东), Zhou Heyu (周河宇), and Wu Xiaotao (吴小涛). “俄乌冲突中无人艇作战运用的分析研究 [Analysis of the Operational Use of Unmanned Surface Vessels in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict].” 数字海洋与水下攻防 [Digital Ocean and Underwater Offense & Defense] (December 2024);

Mu, Guanjie (穆冠杰) and Lu Ying (鲁赢). “海战场反无人艇集群作战能力需求及典型战法设计 [Requirements for Counter-USV Swarm Combat Capabilities and Typical Tactics Design in Naval Battlefields].” In 第十二届中国指挥控制大会论文集 [Proceedings of the 12th China Command and Control Conference], edited by 中国指挥与控制学会 [China Command and Control Society], May 2024.

[20] Ibid.