Putin’s Needs and Russian Attitudes Driving Re-Stalinization

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin has opened the way for memorials to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin by praising his role in the Soviet victory in World War II and silencing any discussion of Stalin’s repressions.
• The push to restore Stalin to a position of honor is both a top-down and bottom-up phenomenon, with many outside Moscow and in nominally opposition parties, such as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), taking the lead in attacking critics of Stalin, confident that they will not get in trouble given Putin’s pro-Stalin rhetoric.
• Putin benefits from the grassroots origins of re-Stalinization as long as he is perceived as taking a position close to theirs, but could be in trouble if he is perceived as deviating too far from his political base among Russians outside major cities.

Renewed memorialization of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in Russia and the silencing of his critics is both a top-down and bottom-up phenomenon. This trend reflects the rhetorical needs of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dictatorship as well as the attitudes of the nominally opposition Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and many ordinary Russians (The Moscow Times, July 15; Novaya Gazeta; MK.RU, September 4). Putin opened the way for positive perceptions of Stalin by praising him as a war leader and promoting the idea that the Russian past is the story of military victory after victory. Even though Putin has also referred to Stalin as a dictator, the Kremlin is cracking down on those who publicize Stalin’s repressions to ensure that they do not repeat in the present. The push to restore Stalin to a position of honor beyond criticism is still largely a grassroots operation, with many Russians outside the liberal big cities, especially leaders and members of the KPRF, taking the lead in attacking critics of Stalin and in erecting statues of him (Re: Russia, September 1). This combination of support from political elites and citizens from the regions means that the current re-Stalinization of Russia’s public sphere is vastly different from past efforts at de-Stalinization and re-Stalinization in Soviet times, and is likely to be even more complicated. Putin benefits from the re-Stalinization efforts of those below—Russians beyond Moscow’s ring road remain his political base—and is ultimately constrained by them. Putin’s political base beyond Moscow benefits him as long as they believe his positions remain close to theirs (Kasparov.ru, August 13, 2024; Svobodnaya Pressa, September 9).

Putin’s approach to Stalin, combining praise for the Soviet dictator’s role in building up the economy and winning World War II with muted criticism for his actions against the Soviet population, has been widely covered (Radio Svoboda, September 13, 2024). Little attention has been given to how Putin’s approach to Stalin is related to changes in the attitudes and actions of Russians outside of Moscow, especially members of the KPRF. A new, 6,000-word study authored by two Russian scholars now living in France, Aleksandra Arkhipova and Yury Lapshin, is therefore especially important (Re: Russia, September 1).

Since 1995, there have been “a minimum” of 213 new monuments in honor of Stalin in Russian villages and cities (Re: Russia, September 1). The number of new monuments to Stalin grew from only a handful in Yeltsin’s time to 15 new ones in the first seven months of 2025 alone. Arkhipova and Lapshin argue that this “re-memorialization has not been from the outset the result of any directed policy. Its sources are to be found somewhat lower and in the various initiatives reflected the various sides of the myth about Stalin,” including the myths “about ‘our great common past’” and “the exclusion from popular memory anything about Stalinist repressions” (Re: Russia, September 1). Putin, of course, has promoted the Soviet myth about a “great common past” and downplayed Stalin’s crimes against his people, weaving a perspective that polls suggest have been remarkably successful (Window on Eurasia, June 21, August 14). Arkhipova and Lapshin assert that many have developed a more positive image of Stalin than Putin, particularly Russians outside the major cities and members of the KPRF living in decaying industrial zones who recall an image of economic conditions under Stalin with nostalgia.   

These Russians remember Stalin’s regime as orderly and defined by robust government-supplied social welfare (Re: Russia, September 1). For them, Stalin’s rule looks better than Russia since the collapse of the Soviet system, and they believe that Putin has tried to restore some of what they fear has been lost. Grassroots efforts to erect statues, stage demonstrations, and denounce attacks on Stalin, often from the KPRF, have not been the result of a single Kremlin directive but rather reflect a subset of Russian feelings. These uncoordinated actions have evolved over time, ramping up as Putin devoted more attention to memorializing World War II, and especially after he seized Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014 and launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Arkhipova and Lapshin assert that Stalin’s supporters have concluded they can act with impunity in publicly valorizing Stalin’s rule, given that their attitudes are similar if not identical to the Kremlin’s (Re: Russia, September 1).  

According to Arkhipova and Lapshin, “Today, in the mid-2020s, the Kremlin does not need a new Stalin cult of personality, but it does need a cult of ‘the Great Victory,’ where Stalin as victor will fit, not harmed by a dark memory about his crimes” (Re: Russia, September 1). Putin’s focus on Russian victory rather than Stalin’s as an individual sets him apart from many Russians who want to further rehabilitate Stalin’s image as a communist leader. It should be obvious, Arkhipova and Lapshin say, that this is hardly in Putin’s interest. Such elevation of Stalin could become a threat to Putin, but would benefit the KPRF, which has found that its Stalinist position is its best recruiting tool.

Arkhipova and Lapshin conclude that “there are no signs that the restoration of the cult of Stalin is an intentional government policy. The Putin elite does not need it,” although it does need to revive Stalin as the leader of the Great Victory and as the creator of a paternalistic state (Re: Russia, September 1). Using Stalin’s victory in WWII to justify the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, opens the door to the “normalization” of Stalin and his “re-memorialization,” albeit not in as widespread a fashion as if the Kremlin adopted a clearer policy. Nonetheless, the regime’s growing emphasis on Stalin’s service to Russia “is becoming an instrument of the indirect normalization of a new wave of growing repression” (Re: Russia, September 1).